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ABSTRACT
By all accounts, the city has ceased to function as a 
cosmos, a coherent world which can offer meaning and 
validity to the lives of its inhabitants. If the ancient 
city presented the very image of order, the city since the 
advent of the Industrial Revolution has appeared to us as a 
jungle, a wilderness, a wasteland, an endless labyrinth—  
all images which suggest an essentially chaotic space, one 
which lacks any organizing principle or rationale.
Moreover, if the city once offered the individual the 
greatest possible realization of his freedom, it now 
appears as the space in which he is most alienated, the 
space of a meaningless and unnoticed existence.
Perhaps paradoxically, the demise of the city as an 
ordered world has coincided with the birth of the field of 
urban studies. However, in their search to discern a 
rational law which governs the processes of city 
development, urban theorists— with their overwhelmingly 
empiricist assumptions— have tended to simply reinforce the 
impression of chaos. It is finally the novelist— with his 
focus on the invisible life of the city— who seeks out the 
essential meaning of the modern city.
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Unlike the urban theorist, the novelist depicts the 
city not as a system which determines and delimits human 
existence but as a reality which is intimately bound up 
with human destiny itself. Feodor Dostoevsky's Crime and 
Punishment, Herman Melville's Pierre and William Faulkner's 
Light in August rediscover the city as the space of 
potentiality, as a dynamic reality which reflects the 
unfinalizability of human existence. Moreover, they show 
that the redemption of the modern individual lies not in 
his rejection of the city but in his reintegration with the 
human community that exists within it. In their themes and 
concerns, these novels find a paradigm in the Aeneld, 
Virgil's epic telling of the founding of Rome. Thus, they 
allow us to glimpse a continuity— which is typically 




As an object of knowledge, the city has proven 
extraordinarily elusive. "No one seems to know what it 
really is," Marc Eli Blanchard suggests in the 
introduction to his book, In Search of the City (10). At 
least part of the difficulty stems from the apparently 
protean nature of the city itself. Even a cursory survey 
of its history reveals an immense diversity of social 
organization— from the imperial civilizations of the 
ancient Near East to the independent city states which 
emerged in Europe during the late Middle Ages to the vast 
industrial societies of our own age. But if there are many 
kinds of cities, the one constant which allows us to 
recognize each of them as distinctly urban is not 
immediately visible.
Perhaps the city has always been a mystery, extending 
beyond the full reach of the human intellect. However, 
only since the advent of the Industrial Age have we begun 
to sense with some anxiety that it is actually unknowable—  
and this despite an abundance of studies produced over the 
last century and a half. In fact, the growth of urban 
studies as a discipline parallels rather than alleviates 
our uncertainty about the nature of urban life. In his
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prefatory remarks to Max Weber's pioneering work The Citv.
Don Martindale complains that urban theorists have told us
everything "except the informing principle that creates the
city itself" (11). "One is reminded," he writes, "of
Pirandello's piece Six Characters in Search of An Author.
Everything is present except the one precise essential that
gives life to the whole. When all is said and done the
question remains, What is the city?" (11).*
Most obviously, the confusion is an effect of the
increased complexity of urban life itself. Cities, Richard
Sennett suggests, underwent an unprecedented transformation
at the hands of the Industrial Revolution:
They became immensely larger than anything known since
the time of Rome, and their growth came not from
within, through internal population change, but from 
without, as a result of agricultural changes that 
either encouraged or, in fewer cases, forced men of 
the countryside to move to town. This human 
migration, unsettling in itself, was conjoined to a 
new means of labor by which the experience of time, 
motion, and human relatedness became altered in men's 
lives. (3-4)
In fact, it was as a result of these changes that the field
of urban studies emerged in the first place. Sennett notes
that the city— while one of the oldest artifacts of human 
civilization— was not regarded as an object of study in its 
own right until the nineteenth century. It was taken by 
most thinkers "to be the mirror of a broader reality, more
1. Martindale's remarks include a useful survey and 
evaluation of the major schools of urban theory. Blanchard 
also has insightful comments about the sociological 
approach to the city in the introduction to his book.
appropriate as a focus of thought" (3). Only with the 
radical changes wrought on the urban environment by the 
Industrial Revolution was a different perspective deemed 
necessary. As Sennett puts it, the complexity of the new 
environment was "something to be explored as a problem of 
itself, something that could not be understood by the use 
of a few easy labels or categories" (4).
Underlying this evaluation is the assumption that the 
mode of understanding of earlier thinkers was not 
sufficiently rigorous for the purpose of investigating the 
complexities of the changed world. The new discipline 
would approach the city not as a vague image of some larger 
reality but as a strictly empirical phenomenon with its own 
laws which— like those of nature itself— could be observed 
with scientific objectivity.
As Eric Voegelin reminds us, however, to approach the 
human world is never to approach a world of raw fact: "man 
does not wait to have his life explained to him, and when 
the theorist approaches social reality he finds the field 
pre-empted by what may be called the self-interpretation of 
society" (New Science 27). Moreover, in the case of the 
cities of archaic culture, that self-interpretation is 
precisely the reverse of the empirical understanding which 
urban theory has tended to bring to the city.
Sacred and Profane Space
Archaic man, Mircea Eliade notes, built his cities
according to celestial models. The Babylonian cities, for
example, "had their archetypes in the constellations;
Sippara in Cancer, Nineveh in Ursa Major, Assur in
Arcturus, etc." (Cosmos 8). By repeating the archetype,
the city is constituted as sacred space. It becomes
something altogether other than the profane, manifesting
the presence of a transcendent reality which is opposed to
the empty homogeneity— the unreality— of profane space.
For archaic man, in other words, the "participation by
urban cultures in an archetypal model is what gives them
their reality and their validity" (10). The city is more
than an empirical phenomenon. Its very form— that is, its
innermost reality— is a consequence of the city's relation
to a world that transcends itself.
Seen in this light, the city cannot be taken as simply
an object of knowledge, something to be observed from the
outside. Moreover, from its inception, Lewis Mumford
suggests, the city
enlarged all the dimensions of life. Beginning as a 
representation of the cosmos, a means of bringing down 
heaven to earth, the city became a symbol of the 
possible. . . .  It brought into existence realities 
that might have remained latent for an indefinite time 
in more soberly governed small communities, pitched to 
lower expectations and unwilling to make exertions 
that transcended both their workaday habits and their 
mundane hopes. (City 31)
The city, Mumford implies, effects a defamiliarization of 
reality, an opening up of the imagination to previously 
unseen or forgotten dimensions of existence. Its status is 
not that of an inert body which can be viewed from the 
objective standpoint of the external world. Rather, the 
city itself is an embodied world, a concrete universe which 
gives its inhabitants a reality larger than that of their 
individual lives. As Bernd Jager suggests, "a city, when 
properly inhabited, will not merely remain something seen, 
it will itself become a source of vision and light 
according to which we see" (241).
As these remarks imply, a constitutive— if not 
definitive— element of urban culture is its capacity to 
represent a reality other than itself. The city offers a 
sign of another world, a world not immediately apparent 
when we are immersed in the mundane activities of everyday 
existence. It is perhaps misleading, however, to call the 
city a symbol. Most obviously, it is a concrete reality, 
whereas the symbol tends to be understood as insubstantial, 
a mere sign of something which is itself entirely absent.
It was this misconception which Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
attempted to counter when he offered his account of the 
symbol: "it always partakes of the Reality which it renders 
intelligible; and while it enumerates the whole, abides 
itself as a living part in that Unity, of which it is the 
representation" (30). If we accept Coleridge's definition,
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the city— or a least that which Eliade describes— is indeed
symbolic. That is, it expresses its participation in a
whole which transcends its own particular existence.2 The
city is an embodied world.
Urban space which possesses this symbolic quality
exhibits a qualitative difference from mere empirical
space. It is a product of what Gaston Bachelard has called
the material Imagination: "Space that has been seized upon
by the imagination cannot remain indifferent space subject
to the measures and estimates of the surveyor" (xxxii).
Once imagined, space is opened up, taken beyond its
natural, quantifiable dimensions. It reveals a reality
which exceeds its own empirical boundaries. Such space,
Ivan Illich remarks, "sings reality":
The classical town is first and foremost a ritual song 
of this sort. Its wellspring is dreams. Every urban 
culture seems to have its own ritual proceedings 
through which this dream of "life as an indwelling 
flow" is reflected in the social representation of in­
habitable space. An agglomeration of huts or tents 
turns into a settlement or town only when its space 
has been recognized ceremonially as substantially 
other than the rural expanse, when it is opposed to 
the "outside," when the paths that transverse its 
space are recognized as roads. (12)
It is the ritual creation of space which makes the city
more than an arbitrary or random entity, which gives it an
2. In fact, Voegelin uses precisely this notion of symbol 
to describe the order of representation of archaic 
civilization: "Cosmological symbolization is neither a 
theory nor an allegory. It is the mythical expression of 
the participation, experienced as real, of the order of 
society in the divine being that also orders the cosmos" 
(Order and History 27).
orientation. Through the ritual of founding, Eliade notes, 
the city is established as the "axis mundi." the center of 
the universe, the meeting point of heaven and earth (Sacred 
36-47).
Although the conception of space was modified with the 
emergence of both Greek philosophy and Christianity, it 
retained its symbolic or ritual quality through the Middle 
Ages and into the Renaissance. Only with the advent of 
modern science in the seventeenth century did space come to 
be understood in an entirely new way. Of course, the 
empirical sciences existed before then, but as a 
subordinate part of an entire body of knowledge that was 
given direction by the principles of philosophy. By 
contrast, the new epistemology— as Nicholas Berdyaev 
suggests— means "carrying the criteria of science over into 
other spheres of spiritual life quite foreign to science" 
(Meaning 24). It assumes that there is a single method for 
everything, that "science is the supreme criterion of the 
whole life of the spirit, that everything must be subject 
to the order established by science, that its permissions 
or prohibitions have decisive meaning, everywhere" (24).
With this new epistemology came a view of the physical 
universe that was radically different than that of the 
older cosmology. As Alfred North Whitehead states, it 
posited
the ultimate fact of an irreducible brute matter, or
material, spread throughout space in a flux of
configurations. In itself such a material is 
senseless, valueless, purposeless. It does just what 
it does do, following a fixed routine imposed by 
external relations which do not spring from the nature 
of its being. (23)
Thus, the kind of space which for archaic culture was
unreal— homogeneous, unformed, chaotic space— was taken by
science as the only valid reality. For archaic man, space
«
had to be founded before it could be lived in; that is to
say, it had to be differentiated.3 As Eliade remarks, "it
is the break effected in space that allows the world to be
constituted, because it reveals the fixed point, the
central axis for all future orientation" (21).
The homogeneous space which arises with the new
science, Illich indicates, "constitutes a continuum which
was formally not experienced, a continuum that is neither
interior nor exterior, neither right nor left" (21).
Within this geometrical continuum, "'Home* and 'abroad,'
'dwelling' and 'Wilderness' are nothing but regions or
areas or territories selected from the same expanse" (21).
It was just this kind of undifferentiated space which
Charles Dickens attempted to represent in Coketown, his
imagined archetype of the nineteenth-century industrial
cities of northern England:
You saw nothing in Coketown but what was severely 
workful. If the members of the religious persuasion
3. Illich offers a description of the founding or 
inauguration ritual, as does Joseph Rykwert in The Idea of 
a Town: the Anthropology of Urban Form in Rome. Italy and 
the Ancient World.
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built a chapel there— as the members of eighteen 
religious persuasions had done— they made it a pious 
warehouse of red brick, with sometimes {but this is 
only in highly ornamented examples) a bell in a 
birdcage on the top of it. The solitary exception was 
the new Church; a stuccoed edifice with a square 
pinnacle like four florid wooden legs. All the public 
inscriptions in the town were painted alike in severe 
characters of black and white. The jail might have 
been the infirmary, the infirmary might have been the 
jail, the town hall might have been either, or both, 
or anything else, for anything that appeared to the 
contrary in the graces of their construction. Fact, 
fact, fact, everywhere in the material aspect of the 
town; fact, fact, everywhere in the immaterial. (17)
If space that has been imagined "concentrates being within
limits that protect," as Bachelard suggests, Coketown
appears endless like the "interminable serpents of smoke"
which trail "forever and ever" from its tall chimneys
(xxxii). Its infinite quality, however, does not mean that
it is ontologically substantial. In fact, Coketown is the
most closed and delimited of worlds, its homogeneous
expanse the effect of a radical reduction, a collapsing of
the immeasurable forms of reality into a sea of gray
matter. Its lack of delineation means that it is a space
in which everything is interchangeable and nothing
possesses its own value. It is at once city and
wilderness, savage and civilized. As Illich suggests— and
Dickens illustrates— to attempt to dwell in this kind of
space is a "nightmare" (21).
Dickens, however, locates the radical nature of the
new industrial cities not so much in changes at the
strictly empirical level— size, population composition,
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economic conditions— as in the absence of form which 
resulted, at least in part, from those changes. The same 
point is implicit in Mumford's prefatory remarks to The 
City in History: "This book opens with a city that was, 
symbolically, a world; it closes with a world that has 
become, in many practical aspects a city" (xi). Although 
the city has grown as a fact— a growth which has been 
called urbanization— its capacity to offer its inhabitants 
a coherent world has declined.
An obvious factor in this decline is the rise of 
nationalism.* "The modern city," Martindale indicates, "is 
losing its external and formal structure. Internally it is 
in a state of decay while the new community represented by 
the nation grows at its expense" (62). In fact,
Christopher Dawson has argued that the industrial cities 
which arose in the nineteenth century were themselves mere 
"organs of a nationalist-imperialist movement of economic 
expansion" rather than "self-conscious and self-determining 
societies" (192).5 With the revolution of transportation
4. In Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism. Benedict Anderson links the rise of 
the nation with the replacement of the older cosmology by a 
scientific one and, in particular with the emergence of a 
secular understanding of time: "The idea of a sociological 
organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty 
time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which 
also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down 
(or up) history" (31).
5. In The Human Condition. Hannah Arendt argues that the 
terms nation and economy are almost synonymous for modern 
people: "we see the body of peoples and political
11
and communication in the middle of the nineteenth century
and the consequent realization of the lalssez faire ideal
of the world market, the character of the industrial city
was complete:
All the ancient limitations in the size of the city 
were removed, and the last links that bound the 
industrial town to its rural environment were broken. 
The city now lived entirely for and by the world 
market. It drew its food from one continent, the raw 
materials for Its industries from another, and 
exported the finished product, perhaps, to a third. 
(193)
However, Illich notes that in the classical tradition the 
site of the city is essentially a revealed location: "Host 
founders are led by a sign in a dreamlike state to the site 
where the new town will be. Sometimes a wounded game 
animal, a strange bird, a cloud, or lightning takes him to 
the spot chosen by the gods" (13). Whatever the case, the 
"dream of foundation is always pregnant with destiny, 
though only obscurely" (13). The industrial city, by 
contrast, appears to be an entirely arbitrary reality, 
which lacks the rootedness of older cities. Whereas cities 
like Rome and Athens are inseparably linked to place (we 
can not imagine them in other locations), the industrial 
city can appear anywhere— from the midwestern United States 
to Central America to the Siberian hinterland— without
communities in the image of a family whose everyday affairs 
have to be taken care of by a gigantic, nation-wide 
administration of house-keeping" (29). As Arendt 
indicates, the science "that corresponds to this 
development is no longer political science but 'national 
economy'" (29).
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surprising us. In other words, whereas the ancient city is 
informed by place, the industrial city is merely located. 
The City as Empirical Object
Perhaps, then, the modern city is unknowable because it has
no essence, because there is no informing principle which
can be discerned beneath its sprawling expanse. If older
cities offered their inhabitants a coherent world or
cosmos, the modern city may be simply a chaos.
Paradoxically, in their efforts to present a
rigorously objective response to the changed urban
environment, urban theorists have tended to reinforce this
very impression. Don Martindale singles out the ecological
theory of the city for particular mention in this regard.
It was governed, he suggests,
by a sort of injunction: Go ye forth and gather facts. 
This favored the accumulation of a wide variety of 
data. Of course, this was an advantage won only at a 
great price, for ever and again the study of the city 
reduces to a mechanical inventory, the social problems 
of an urban environment. (30)
In fact, from the beginning the ecological theory was
oriented not toward the social life of the city but toward
its geo-physical aspects, "to the establishment of the
properties of various zones— natural areas, habitats, and
what not— too little attention to the life that produced
these properties" (29).
The psychological theory of the city, Martindale
argues, is no less mechanistic. It tends to adopt
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a simple-minded psychological approach just as ecology 
led to an over-simplification on a physical level. 
There is a strong tendency for the relevant world of 
action to be reduced to mere matters of increase, 
density, and heterogeneity of population which have 
psychological effects. (42)
Ultimately, the outcome of both theories is the same. The
city is reduced to isolated facts and statistics, to that
portion of reality that can be quantified on pie-charts,
overlay maps, diagrams and tables. Indeed, the empirical
approach to the city appears to be informed by the very
epistemology which so profoundly influenced the emerging
cities in the first place. The reconceptualization of
space as homogeneous, geometric expanse which science
effected in the seventeenth century has been uncritically
accepted, in many cases, by urban theorists.
However, if urban theorists have reduced the city to
an inventory of facts, they have not been able to decide
which facts are relevant for its definition. As we have
just seen, some have foregrounded the geophysical aspects
of the city, while others treat demographics as the
determining factor in urban life. Blanchard points to
similar differences within the sociological approach to the
city:
As a socioeconomic system, it warrants purely 
sociological or economic interpretations emphasizing 
the existence and power of groups and reading the city
as the sum of interrelated contexts for these groups.
. . . Other sociologists yet use the urban phenomenon 
merely as a political or cultural background to the 
study of the evolution of family units. (3-4)
That "sociologists can never agree on a set of common 
criteria for the study of the city," as Blanchard suggests, 
is hardly surprising (4). Facts themselves do not reveal 
their own significance. Rather, they take on meaning from 
a context, a coherent whole within which each element 
acquires its proper value. Yet, it is that context which 
is ignored when sociologists and urbanists approach the 
city in its own right, as an object isolated for the 
purposes of scientific investigation.
Not all urban theorists, however, have accepted the 
dictates of science at face value. In fact, over the last 
few decades, some have shown a willingness to criticize the 
kind of positivist assumptions which have tended to mark 
the genre of urban theory as a whole. Among the most 
notable of these is Jane Jacobs.
In her first work, The Economy of Cities. Jacobs 
questions the unique status usually attributed to the 
changes which cities underwent in the nineteenth century.
In particular, she challenges the notion that the kind of 
exponential growth which they experienced was entirely 
unprecedented in the city's history. That a city is 
"large," Jacobs argues, is a reflection not so much of its 
actual size but of the fact that certain serious practical 
problems in its economy have been greatly intensified by 
size (103). Thus, the great cities of the nineteenth 
century were deemed large because "without electricity,
with their high infant death-rates and their tremendous 
number of orphans, with their immense number of dray 
animals, their stinking stables, their flies, streets 
running with horse urine and manure, they were highly 
impractical settlements" (103). However, Jacobs suggests, 
they were no more impractical than "the cities of the 
fourth or fifth millennia B.C. must have been when their 
population outgrew the water supplied by streams and 
springs" or than "the Renaissance cities" must have become 
when "they experienced a population explosion of draft 
animals at a time when Europe was not yet cultivating 
foddercrops" (103-4). Those cities were as "large" as the 
ones of more recent times because they were equally 
impractical.
Jacobs goes on to suggest that impracticality is not 
only a constant feature of developing cities, but the very 
means which enables that development: "Moderate-sized 
cities— what are now deemed to be 'cities of practical 
size'— are practical only because problems were solved in 
the past in cities that had grown to 'impractical' size" 
(104). Large and rapidly growing cities, in other words, 
are not in themselves problems. While such cities 
"magnify" the practical problems that already exist in an 
economy, "they can also solve them by means of new 
technology" (104). Thus, against the commonly held opinion
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of urban planners,6 Jacobs maintains that expanding cities 
are "uniquely valuable to economic life" not "in spite of 
their inefficiency and impracticality but rather because 
they are inefficient and impractical" (86).
As an isolated fact, then, the size of a city reveals 
little or nothing: "What seems big for one period is small 
for another" (20). Moreover, the city may seem bewildering 
when "too large," and may also provoke solutions which 
ultimately stifle rather than ameliorate urban life. It is 
only when the whole economy of the city is placed in an 
analogical relation to the economies of earlier cities that 
the real significance of its size emerges. What we find, 
Jacobs shows, is not simply that size is relative but that 
a large city is "always an impractical settlement" (103).
6. Raisa Broner-Bauer offers an Insightful discussion of 
the origin and nature of urban planning in her essay "Lost 
Utopia: Thoughts on the Dilemma of the Modern City."
She notes that modern urban planning was born not at the 
same time as industrial society but afterwards. In its 
early stages, it "was typified by the fact that it proposed 
improvements only at the moment when, as a consequence of a 
massive transformation process, industrializing urban 
societies had been driven into an intolerable and virtually 
insoluble state of crisis" (16). As a result, nineteenth- 
century urban planning reflects a crisis mentality. On the 
one hand, there were those like Robert Owen, Charles 
Fourier and Jean-Baptiste Godin who wanted to transcend 
industrial society altogether and build an ideal society.
On the other hand, in the latter half of the century, city 
officials attempted to control urban development with laws 
which placed restrictions on the right to build, density, 
building height, etc. As Broner-Bauer indicates, "the 
effect of this legislation was rather depressing— the 
formation of monotonous housing areas, the beginning of a 
certain kind of urban development process, the final 
results of which are all too familiar to us today" (19).
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Of course, In and of Itself this knowledge does not make
the problems of a large city disappear. But it does put
them in perspective and allows for solutions more creative
than that of simply limiting urban growth.
Although Jacobs's discussion is limited to a
particular aspect of urban life— its economy— it suggests
an important general principle for the study of the city.
The nineteenth-century industrial city is typically
understood as a radically new phenomenon. When viewed
analogically, however, its shared characteristics with
cities with which it might otherwise appear to have nothing
in common are revealed. Analogy, in other words, allows
one to identify a historical precedent for cities which at
first glance may seem entirely new. In fact, Jacobs
suggests that the city of the present always contains
traces of past cities:
every city has a direct economic ancestry, a literal 
economic parentage, in a still older city or cities.
. . . The spark of city economic life is passed from 
older cities to younger. It lives on today in cities 
whose ancestors have long since gone to dust. (179)
For Jacobs, then, the city is never an orphan, Isolated in
the historical present. Its very life is the effect of a
prior genealogy, of ancestral cities, the traces of which
it still carries within itself.
18
The Invisible City
According to Oswald Spengler, it is "the presence of a 
soul" rather than size which distinguishes the city from 
the village:
Every primitive population lives wholly as peasant and 
son of the soil— the being "City" does not exist for 
it. That which in externals develops from the village 
is not the city, but the market, a mere meeting point 
of rural-life interests. Here there can be no 
question of a separate existence. (91)
Of course, to suggest that the city has a soul is— to a
certain extent— to speak analogically. If the city shapes
and forms the inner worlds of its inhabitants, it also
reflects and expresses their collective psyche. Indeed,
one could hardly posit the soul of the city apart from the
soul of man. The two exist in a relation of symbiosis,
each inhabiting and informing the other.
In fact, it was Plato who first drew the analogy
between the city and the soul of the individual. According
to his familiar formulation in the Republic, the city is
man writ large: "Societies aren't made of sticks and
stones, but of men whose individual characters, by turning
the scale one way or another, determine the direction of
the whole" (Bk. 8, 1). Thus, the character of the city can
be understood analogically, as an extension of the type of
individual who prevails within it.
Plato's theory amounts to a historicization of the
city. In its earliest form, as we have seen, the city is
essentially a utopian conception, an attempt to manifest an
ideal order in the here and now. With Plato comes the 
recognition that the ideal is only ever imperfectly 
realized in human societies, that the city is as much a 
reflection of the fallen human condition as of a celestial 
paradise. Thus, in the Republic. Plato provides a typology 
of imperfect societies— each of which corresponds to a type 
of flawed individual. However, he did not completely sever 
the link between the ideal and historical city. Rather, as 
Voegelin indicates, Plato measured the different human 
types that find expression in different social orders 
against the true type of humanity, the wise man (62). In 
fact, it is only because of "the discovery of a true order 
of the human psyche" and "the desire of expressing the true 
order in the social environment of the discoverer" that 
"differences of social order come into view as differences 
of human types at all" (62).
Thus, Plato did not discount the notion of the ideal 
city. On the contrary, he articulated a more comprehensive 
ideal, one founded not simply on the order of the visible 
heavens but on an invisible order within man himself. The 
cities of history— although they fall short of this ideal, 
are nevertheless linked to it by way of analogy. Moreover, 
they are linked to each other, since each of them reflects 
a human reality which— although it shifts and modifies 
itself with each passing era— in some sense remains 
fundamentally the same.
Plato's perspective on the city bears an important 
resemblance to that of the novelist. Unlike the natural 
scientist, who works to establish the laws of the external 
world, the novelist offers a view of reality which is 
fundamentally anthropological. Thus, the city he 
represents is not a world which transcends man— although in 
actuality it may appear to do just that— but one which is 
intimately bound up with him. As a system, the city may 
lack a human face. But for the novelist, its deepest 
reality is irreducibly human, a complex manifestation of 
the invisible life within man himself.
The business of the artist, D.H. Lawrence suggests,
"is to reveal the relation between man and his 
circumambient universe, at the living moment" (108). Thus, 
the poet's focus is neither the city-in-itself nor man-in- 
himself but the relation between man and the city or, as 
Plato might say, the city within man. In the modern city, 
however, that relation is hidden, a secret which its stony 
facades seems to withhold, a riddle whose answer lies 
buried beneath its monumental structures. The city appears 
to us as precisely that environment from which humanity is 
alienated, and with which it has no living relation. But 
to treat the city as a system independent of man, as urban 
theorists have tended to do, is to render it entirely 
arbitrary. It is to accord the city a life wholly its own,
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a life which supersedes and controls man own's existence,
leaving him helpless, a victim of his own creation.
For the novelist, however, the city is never
arbitrary. If it is disordered, it is because it reflects
a confusion within human beings themselves. It is tempting
to suggest, as Oswald Spengler does, that the cities of our
time are soulless, that they represent the denial, the
annihilation of the life within. But, as Michel de Certeau
has suggested, the totalizing strategies of the urban
system never quite complete themselves:
Beneath the discourses that ideologize the city, the 
ruses and combinations of powers that have no readable 
identity proliferate; without points where one can 
take hold of them, without rational transparency, they 
are impossible to administer. (15)
It is this subterranean reality— the invisible city— which
the novelist seeks out. This poetic movement constitutes a
kind of archaeology or, as Jacques Maritain suggests, "a
kind of divination, . . . that intercommunication between
the inner being of things and the inner being of the human
Self" (3). Thus, the reality which the novelist presents
is not the visible structure of the city— its sociological
composition, the interactions between its classes, its
economic exchanges, its system of laws— but its inner form.
He finds that form in a human soul— a soul alone, restless,
fragmented, suffering, often sinful, yet searching for a
reality which can endow its existence with meaning and
validity.
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This mode of understanding, however, is not 
characteristic of every novel which deals with the city. 
"Realism," as Elizabeth Lowe notes, "is the predominant 
mode of city fiction" (44). Of course, to the extent that 
every novelist is concerned with the representation of 
reality, all novelists are realists. But as Flannery 
O'Connor suggests, "the realism of each novelist will 
depend on his view of the ultimate reaches of reality"
(40).
In its pure form, realism offers a view which is
essentially historical in nature. It attempts to produce a
complete and faithful depiction of a particular society at
a particular moment in time. "What is demanded," Donald
Fanger— citing Guy de Maupassant— notes,
is an imaginative synthesis of the facts of life . . . 
in which imaginative selection of "facts of a constant 
and unimpeachable veracity" is the means, but the 
synthesis itself is the end, "the complete Illusion of 
the real." (11)
For the nineteenth-century novelist, the European city—
which at the time was experiencing an influx of population
from all quarters— provided an ideal tonos for this kind of
synthesis. Encompassing every class, profession, age, and
character, the city presented a microcosm of society as a
whole.
A hallmark of the realistic novel, then, Is its 
concern with "contemporaneity," a concern which Fanger 
notes is reflected in the titles of "nineteenth-century
23
realism's typical productions, from Balzac's L*Envers de 
1'histolre contemporalne through Stendhal's Le Rouge et le 
Noir: Chronigue du XIXe siecle to Trollope's The Wav We 
Live Now" (9). Of course, comedy— itself an important 
source for the novelistic tradition— "had always worked 
with the familiar detail of contemporary mores" (9). But 
with the novel, Fanger suggests, contemporary society is no 
longer simply "a norm against which to measure individual 
comic aberrations, but a subject calling in its own right 
for investigation; not a milieu, but an aspect of 
character" (9).
Thus, the realistic novel attempts on a literary 
plane^ what the urban theorist attempts from the 
standpoint of science— to represent "a particular social 
reality in its uniqueness" (9).fl
7. The link between these two "genres" becomes even closer 
in the light of one of the primary characteristics of the 
realistic novel, its attempt to efface its status as 
literary. See Fanger 5-7. But for a more comprehensive 
discussion of this aspect of realism Roland Barthes's essay 
"The Reality Effect" and his longer work S/Z. a reading of 
Balzac's classic realist narrative "Sarrasine," are 
important sources.
8. As Fred Schwarzbach indicates, much of the criticism on 
the relation between the city and literature shares this 
epistemology: "there is a 'real' entity, the city and the 
essential experience of its residents at some particular 
historical moment, which is represented and commented on in 
some works of literature" ("Victorian" 330). Elizabeth 
Lowe identifies the same "realist" epistemology in two of 
the major approaches to the study of the city: "The 
historical approach uses fiction to supplement nonliterary 
sources for historical information. The sociological 
approach uses the novel as an illustration of the nature of 
urban society" (43).
A central category in the novelist's attempt to
achieve this kind of representation is the "typical." As
Fanger notes, comedy— especially in its satirical vein—
"found types in the unrelieved presence of certain traits"
(9). Such traits, in other words, were typical not of a
particular society but of a human condition— a very fallen
one— which transcended time and place. But with realism,
the typical becomes the mark or symbol of those traits
which are unique to the society the novelist represents.
Whereas comedy found the typical in universal qualities,
the realistic novel makes the type the individual stamp of
a whole society. Thus, Fanger notes, "a favorite device
for entitling a realistic novel" is the name: from Moll
Flanders through Anna Karenina, "it suggests a unique
phenomenon, an unrepeatable Individual" (10).
In comedy, the type is easily identified because it is
universal. But for the realistic novel it is something
which must to be discovered. The type embodies everything
which makes a society different from other societies.
Thus, it can only be discerned with difficulty. "What
makes a type a type," George Lukacs writes,
is not its average quality, nor its mere individual 
being, however profoundly conceived; what makes it a 
type is that in it all the humanly and socially 
essential determinants are present on their highest 
level of development, in the ultimate unfolding of the 
possibilities latent in them, in extreme presentation 
of their extremes, rendering concrete the peaks and 
limits of men and epochs. (6)
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In the realistic novel, then, the type represents the 
essence, the very core which exists at the heart of a
society or epoch. But that essence is the ultimate outcome
of a historical process, an unfolding which transcends the 
lives of individuals. While the type expresses the 
individuality of a society, it posits that quality as the
product of history rather than of men.
Clearly, the category of the typical in the realistic 
novel differs significantly from Plato's use of it. In The 
Republic, as we have seen, the type is used to identify 
differences between societies. But those differences only 
become evident in the light of an ideal society which 
transcends the processes of history. In the realistic 
novel, by contrast, history itself is the ultimate horizon. 
The typical character is understood not as the analogue of 
a more perfect type but as the embodiment of the historical 
forces which produced the society he represents; history 
exhausts his existence. Thus, the realistic novel 
expresses a new type of man, the man of the masses, the man 
whose life ends rather than begins with the limits of 
history.
Dostoesvky, Melville and Faulkner
This study offers readings of three novels which depart in 
significant ways from the tradition of pure realism. My 
argument is that these works— Feodor Dostoevsky's Crime and 
Punishment. Herman Melville's Pierre and William Faulkner's
Light in August— are among those which best express the 
essential meaning of the modern city, which uncover its 
hidden reality, a reality which the purely realistic novel 
— because of its own inherent limitation— cannot 
acknowledge. That limitation is the same one which has 
frequently prevented the social sciences from fully 
grasping the nature of the city— a skepticism about 
anything which does not lie within the bounds of the 
empirically possible or which is not reducible to some 
historical or narrowly psychological determinant.
Dostoevsky, Melville and Faulkner are essentially 
explorers of the real. They uncover dimensions of reality 
which the scientific epistemologies of the last two 
centuries have dismissed, but which have remained present 
to the consciousness of the artist and the poet. This 
visionary capacity enables them to present an understanding 
of the modern city which is more global than that usually 
allowed for by the field of scientific knowledge. Each of 
these novelists effects a destabilization of the city, or 
of our typical perceptions of it. The city is no longer 
seen as a static entity, isolated in time and space. It is 
placed in new, dynamic relations with other aspects of 
reality, new contexts— both temporal and spatial— which 
shed light on its nature. Most importantly, the city is 
given meaning. It emerges not as an arbitrary system which 
transcends the lives of its inhabitants but as a reality
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whose future is intimately bound up with human destiny 
itself. Admittedly, the depiction of the city which these 
novelists offer often seems bleak. But it is not one which 
leads us into despair. Quite the reverse, the city is 
presented as a space still to be determined, whose status 
is that of a continual becoming. The city can either go 
forward or backward, grow or stagnate, condemn or renew 
itself. Its destiny is not fixed but lies in the hands of 
men and the gods.
Critics of the novel have not agreed on a single term 
to express the difference of novelists like Dostoevsky, 
Melville and Faulkner from those who belong to the purely 
realistic tradition. Fanger argues that Dostoevsky 
represents the culmination of a "romantic realism" which 
was "developed separately by Balzac, Dickens and Gogol" 
(ix). What distinguishes the romantic realist from the 
realist is that the former's attempt "to record the real 
world"— an attempt which he shares with the realist— "is 
shaped by his vision of that world, and his vision is 
inevitably a function of his autobiography— as personal and 
inimitable" (15). "The result," Fanger suggests, "is a 
principled deformation of reality; its familiar contours 
are presented to us, but in a new manipulated light" (15).
Melville's Pierre has puzzled generations of critics 
because it does not conform to the conventions of realism. 
Its "deformation of reality" has typically been understood
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not as "principled" but as insane, bizarre, morbid and
perverse. Some critics, however, have argued that Melville
was actually satirizing the conventions of popular fiction
and, in particular, those of the Gothic romance. Brian
Higgins and Hershel Parker, for example, point to the
overblown style of the novel's opening lines:
In Book I, "Pierre Just Emerging from His Teens," the 
first words of dialogue are ludicrous, by realistic 
standards, and there seems some fairy-tale quality 
about the whole situation. The style is often pseudo- 
Elizabethan bombast, often near the cloying 
romanticism of female novels of Melville’s own time. 
(245)
More recently, the insights of deconstruction have led 
critics to argue that the novel's concern is a more 
fundamental one— whether art can ever adequately represent 
reality. My own view is closer to that of Rowland 
Sherrill, who identifies a "prophetic" quality in all of 
Melville's fiction, a quality which suggests not so much a 
capacity for clairvoyance as an attempt by Melville "to 
issue a radical critique of the cultural alternatives of 
his time and to penetrate to the fundamental levels of 
human nature and experience" (3).
Faulkner is most often identified with the tradition of 
high modernism, a tradition which— with its stylistic 
innovations— represents a radical departure from the 
depoeticized fiction of realism. However, for the purpose 
of characterizing the nature of Faulkner’s vision, it is 
perhaps more useful to see him— as he has been seen in
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recent years— in relation to the magical realism of the 
Latin American novelists. The expanded reality which they 
depict seems more akin to Faulkner's world, with its mythic 
proportions, than does the kind of self-referential world 
typically associated with the modernist novel.
Perhaps "visionary" is the term which best encompasses 
the three novels discussed in this study. But whatever 
their designation, they share a number of characteristics 
which deserve mention.
1. The hero is not obviously typical of his society. 
In fact, he is defined precisely by his eccentricity, by an 
action or mark which has placed him outside the bounds of 
the "usual" or the "familiar." Either an exile from the 
city like Faulkner's Joe Christmas or a wanderer within it 
like Dostoevsky's Raskolnikov, the hero is someone who has 
transgressed the social code, a criminal who has been 
rejected by the community or who has rejected it. Their 
crimes— Raskolnikov's murder, Joe Christmas's mixed blood 
and Pierre's illicit relationship with his half-sister—  
make these heroes the possessors of a secret knowledge, a 
knowledge which— because it cannot be revealed— only 
increases their isolation from others. The paradox of the 
hero, however, is that his very estrangement from society 
makes him a more profound symbol of its inner fragmentation 
and disorder than its more typical representatives.
2. More than simply an embodiment of the historical 
conditions of his particular society, the hero is an 
analogue of certain archetypal outsiders. In Raskolnikov, 
we find echoes of Cain, the founder of the first city and 
the first murderer; in Pierre's blindness and in the 
incestuous quality of his relations with his mother and 
half-sister, we are inevitably reminded of Oedipus; and the 
sacrificial murder of Joe Christmas makes him a version of 
the Christ-figure. Although none of these heroes are 
straightforward repetitions of their originals, their 
experience acquires coherence and unity in relation to the 
archetypal patterns of action.9 In fact, as a result of 
this relation, the figure of the hero is universalized. He 
becomes the representative not simply of his own epoch but 
of common humanity.
3. The hero's status as outsider places him on the 
threshold of two worlds, between the familiar and the 
strange, the known and the unknown, the routine and the 
unexpected, the rational and the mysterious, the actual and 
the ideal. Thus, his experience is understood within the
9. Fanger notes that the recourse to archetypes was a 
characteristic feature of Romanticism which "had made much of 
the outlaw, the noble criminal, of whom the first claimed 
ancestor was Milton's Satan and the first nineteenth-century 
exemplars the rash of Byronic heroes" (21). What Dostoevsky 
and the Romantic realists achieved, "while preserving both 
the type and its mythical aura, was to renew its appeal and 
deepen its relevance to contemporary life, by discovering a 
milieu that would give it support and substantiation" (21).
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context not simply of his own social world but of that 
other world upon the verge of which he continually stands. 
As the Russian critic Mikhail Bakhtin has indicated, time 
on the threshold "is crisis time, in which a moment is 
equal to years, decades, even to a 'billion years'" (169). 
At the threshold, the hero must act— either for change and 
rebirth or stagnation and death. Pierre and Joe Christmas 
are tragic figures because at crucial moments they can only 
repeat the gestures of the past; they are incapable of the 
renewal which the threshold holds out to them. But for 
Raskolnikov and Gail Hightower— one of the other two 
protagonists in Faulkner's Light and August, the threshold 
represents the turn toward comedy, a movement from 
isolation to community, decay to regeneration, death to new 
life.
4. The city points beyond itself. In its own right, 
it is radically incomplete, a foreshadowing or prefiguring 
of things to come. Thus, like the hero himself, the city 
exists on the threshold, at the moment of crisis. "The 
modern vision of the city," Elizabeth Lowe writes, "is 
apocalyptic" (46). What this means for novelists like 
Dostoevsky, Melville and Faulkner, however, is not that the 
city faces inevitable decline or destruction but that it 
stands on the verge of its own fulfillment, a fulfillment—  
either positive or negative— which depends on the responses 
of the hero himself. The realism of these novelists,
then, is essentially prophetic. Its purpose is to 
represent the city not simply in the static present but at 
the point of its ultimate self-realization. According to 
Lukacs, the realist "radically thinks through to the end 
the necessities of social reality, beyond their normal 
limits, beyond even their feasibility" (31). For these 
novelists, however, that "end" is not so much a historical 
as a metaphysical realization. They depict the city as it 
passes into eternity.
5. The fate of the city depends in a special way on 
its relation to the feminine. Thus, women occupy a central 
role in these novels, carrying within themselves the seeds 
of an unrealized future, a new life rooted in compassion, 
forgiveness, community and love. In Lena Grove, who is 
literally pregnant with destiny, Faulkner gives us perhaps 
the most dramatic embodiment of these qualities. But they 
are also vividly presented in Sonya, the selfless 
prostitute who helps save Raskolnikov and, in more 
complicated ways, in Isabel, the half-sister of Pierre.
The very centrality of women in these novels, however, is 
paradoxically a sign of the displacement of the feminine in 
the societies their authors seek to represent, societies 
whose mode of existence had become excessively abstract, 
atomistic and inward-looking. The fragmented personality 
of the hero offers the principal sign of that displacement; 
we see it in Raskolnikov's refusal to eat, in Pierre's
inability to love anyone outside his own circle of kin, and 
in the desperate wanderings of Joe Christinas. The 
condition of their reintegration— and of the societies they 
represent— is their acceptance not simply of women but of 
the qualities they embody.
The City ia History
The image of the city is strangely bifurcated. On the one 
hand, it suggests a reality which transcends historical 
time, an ideal world, a locus of perfection, a celestial 
paradise. On the other hand, the city is the very mark of 
history, a radically fallen world, a locus of corruption, a 
hell on earth. "In modern times," Burton Pike indicates, 
"the real cities of Western Europe and America have 
generally tended to be associated with the evils of human 
nature; ideal cities, on the model of Revelation, have been 
put off to some vague future time" (7).
Archaic cultures, however, attempted to resolve the 
tension between the actual and the ideal in origin myths 
which effaced the reality of history itself. According to 
Eliade, "every new appearance"— whether it be an animal, a 
plant, a house, a temple, or a city— is presented in the 
origin myth as a continuation of the cosmogony, of the pre­
eminent act which created the world (Myth 21). Its mythic 
presentation, in other words, makes the "new appearance" 
simultaneous with the time of the Creation. Thus, the 
effect of the origin myth is precisely the abolition of
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history. The man of archaic society, "emerges from 
profane, chronological time and enters a time that is of a 
different quality, a 'sacred' time at once primordial and 
indefinitely recoverable" (18).
For archaic cultures, as we have seen, the city is by 
very definition an ideal reality, a reality which 
transcends the processes of history. However, even in the 
origin myths, its ambiguous character is not entirely 
effaced. As Eliade indicates, archaic man regards the 
cosmogony as the exemplary model for every kind of doing or 
creating; whatever he does is "in some way a repetition of 
the pre-eminent deed, the archetypal gesture of the Creator 
god, the Creation of the world" (32). Through that 
repetition, however, he not only enters into the presence 
of the gods but becomes their rival. By founding the city, 
he creates the world anew; but his own creation stands— at 
least potentially— as an alternative to the divine creation 
itself. Pike notes that the founding of the ancient city 
"represents a separation from the world of nature, the 
imposition of man's will on a natural order created by 
divinity" (5). Thus, because it is "an act of interference 
in the divine order," the founding "involves a sense of 
guilt" (5). The city, in other words, both unites and 
separates men and the gods.
For modern man, the burden of history is arguably even 
more unbearable than it was for his archaic ancestor, not
simply because of his own violent past but because the 
epistemologies of his age have made him skeptical of the 
possibility of other realities. Whereas archaic man saw 
only the ideal city, his modern counterpart finds himself 
imprisoned in the city of history with all its flaws and 
imperfections. Thus, the temptation he suffers is to 
simply reject the city— and therefore humanity itself—  
either by recreating himself as a man-god or by 
establishing a myth of earthly paradise. Both attempts 
constitute a return of sorts to the archaic cosmology.
In each of the novels discussed in this study, we 
witness this kind of return— in Raskolnikov's aspiration to 
superhuman status, in Hightower's belief in the inherent 
superiority of his race, and in Pierre's attempt to live a 
paradisal existence at Saddle Meadows. However, the 
presentation of these heroes ultimately links them with 
both the Hebraic and the Greco-Roman traditions rather than 
with the archaic myths.
What is involved in the archaic cosmology, Eliade 
remarks, "is creating a new man and creating him on a 
super-human plane, a man-god, such as the imagination of 
historical man has never dreamed it possible to create" 
{159). As we have seen, however, there is an inherent 
contradiction in this act. In his very attempt to place 
himself in the company of the gods, archaic man threatens 
to usurp their position and, therefore, to alienate himself
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from them. In fact, the myths themselves are an attempt to 
resolve precisely this— presumably irresolvable—  
contradiction.
In the fourth chapter of Genesis, which records the 
founding of the first city, the contradiction is exposed. 
"The city," Jacques Ellul comments, "is the direct 
consequence of Cain's murderous act and his refusal to 
accept God's protection" (5). Thus, the sense of guilt 
associated with the city-founding, a sense which is 
implicit in the archaic myths, is openly acknowledged in 
the biblical narrative. The founder of the city is a 
criminal, an outcast from the world created for him by God. 
The account in Genesis has remarkable parallels in the 
Greek and Roman myths. Theseus, for example, is a 
parricide-founder. In the Citv of God. Augustine is struck 
by the "reflection" which the fratricidal origin of the 
first city finds in the founding of Rome, the city which 
occupied such a central place in his own thought: "For this 
is how Rome was founded, when Remus, as Roman history 
witnesses, was slain by his brother Romulus" (15. 5).
In both the biblical and the classical traditions, 
then, there is an implicit criticism of the archaic 
cosmology. The status of the city as a parallel creation, 
as a repetition or refounding of the cosmos, is taken as a 
sign of man's revolt against the gods, as an assertion of 
his independence from his creator, of his desire to become
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a power unto himself. It is in this light that the heroes 
of Dostoevsky, Melville and Faulkner are cast. Their 
attempts to create alternative worlds for themselves not 
only make them criminals but leave them suffering in the 
most deeply human way. Like Cain, they are outcasts, cut 
off from their fellow men and from the sources of life 
itself.
Thus, although these novelists make profound 
criticisms of their civilizations, they do not finally seek 
to evade the historical landscape itself. In fact, their 
central concern is how modern man can accept history as his 
mode of existence, as the mode in which he lives in 
communion with others. In this regard, their works find an 
important precursor in Virgil's epic account of the 
founding of Rome. Unlike the origin myths of archaic 
culture, the Aeneid foregrounds rather than effaces the 
ambiguous character of the city, a fact which is reflected 
in the disagreement among critics over the meaning of the 
poem. While some have read it as a panegyric of an ideal 
Roman order, others— especially in our own century— have 
argued that it calls into question the terrible price which 
civilization demands for its realization. Adam Parry 
suggests that the two views correspond to the "two voices" 
of Virgil himself, one the "public voice of Roman success," 
the other a "personal voice" which laments the limitations 
of human action in the world (61).
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Virgil's grim presentation of the events preceding the 
Roman founding— the war with the Italians and the killing 
of their leader, Turnus— makes the Aeneid a powerfully 
resonant work for modern and especially twentieth-century 
readers, whose own experience of the devastating effects of 
war has shaken their faith in the value of civilization 
itself.10 But Virgil's epic does not serve as a signal to 
despair. On the contrary, in its depiction of the perilous 
journey which Aeneas and his small band of men undertake 
from Troy, it invokes an ideal order above and beyond that 
of the Rome of history. It is an order founded on self- 
sacrifice, loyalty, courage and love, and one which—  
although it belongs to a distant future— spurs men on in 
their attempt to create the good city.
The themes of Virgil's poem, which are laid out in the 
first chapter of this study, make it a paradigmatic text 
for the three novels discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
First, there is the theme of exile. Like the protagonists 
of the novels, Aeneas is a wanderer, an exile in search of 
a new future. Second, the poem offers us— most obviously, 
in the image of the fall of Troy— that apocalyptic vision 
of the city which is so central to modern city fiction. 
Third, the centrality of the poem's female figures—  
namely, Dido and Juno— suggests that it has as one of its
10. Theodore Ziolkowski's book Virgil and the Moderns 
provides a comprehensive and acute discussion of Virgil's 
influence on modern thought.
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principal concerns the role of the feminine in the life of
civilization.
In one of his last books. Civilization and its
Discontents. Sigmund Freud draws a remarkable analogy
between the "history of the Eternal City" and psychic
contents of the mind (16). Just as not a little of the
remains of ancient Rome are preserved beneath the buildings
of the modern city, so "in mental life nothing which has
once been formed can perish— that everything is somehow
preserved and that in suitable circumstances... it can once
more be brought to light" (17). Although the focus of the
analogy is the mind rather than the city, it implies that
the city itself— and Rome, in particular— serves as the
collective memory of a people, as a vital link between past
and present, the living and the dead. In fact, Freud
himself goes on to render this vision of Rome in more
explicit terms:
suppose that Rome is not a human habitation but a 
psychical entity with a similarly long and copious 
past— an entity, that is to say, in which nothing that 
has once come into existence, will have passed away 
and all the earlier phases of development continue to 
exist alongside the latest one. (17)
However, almost as soon as he has allowed himself this
"flight of imagination," Freud dismisses it— "for it leads
to things that are unimaginable and even absurd" (17).
Nevertheless, as Pike remarks, "the analogy has been made,
and it has been made with the evocative power we might
expect from a poet" (18).
The image of Rome has always held a central place in
Western consciousness. Indeed, Freud's own text is
evidence of the power which it has continued to exert in
the twentieth century. What Freud allows us to suggest is
that the exploration of that image involves us in some
sense in an exploration— or more properly an archaeology—
of the modern mind itself. In fact, it was precisely this
kind of rationale which led Fustel de Coulanges in the
middle of the nineteenth century to undertake his study of
the earliest stages of the societies of ancient Greece and
Rome. While at first glance those societies could hardly
be more different than their nineteenth-century
counterparts, de Coulanges hoped that their traces still
existed in modern life:
the past never completely dies for man. Man may 
forget it, but he always preserves it within him.
For, take him at any epoch, and he is the product, the 
epitome, of all the earlier epochs. Let him look into 
his own soul, and he can find and distinguish these 
different epochs by what each of them has left within 
him. (14)
Keeping in mind, then, the hidden continuity between the 
ancient city and ourselves, we turn to Virgil and his tale 
of Rome's founding.
II
THE CITY AND EXILE 
Virgil's Aeneid
At the beginning of Virgil's poem, we find Aeneas and 
his men just a short distance from the coast of Sicily—  
having wandered from sea to sea for years, their journey 
prolonged by the vengeful actions of the goddess Juno. At 
this moment, however, Juno herself Is desperate. Despite 
all her efforts to keep them from Italy, the Trojans are 
now perilously close to their destination. So, in a last 
ditch attempt to prevent their passage, she visits Aeolus, 
the ruler of the winds, and begs him— with the help of a 
bribe— to drive the Trojans off their course. As a result 
of Juno's pleas, Aeneas's ships are engulfed in a whirling 
tempest and dispersed far and wide over the water.
Amidst all this commotion, Neptune— Juno's brother—  
realizes that his own jurisdiction over the ocean has been 
usurped by the wind god: “Power over the sea and the cruel 
trident / Were never his by destiny, but mine" (1. 188-9). 
After sending an angry message to Aeolus, "he quieted / The 
surging water, drove the clouds away, / And brought the 
sunlight back" (1. 193-5). At this point, Virgil offers us 
a striking image:
When rioting breaks out in a great city.
And the rampaging rabble goes so far
That stones fly, and incendiary brands—
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For anger can supply that kind of weapon—
If it so happens they look round and see
Some dedicated public man, a veteran
Whose record gives him weight, they quiet down,
Willing to stop and listen.
Then he prevails in speech over their fury 
By his authority, and placates them.
Just so, the whole uproar of the great sea 
Fell silent, as the Father of it all,
Scanning horizons under the open sky.
Swung his team around and gave free rein 
In flight to his eager chariot. (1. 201-15)
What is remarkable about the simile is not so much its
characterization of Neptune as its depiction of urban
space. For a brief moment we see the city on the verge of
crisis, about to be overwhelmed by a sea of unrestrained
emotion. If the act of founding the city is a movement
from chaos to a cosmos, Virgil gives us this movement in
reverse— a reversion to chaos, the onset of catastrophe.
Its source is not the flawed action of an essentially noble
individual— as it is in tragedy— but the irrational anger
of the masses.
The image which Virgil presents— of a civilization
under threat— bears an extraordinary resemblance to the
image which modern peoples have of their lives. As Mircea
Eliade notes, "we speak of the chaos, the disorder, the
darkness that will overwhelm 'our world'" (Sacred 49).
Moreover, we sense that such a threat emanates not from
some external source but from ourselves. Freud, who was
profoundly influenced by Virgil's writings, expressed
precisely this sentiment in the closing remarks of
Civilization and its Discontents: "The fateful question for
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the human species seems to me to be whether and to what 
extent their cultural development will succeed in mastering 
the disturbance of their communal life by the human 
instinct of aggression and self-destruction" (92).
In Virgil's simile, the city is the locus of the 
crowd, a trope which becomes increasingly important for 
modern writers from about the middle of the nineteenth 
century. As Burton Pike notes, in the city of nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century literature, the crowd loses its 
neutral sense— a gathering of individuals with a common 
interest— and becomes "an undifferentiated mass, acting as 
a depersonalized collective character and forming a 
peculiar kind of anti-community within the dissociated 
culture" (110). Typically, the sole locus of individuality 
is an alienated and isolated figure who by himself is 
incapable of ameliorating his life: "there is a whole 
parade of small men in the novels of the period who are 
unable to cope with their urban environment or with 
themselves and whose attempts to cope lead to constant 
frustration" (101).1
The scenario which Virgil paints is not so bleak the 
one Pike suggests. Unlike the hero of the novel, who
1. A list of such figures, Pike suggests, "would include 
Flaubert's Frederic Moreau, Dostoevsky's underground man 
and Raskolnikov, Hardy's obscure Jude, Joyce's Bloom, 
Kafka's two K.s, Howells's Silas Lapham and Eliot's 
Prufrock, as well as Biely's Nikolai Ableukhov" (101).
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appears helpless In the face of the crowd, a "dedicated
public man"— perhaps a Cicero or an Augustus— is capable of
placating the anger and fears of the people with calming
words. The crowd can still be reached. Nevertheless, the
simile presents us with a remarkably unidealized and,
therefore, contemporary image of urban life, one which
surely reflects the civil unrest which Virgil knew in his
own time. The city is not the utopian conception which
archaic culture gave us. It is the city in history,
embodying the flawed nature of humanity itself.
Of course, Virgil's simile is not primarily a
discourse on the city; its purpose is to convey the
commanding presence of Neptune before the turmoil of the
seas. Moreover, the poem as a whole appears to locate the
origins of Home not in the historical past but in the
mythical age of the Homeric hero. At the same time,
however, Virgil's evocation of the Homeric age is not empty
of allusions to the Rome of history. As Robert Fitzgerald
indicates, Virgil
deliberately echoed Homer in many details of 
narrative, in many conventions and features of style. 
But his purpose was totally un-Homeric and drastically 
original: to unfold in the mythical action of The 
Aeneid foreshadowings and direct foretellings of Roman 
history. Most of all the apparent Homeric pastiche, 
the ancient story, was to refer at times explicitly 
but more often by analogy to the latter centuries of 
that history, to the immediate past and present, and 
to such hopes and fears for the future as the record 
might suggest. (405)
In fact, T. S. Eliot suggests that it was through
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their constant adaptation and use of the discoveries,
traditions and inventions not simply of the earlier stages
of their own literature but of Greek poetry, that the Roman
poets— and Virgil, in particular— developed a sense of
history (61).
According to Eliot, this sense is most fully awake
where there is consciousness of a history other "than the
history of the poet's own people," another history which is
necessary in order to see our own:
There must be the knowledge of at least one other 
highly civilized people, and of a people whose 
civilization is sufficiently cognate to have 
influenced and entered our own. This is a 
consciousness which the Romans had, and which the 
Greeks, however much more highly we may estimate their 
achievement— and indeed, we may respect it all the 
more on this account— could not possess. (61)
The subject of Virgil's poem, then, is not simply the
founding of a civilization but, as Eliot indicates, the
"development of. . . one civilization, in relation to
another" (61). "In Homer," he remarks, "the conflict
between the Greeks and the Trojans is hardly larger in
scope than a feud between one Greek city-state and a
coalition of other city-states" (61). By contrast, "the
story of Aeneas" is marked by "the consciousness of a more
radical distinction, a distinction, which is at the same
time a statement of relatedness, between two great
cultures, and finally, of their reconciliation under an
all-embracing destiny" (61-62).
Thus, while Virgil appears to situate Rome's origins 
in a mythical past, he does not present them as 
simultaneous with the "absolute beginning," with the 
creation of the world. Quite the reverse, in fact: the new 
world begins with the apocalyptic destruction of an older 
one, the world of th,e Homeric hero; Rome begins where Troy 
ends. For archaic man, we have seen, the founding of a 
city is an act which transforms chaos into a cosmos. For 
Aeneas, by contrast, the journey from Troy to Rome begins 
with the loss of an ordered world, with a reimmersion into 
a state of formlessness. "Any destruction of a city,"
Eliade notes, "is equivalent to a retrogression to chaos" 
(48). Thus, the simile which Virgil presents at the outset 
of the Aeneid is a reflection not simply of Rome's recent 
history but of its very origins. In its fleeting depiction 
of a city in turmoil, it anticipates the account which 
Aeneas himself will later give of the fall of Troy, the 
event which marks the beginning of the journey towards 
Italy. Rome is, in other words, a city born in the midst 
of crisis.
The city which Eliade describes is essentially a 
static entity. It exists outside time or— more properly—  
at the primordial time of beginnings, in sacred time. The 
exit of Aeneas and his men from the mythical world of Troy 
is an exit from this mode of existence. The beginning of
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their journey towards the new city marks their entrance 
into history. But herein lies a peculiar paradox.
On the one hand, Rome appears as a city which is engendered 
within the span of historical time. It is a city with an 
actual past (both immediate and distant), a past which is 
alluded to throughout Virgil's poem. On the other hand, it 
is a reality which is never fully presented. "The city, as 
goal of the wanderer's quest," Elizabeth Lowe remarks, "is 
. . . a future event. Aeneas's Rome is prophesied, not 
realized, in the Aeneid" (47).2 Thus, the city is at once 
far and near, present and absent, an actual reality and an 
ideal conception.
So, what finally is the status of Rome in Virgil's 
poem? Is it the contemporary reality which we see in the 
simile, or a future utopia which is glimpsed from a 
distance but never reached? Or is it somehow both? It 
seems that the meaning of the city in the Aeneid is 
inextricably bound up with the meaning of exile. The
2. Lowe notes that there is "a noteworthy resemblance 
between the story of Exodus and the Aeneid. In both 
narratives a divinely inspired leader shepherds his people 
to a promised land that was also the home of their distant 
ancestors" (46). In addition, both leaders— Aeneas and 
Moses— die before the realization of the promised future. 
According to Voegelin, "Israel . . . constituted itself by 
recording its own genesis as a people as an event with a 
special meaning in history, while the other Near Eastern 
societies constituted themselves as analogues of cosmic 
order. Israel alone had history as an inner form, while 
the other societies existed in the form of the cosmological 
myth" (Order and History 124).
founding of Rome appears to require that Aeneas and his men 
become fugitives, that they wander far from home for years, 
"buffeted / Cruelly on land as on the sea / By blows from 
powers of the air" (1. 5-7). Exile, however, is not a 
senseless trial arbitrarily Imposed upon men by the gods. 
Undergone by a community united in their striving for a 
common goal or end, it plays a crucial role in their 
achievement of identity. Exile anticipates and prepares 
the way for the promise which the future holds. As Louise 
Cowan suggests, this sense of exile is fundamental to the 
world depicted by the epic poet: "Exodus and the Aeneid. 
containing the most telling examples of the formation of a 
people into a nation, depict the movement towards a destiny 
of fulfillment— towards a New Jersualem or New Troy" 
(Introduction 9). Accordingly, the hope of this chapter is 
that in understanding the nature of the journey undertaken 
from Troy, we will more completely grasp the image of Rome 
itself.
Leaves and Trees
The difference between the old order which Aeneas leaves 
behind and the new order which he is destined to found is a 
difference between the relation each bears toward history. 
The very mark of the transition from Troy to Rome, in other 
words, is the emergence of a historical consciousness.
According to Erich Auerbach, the Homeric heroes live 
in an eternal present; their destiny is "clearly defined"
and they "wake every morning as if it were the first day of
their lives" (12). For them/ the present neither lies
"open to the depths of the past" nor hints at a future yet
to be realized/ but is "brought to light in perfect
fullness" (6-7). One of the clearest expressions of the
Homeric hero's experience of time occurs in the sixth book
of the Iliad, as the Trojan and Greek armies first
encounter each other on the battlefield. A Trojan,
Diomedes, calls out to his opponent, Glaukos, and inquires
of his birth. The reply which Glaukos offers is one of
Homer's best-known similes and one which— as we shall later
see— Virgil himself repeats in the Aeneid:
High-hearted son of Tydeus, why ask of my generation? 
As is the generation of leaves, so is that of 
humanity. The wind scatters the leaves on the ground, 
but the live timber burgeons with leaves again in the 
season of spring returning. So one generation of men 
will grow while another dies. (6. 145-50)
As C. A. Patrides has indicated, the "idea of recurrence"
underlying Glaukos's simile "is one of the most splendid
commonplaces of ancient Greek thought" (1). Men's lives,
like the leaves of a tree, come and go in a perpetual cycle
of spring and autumn, of death and rebirth.
At first glance, the simile appears to dismiss men's
lives as insignificant. Just as the leaves which burgeon
each spring are merely short-lived products of the life-
stock of the tree, so men's lives are merely transient
effects of an eternal cause; like the leaves, they will
fall away and be replaced. As G. S. Kirk suggests, the
50
"likening of human generations to the fall of leaves in 
autumn and their growing again in spring . . . means that 
life is transient and one generation succeeds another" 
(176).
Seth Schein, however, has pointed out that "Glaukos 
puts his emphasis as much on the stock that survives to put 
out new leaves as on the leaves that bloom and are poured 
to the ground like dead warriors" (70). In this light, the 
focus of the simile is not so much the transience of men's 
lives as the permanence of the source from which they 
derive their meaning. It is only because the leaves are 
attached to the tree that they have life— nourished and 
sustained by the strength of its sap. By analogy, the 
significance of men's lives is to be found not in their 
individuality but through their link with a common origin 
or ancestor. In fact, it is this identification that 
allows the Homeric hero to efface from his consciousness 
the essential transience of historical existence. Glaukos 
understands his life not as a unique event that occurs 
within the span of chronological time but as a repetition 
of the exemplary lives led by his heroic ancestors. Thus, 
the "idea of recurrence," far from emptying human lives of 
their significance, is what enables them to remain present 
to those primordial origins which endow them with meaning 
in the first place.
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The Homeric hero's need to preserve contemporaneity 
with his ancestral past is not afforded by linear time, 
since its apparently endless succession of moments actually 
takes one further and further away from one's origins. It 
is only "by conferring a cyclic direction upon time," as 
Eliade indicates, that man annuls its irreversible, onward 
march:
Everything begins over again at its commencement every 
instant. . . . In a certain sense, it is even possible 
to say that nothing new happens in the world, for 
everything is but the repetition of the same 
primordial archetypes; this repetition, by actualizing 
the mythical moment when the archetypal gesture was 
revealed, constantly maintains the world in the same 
auroral instant of the beginnings. (Cosmos 89-90)
However, the cyclical movement which Glaukos attributes to
time does not proceed with the same Inevitability which
appears to characterize the movement of the seasons. In
fact, Page DuBois has argued that the view of time as a
process of "regeneration which must be enacted by a human
or divine agent" is actually more characteristic of the
Iliad than that of an inevitable process of cyclical
repetition (9).3
"Trees, in the Iliad, are not immortal," DuBois
suggests in her discussion of the leaf simile:
3. Eliade himself suggests that societies for whom time is 
not allowed to become "history" feel the need to 
"regenerate themselves periodically through expulsion of 
'evils' and confession of sins" (75).
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Again and again a falling hero is compared to a 
falling tree, one whose leaves will not burgeon again 
in the spring. . . .  If human generations are like the 
leaves of the tree, and the tree is like a hero, then 
the possibility of a tree's destruction threatens the 
organic continuity of men's shared existence. (10)
Glaukos's own actions on the battlefield are part of the
process of regeneration required for the preservation of
that fragile continuity. After recounting his genealogy,
he tells Diomedes that he has been sent to Troy by his
father, Hippolochos, and urged by him "to be always among
the bravest," so as not to shame the generations of his
ancestors, "who were the greatest men in Ephyre and again
in wide Lykia" (6. 208-10). By carrying out his father's
injunction, Glaukos recreates for the present the heroic
deeds of the past, thus making time new again.
Jasper Griffin has suggested that the "development of
feeling" in Glaukos's speech "runs from humility to pride"
(72). When first asked by Diomedes to reveal his origins,
Glaukos declines, apparently interpreting the question as a
request for an account of his own personal history. For
Glaukos, the individual life, seen in isolation from the
archetypal category of the ancestor, is wholly transitory
and insignificant; it represents the fatality and
irreversibility of historical time. However, the man who
initially declines to speak of his birth boasts of it in
the end. But the account which Glaukos gives Diomedes is
not a personal biography. Rather, it celebrates the
essential unity of that life which far surpasses the extent
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of his own limited existence. It is that larger life which 
enables Glaukos to imagine his own as meaningful, 
transforming his fatality into a continuity with both past 
and future.
In book six of the Aeneid. Virgil repeats the Homeric 
simile. The repetition, however, ultimately serves to 
emphasize the difference rather than the similarity between 
the experience of the exiled Trojans and that of their 
Homeric counterparts. Like Glaukos, Virgil compares the 
souls of the dead with the "leaves that yield their hold on 
boughs and fall through / Forests in the early frost of 
autumn" (6. 419-420). But the occasion for the comparison 
is entirely different than that in the Iliad. Whereas 
Glaukos is on the battlefield at Troy, Aeneas has descended 
into the underworld in order to visit his father's ghost.
It is in part this difference in setting which accounts for 
the fact that whereas Glaukos turns immediately to the 
renewal of life that comes with spring, Virgil continues to 
dwell on the fate of the deceased.
The souls whom Aeneas encounters waiting on the banks 
of the river Acheron— and to which Virgil's simile refers—  
are those of the unburied dead. The account of their fate 
which the Sybil offers Aeneas is a reformulation of the 
ancient belief that funeral rites properly performed are a 
prerequisite for the restful abode of the soul in its 
after-life:
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All in the nearby crowd you notice here 
Are pauper souls, the souls of the unburied.
Charon's the boatman. Those the water bears 
Are souls of buried men. He may not take them 
Shore to dread shore on the hoarse currents there 
Until their bones rest in the grave, or till 
They flutter and roam this side a hundred years;
They may have passage then, and may return
To cross the deeps they long for. (6. 439-447)
The analogy which Virgil draws between these souls and the
autumnal leaves is both more limited and more specific than
the Homeric simile. While Glaukos takes the falling leaves
as an image of the death which all men experience, Virgil
adapts the image to distinguish the plight of the unburied
dead from those who have already found their rest in Hades.
Both similes offer an image of the separation which
death brings. For Glaukos, however, that separation is
mitigated— if not abolished— by the fact that he
participates in a larger life which continues even after
his own has ended. As DuBois indicates, the new leaves
which appear on the tree each spring "are the same as last
year's, part of the larger structure of the tree" (9). It
is by virtue of such cyclical repetitions that the dead
live on, not as historical individuals, but— as Eliade has
suggested— "through their reidentification with the
impersonal archetype of an ancestor" (47).
In Virgil's simile, by contrast, the kind of cyclical
continuity to which Glaukos points remains incomplete.
Just as leaves which are not returned to the soil cannot
again become part of the organic structure of the tree, so.
without the ritual of burial, the dead cannot regain that 
link with those who are still living. The souls who crowd 
Acheron's banks exist in a state of limbo, having left the 
community of the living but not yet reached the final 
resting place of the dead. Their experience, like that of 
Aeneas and his men, is essentially one of exile. Thus, if 
on one level, Virgil's simile serves to distinguish the 
plight of the buried from the unburied dead, on another, it 
distinguishes the fate of the Virgilian hero from that of 
his Homeric precursor.
The identification of the exiled Trojans with the 
souls of the unburied is at once literal and symbolic. A 
literal affinity exists because among the souls of 
"unhonored dead" whom Aeneas encounters on the banks of 
Acheron are those of three men who had undertaken with him 
the journey from Troy: "Leucaspis and the Lycian fleet's 
commander, / Orontes, who had sailed the windy sea / From 
Troy together, till the Southern gale / Had swamped and 
whirled them down" and Aeneas's helmsman, Palinurus, who on 
"course from Lybia, as he watched the stars, / Had been 
pitched overboard astern" {6. 451-59). Thus, although 
death at sea, unwept and unburied, is feared as much by the 
Homeric as by the Virgilian hero, it is far closer to the 
reality of Aeneas's experience than to that of Glaukos.
That Aeneas is acutely aware of this distinction is never 
more evident than when his own life is threatened by
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Aeolus's winds. Faced with the imminent prospect of death 
at sea, he laments the separation of his own fate from that 
of those Trojans who were afforded an honorable death in 
the war against the Greeks:
Triply lucky, all you men
To whom death came before your fathers1 eyes 
Below the wall at Troy! Bravest Danaan,
Diomedes, why could I not go down
When you had wounded me, and lose my life
On Ilium's battlefield? Our Hector lies there,
Torn by Achilles' weapon; there Sarpedon,
Our giant fighter, lies; and there the river
Simois washes down so many shields
And helmets, with strong bodies taken under!
(1. 134-143)
Like Glaukos, Aeneas knows that to die honorably on the 
battlefield— although terrible in its own way— is not to be 
eternally separated from the living but rather to achieve 
an even closer identification with them. On account of 
their exemplary deeds, Hector and Sarpedon remain present 
to the memory of the Trojans. By contrast, Aeneas himself 
faces the prospect of the oblivion that results from an 
ignoble death.
The fate of the unburied dead, however, is more than 
simply a possibility which awaits the Trojans in their 
afterlife. On a symbolic plane, the fate of the unburied 
dead is analogous to their present existence, a fact which 
Virgil stresses through the addition of a second simile, 
entirely absent from Glaukos's speech, comparing the 
unburied dead to "migrating birds from the open sea / that 
darken heaven when the cold season comes / And drives them
overseas to sunlit lands" (6. 421-423). Even more than 
that of the unburied dead, the fate of Aeneas and his men—
to wander for years from one sea to the next in search of a
new homeland— finds a concrete reflection in the winter 
flight of birds across the oceans to warmer territory.
This close identification— albeit unstated— between the 
migration of birds and men serves to strengthen the already 
implicit analogy between the experience of the souls who 
await their final passage to Hades and that of the exiled 
Trojans themselves.
Like the unburied dead, Aeneas and his men have been
separated from the community of the living, cut off from
the security of home and hearth; "tossed about / From one 
coast to another on the high seas," their wanderings appear 
to be characterized by the same aimlessness with which the 
pauper souls flutter and roam before gaining entrance to 
Hades (1. 912-913). Just as the pitiful crowds on 
Acheron's banks reach out longingly for the far shore, the 
Trojans, weary from years of hardship and forced exile, 
crave "the firm earth underfoot" (1. 236).
Of course, the crew of Trojans has not endured literal 
death. However, their experience of separation is arguably 
even more intense than that felt by the pauper souls. Not 
only have they been exiled from the living world of Troy, 
they have witnessed its very destruction. If the pauper 
souls are like the leaves which fall in the course of the
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natural movement of the seasons, the Trojans are like those
which scatter when the life of the tree itself is violently
cut short. Indeed, it is this image that Aeneas himself
employs to recall the memory of Troy's demise:
I knew the end then: Ilium was going down
In fire, the Troy of Neptune going down
As in high mountains when the countrymen
Have notched an ancient ash, then make their axes
Ring with might and main, chopping away
To fell the tree— ever on the point of falling,
Shaking through all its foliage, and the treetop 
Nodding; bit by bit the strokes prevail 
Until it gives a final groan at last 
And crashes down in ruin from the height.
(2. 816-25)
The simile is charged with an intense emotion. According
to Viktor Poschl, it "quite unHomerically, does not
illustrate an event, but expounds a destiny. The suffering
of the tree— its 'tragedy* is the main thing" (46).
Although Aeneas does not describe his feelings as he
witnesses Troy's destruction, he shares in a profound way
in its suffering. In fact, it is in the image of the dying
tree itself that his own heartfelt sorrow finds its most
adequate expression.
Of course, the remembrance of the fall of Troy is not
unique to the Aeneid. It lies at the very "core of the
Homeric poems," as George Steiner has noted:
A city is the outward sum of man's nobility; in it, 
his condition is most thoroughly humanized. When a 
city is destroyed, man is compelled to wander the 
earth or dwell in the open fields in partial return to 
the manner of a beast. That is the central 
realization of the Iliad. Resounding through the 
epic, now in stifled allusion, now in strident lament.
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is the dread fact that an ancient and splendid city 
has perished by the edge of the sea. (3)
It is Virgil's hero, however, who experiences the full
effects of the loss which Steiner describes. Both Hector
and Sarpedon go down with the city and, as a result, remain
eternally identified with it; it is their closeness to Troy
which Aeneas envies as he faces the prospect of an unheroic
death far from Trojan shores. Aeneas himself, by contrast,
must endure the reality of a world without Troy. It is he
rather than the Homeric hero who is "compelled to wander
the earth" with the knowledge that the world of his
ancestors can never be recovered.
According to Eliade, the myths which describe the
primordial situation "express its paradisiac character
simply by depicting Heaven as, in illo tempore, very close
to the Earth, or as easily accessible, either by climbing a
tree or a tropical creeper or a ladder, or by scaling a
mountain" (59). By corollary, the felling of the tree
indicates man’s exit from paradise into history: "When
heaven had become abruptly separated from the earth, that
is, when it had become remote, as in our days; when the
tree . . . connecting Earth to Heaven had become cut; . . .
then the paradisiac stage was over, and man entered into
his present condition" (59-60).
Of course, the Homeric world is not situated in the
age of paradise— far from it, in fact. However, as we have
seen, the Homeric world achieves a continuity with the
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primordial beginnings through an active process of 
regeneration which resists the onset of time. With Troy's 
destruction— symbolized in the axing of a tree— that 
continuity is ruptured. Those who remain behind, having 
lost their contemporaneity with primordial man, are faced 
with the inevitable historicity of their existence.
That the exiled Trojans experience the fall into 
history as a profound loss is evident. It is Aeneas, 
however, who feels that loss most acutely. Not only has he 
been cut off from Troy; his emergence as leader of his men 
has separated him from them also. Virgil calls him "a man 
apart" (1. 16). Although the other Trojans feel the loss 
of their homeland, they at least can share their sorrow 
among themselves: "When hunger had been banished, / And 
tables put away, they talked at length / In hope and fear 
about their missing friends" (1. 294-6). Aeneas, by 
contrast, must disguise his emotions; "Burdened and sick at 
heart, / He feigned hope in his look, and inwardly / 
Contained his anguish" (1. 284-6). In fact, it is only 
because he is willing to bear the burden of loss that his 
men can relieve themselves of it. While they enjoy the 
oblivion of sleep, he remains "thoughtful through the 
restless night" (1. 412).
History aad Loss
Eliade suggests that "the desire felt by the man of 
traditional societies to refuse history, and to confine
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himself to an indefinite repetition of archetypes" is not a 
nostalgia for a "lost paradise of animality" in which 
humanity and nature were inseparable (90). Rather, it 
testifies to "his thirst for the 'ontic,' his will to be, 
to be after the fashion of the archetypal beings whose 
gestures he constantly repeats" (90). For Aeneas and his 
men, the exile from Troy seems— at least initially— to 
involve a separation from the ontology of the ancestor. 
Their existence in history appears to be the very existence 
which archaic man attempted to refuse— a mode of non-being, 
a dwelling in unreality.
Whether the sense of loss which the exiles feel is the 
definitive mark of their existence after Troy, however, 
remains to be seen. It has certainly been accorded a 
central place in twentieth-century readings of the poem. 
Adam Parry, for example, suggests that "the sense of 
emptiness is the very heart of the Virgilian mood" (63).
He points to "the frequent elegiac note so apparently 
uncalled for in a panegyric of Roman greatness" and "the 
continual opposition of a personal voice which comes to us 
as if it were Virgil's own to the public voice of Roman 
success" as evidence against "orthodox interpretations" 
which "take the poem ultimately as a great work of Augustan 
propaganda" (61).
Parry's case is not that Virgil simply rejects the 
glory of the Roman achievement. In fact, he maintains that
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"Virgil continually insists on . . . the establishment of
peace and order and civilization, that dominion without end
which Jupiter tells Venus he has given the Romans” (73).
"But," Parry suggests,
he insists equally on the terrible price one must pay 
for this glory. More than blood, sweat and tears, 
something more precious is continually lost by the 
necessary process; human freedom, love, personal 
loyalty, all the qualities which the heroes of Homer 
represent, are lost in the service of what is grand, 
monumental and impersonal: the Roman State. (71)
Essentially, Parry presents Virgil as a proto-Freudian who
recognizes that civilization is only made possible by
individual renouncement. Virgil's hero is a man who bears
his people's destiny at the expense of the fulfillment of
his own desires— the most obvious of which is his love for
Dido: "An agent of powers at once high and impersonal, he
is successively denied all the attributes of a hero, and
even of a man. His every utterance perforce contains a
note of history, rather than of individuality" (68).
That there should be a resemblance between the view of
civilization presented in the Aeneid and that of Freud is
not coincidental; Freud himself inscribed Juno's invocation
of the underworld from Book Seven of the Aeneid— Flectere
si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo— as an epigraph on the
title page of The Interpretation of Dreams.* Indeed, it
4. Fitzgerald translates this: "If I can sway/No heavenly 
hearts I'll rouse the world below" (7. 425-6). Jean 
Starobinski's essay "Acheronta Movebo" provides an 
extensive discussion of Freud's use of the quotation: "the 
line twice cited in The Interpretation of Dreams . . .  is
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is in the writings of Freud, as Theodore Ziolkowski notes,
that the modern appropriation of Virgil is exemplified— an
appropriation which “differs strikingly from the view
pervasive throughout the nineteenth century" and which
"anticipates the 'dark* readings characteristic of recent
decades" (4). In fact, Freud's Virgil is darker and less
sentimental than the version Parry gives us. In Juno's
attempt to summon the infernal powers of the underworld,
Freud found an image of the analyst's attempt to uncover
the repressed contents of the unconscious. However, as
Ziolkowski indicates,
the words of the vengeful Juno also anticipate the 
ideological forces about to be unleashed on the modern 
world. In her implacable opposition to the progress 
of history embodied by Aeneas— from the semibarbarous 
tribal culture of Turnus and his Latin allies to the 
new Roman society governed by humane laws, pietas, and 
ordo— Juno prefigures the reactionary forces of 
totalitarianism that emerged from the chaos of World 
War I. (3)
It was precisely those forces which led Freud to recognize 
that the sufferings and renunciations which civilization 
demands of individuals were not wholly negative. Freud did 
not despair of the possibility of a better society; in 
fact, there is a utopian strain in his work which
put forth as a condensed and figural interpretation of 
repression and symptom theory themselves. The quotation 
uses a cultural model in order to fully explicate the 
repression theory. It urges us to proceed along a 
Virgilian interpretation of Freudian knowledge, since the 
Freudian text itself establishes an isomorphism, or at 
least an occasional equivalence, between myth and 
psychological theory" (399).
counterbalances what is often perceived as an excessive 
pessimism. But if he recognized that "a person becomes 
neurotic because he cannot tolerate the amount of 
frustration which society imposes on him in the service of 
its cultural ideals," he did not infer from this that "the 
abolition or reduction of those demands would result in a 
return to happiness" (34). Quite the contrary: he 
maintained that "all the things with which we seek to 
protect ourselves against the threats that emanate from the 
sources of our suffering are part of that very 
civilization" which is held "largely responsible for our 
misery" (33).
According to Parry, Virgil presents the processes of 
history as inevitable while, at the same time, casting 
doubt on the value of what they achieve; civilization is 
realized only at the expense of individual fulfillment.
For Freud, however, the relation between civilization and 
individuality is not one of simple opposition. Indeed, he 
maintains that "the process of human civilization and the 
developmental or educative process of individual human 
beings" are "very similar in nature, if not the very same 
process applied to different kinds of objects" (86-87). 
Although the main aim of "the developmental process of the 
individual" is the attainment of happiness, its realization 
can scarcely be brought about without the integration in, 
or adaption of the individual to a human community (87).
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Thus, insofar as the process has union with the community 
as its end, it coincides with the process of civilization 
itself, the aim of which is "the creation of a unified 
group out of many individuals" (87).
For Freud, then, there is no pristine individuality 
which predates the structure of culture. The very process 
of individuation has as its condition the integration of 
the human subject into the communal life of society. 
Moreover, that integration is achieved through the kind of 
imposition of restrictions— the most fundamental of which 
is the taboo against incest— carried out, albeit on a far 
more extensive scale, by the process of civilization 
itself. In other words, the renunciations which 
civilization requires of individuals are themselves an 
elaboration of that primordial renunciation— the infant's 
separation from his mother— which initiates the 
developmental process of the individual. Thus, whereas 
Parry's reading of the Aeneid stresses the losses suffered 
by the individual at the hands of civilization, Freud 
suggests that individuality itself is structured on an 
originary loss.
Although Freud himself never produced a systematic 
interpretation of the Aeneid, his allusions to the poem 
suggest a reading which views it as an allegory of the 
Freudian model of ego-development. In Translations of 
Power: Narcissism and the Unconscious in Epic History,
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Elizabeth Bellamy develops this view by applying the 
insights of the French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan.
Lacan's innovation in the field of psychoanalysis was to 
reinterpret Freud's thought in the light of structural 
linguistics. Specifically, he argued that the division of 
the Freudian subject into the conscious life of the ego and 
the unconscious or repressed desire corresponds, in 
linguistic terms, with the entry of the subject into 
language. With the repression of the child's Oedipal 
desire, Terry Eagleton explains in his discussion of Lacan, 
the child
must now resign itself to the fact that it can never 
have any direct access to reality, in particular to 
the now prohibited body of the mother. It has been 
banished from this "full," imaginary possession into 
the "empty" world of language. . . .  To enter 
language, then, is to become a prey to desire: 
language, Lacan remarks, is "what follows being into 
desire." Language divides up— articulates— the 
fullness of the imaginary: we will now never be able 
to find rest in the single object, the final meaning, 
which will make sense of all the others. To enter 
language is to be severed from what Lacan calls the 
"real," that inaccessible realm which is always beyond 
the reach of signification, always outside the 
symbolic order. <167-168)
In her reading of the Aeneid. Bellamy suggests that Troy is
the city of the "Imaginary," the term which Lacan uses to
indicate the subject's pre-oedipal experience of plenitude
and unity. For Aeneas, the exile from Troy is the origin
of the self in epic history, a self which Bellamy regards
as inherently narcissistic because it seeks finally to
recover the lost Troy as the "other" which will reflect its
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own ego ideal. But, Bellamy suggests, "the narcissistic 
search for the other always exiles the subject from itself" 
(81). Applying Lacan's notion that loss is the very 
condition of language, she argues that Aeneas's own 
narration of his escape from Troy is the very moment of his 
"accession to subject-hood, the moment he becomes a subject 
'speaking' from alienation" (80).
However, to argue, as Bellamy does, that Aeneas's 
identity is constituted entirely through loss is, perhaps, 
to mistake his impression of the exile from Troy for its 
deepest reality. It is true, as Bellamy indicates, that 
Virgil’s hero is "haunted by the lost Troy as his 'other'" 
(34). Indeed, Aeneas feels that the exile from Troy has 
transformed his own life into that of a ghost, a shadowy 
remnant of the old order destroyed in the war against the 
Greeks. The pathos of his encounter with the unburied dead 
is only increased by the fact that the condition of those 
for whom he feels so much pity appears analogous to that of 
himself and the other exiled Trojans. That the analogy is 
never made completely explicit by Virgil, however, suggests 
that it may be more indicative of Aeneas's limited 
understanding of the reality in which he finds himself than 
of the reality itself. The point is not that Aeneas's 
experience of loss is unreal but that the overwhelming 
nature of his experience may blind him— if only temporarily 
— to its larger context.
Exile and Knowledge
If the exile from Troy is an analogue of history itself, 
then it may be better understood as a condition in which 
appearances and reality do not always correspond, rather 
than one which is predicated upon the loss of a prior state 
of imaginary plenitude. The historical order, the 
theologian Romano Guardini suggests, "signifies above all a 
state of being that is both shut off and obscure. The 
whole web of causes and effects can neither be surveyed as 
a whole nor can it be clearly grasped and understood" (79). 
The condition of history, in other words, is not the loss 
of reality but its withdrawal from view.
In fact, the breach between appearances and reality is 
a central motif in the narrative which Aeneas himself 
offers Dido and her court. As Aeneas recounts it, the 
immediate cause of Troy's downfall is the failure of the 
Trojans to understand the true nature of the gift presented 
to them by the Greeks. The wooden horse exemplifies the 
kind of deceptive appearances which will plague Aeneas both 
during and after Troy's fall. On the face of it, the horse 
is offered by the Greeks for "a safe return by sea"
(1. 25). But "on the sly they shut inside a company / 
Chosen from their picked soldiery by lot, / Crowding the 
vaulted caverns in the dark—  / The horse's belly— with men 
fully armed" (2. 26-9). Its presence has the immediate 
effect of dividing the Trojans among themselves:
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Thymoetes shouts 
It should be hauled inside the walls and moored 
High on the citadel— whether by treason 
Or just because Troy's fate went that way now.
Capys opposed him; so did the wiser heads:
"Into the sea with it," they said, "or burn it,
Build up a bonfire under it,
This trick of the Greeks, a gift no one can trust,
Or cut it open, search the hollow belly!"
(2. 46-54)
Thus, Aeneas remarks, "Contrary notions pulled the crowd
apart" (2. 55). With the appearance of Sinon, however, the
deception of the Trojans is complete. Apparently a traitor
to the Greek forces, Sinon claims that the Trojan horse has
been offered by his former comrades to Minerva in
reparation for the raid made on her shrine by Diomedes and
Ulysses. The punishment of Laocoon, a Trojan priest who
pierced the horse with his spear, seems to confirm Sinon's
story. Thus, as Aeneas himself records, "a tall tale and
fake tears / Had captured us, whom neither Diomedes / Nor
Larisaean Achilles overpowered, / Nor ten long years, nor
all their thousand ships" (2. 269-72).
Aeneas's narrative recognizes that the cause of Troy's
downfall is not so much its capitulation in the face of
physical force as the willing acceptance by almost the
entire community of a false account of reality:
on we strove unmindful, deaf and blind,
To place the monster on our blessed height.
Then, even then, Cassandra's lips unsealed 
The doom to come: lips by a god's command 
Never believed or heeded by the Trojans.
So pitiably we, for whom that day
Would be the last, made all our temples green
With leafy festal boughs throughout the city.
(2. 328-35)
When the Trojans breach the walls and lay open the city, 
they simultaneously create a breach in the city's own order 
of representation. With the reception of the wooden horse, 
the distinction between enemy and friend— a distinction 
essential to the city's integrity— becomes fatally blurred. 
In the battle which follows, the Greeks, led by Androgeos, 
mistake Aeneas and his men for their own comrades. After 
hailing them cheerfully, Androgeos immediately "knew 
himself / Fallen among enemies" and "recoiled / Like one 
who steps down on a lurking snake / In a briar patch and 
jerks back, terrified, / As the angry thing rears up, all 
puffed and blue" (2. 501-6). The Trojans themselves 
misread their enemies' fate, taking it as a sign that 
fortune is on their side. Supremely confident, they array 
their bodies with the armor of the men they have just 
vanquished so that they can pass unnoticed among the 
Greeks. The result of their ploy, however, is that they 
too become the victims of mistaken identity: "from the 
temple gable's height, / We met a hail of missiles from our 
friends, / Pitiful execution, by their error, / Who thought 
us Greek from our Greek plumes and shields" (2. 541-544).
The fall of Troy appears to take the form of what Rene 
Girard has called a "crisis of non-differentiation," a 
breakdown of the distinctions which form the basis of the 
social order. For Girard, those distinctions are 
essentially arbitrary, maintained only through the
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mechanism of sacrificial violence. Aeneas's narrative, 
however, suggests that the disintegration of the Trojan 
order results from the eclipse of men's capacity to 
distinguish reality. The crisis of non-differentiation is 
not so much the dissolution of an arbitrary system of 
distinctions as a crisis within man himself.
Aeneas recalls that the Trojans resist the onslaught 
of the Greeks with the blind instinct of hunted beasts 
rather than with the precision of a rationally worked-out 
strategy:
like predatory wolves 
In fog and darkness, when a savage hunger 
Drives them blindly on, and cubs in lairs 
Lie waiting with dry famished jaws— just so 
Through arrow flights and enemies we ran 
Toward our sure death, straight for the city's heart, 
Cavernous black night over around us. (2. 475-81)
In Freud's mind, as we have seen, it was this kind of
capitulation to the instinctual life which posed such a
grave threat to the continuity of modern civilization.
Indeed, Virgil himself— the poem indicates— would hardly
disagree with Freud's contention that civilization "is
built upon a renunciation of instinct, however much it
presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction . . .  of
powerful instincts" (44). But whether Virgil would regard
the process of renunciation as the sole basis of
civilization is another question.
According to Freud, the beginning of civilized
existence corresponds to that stage of libidinal
72
development when the Infant's ego "detaches itself from the 
external world" (15). The advent of this stage means that 
"one can differentiate between what is internal— what 
belongs to the ego and what is external— what belongs to 
the external world" (14). "In this way," Freud indicates, 
"one makes the first step towards the introduction of the 
reality principle which is to dominate future development"
(14). Prior to this mature stage of development, however, 
the "ego includes everything" (15). Thus, "our present ego 
feeling is . . . only a shrunken residue of a much more 
inclusive— indeed an all embracing one which corresponded 
to a more intimate bond between the ego and the world about 
it" (15). This original ego-feeling is similar to Hobbes's 
state of nature in which individuals exercise the right of 
all to all. Before it acquires the more sharply 
differentiated ego of maturity, the infant is entirely 
uninhibited in his search for pleasurable sensations; the 
lust for pleasure is so dominant, Freud suggests, that 
everything— both internal and external— becomes simply a 
means towards its satisfaction. For Hobbes, the 
renunciation of this powerful instinct is only made 
possible by the prohibitions of a coercive power. For 
Freud, by contrast, human evolution has led to the 
internalization of those prohibitions, the super-ego taking 
the place of Hobbes's absolute state.
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Freud indicates, however, that the original ego- 
feeling of inclusiveness may persist in some individuals, 
alongside the narrower, "more sharply differentiated ego- 
feeling of maturity, like a kind of counterpart to it"
(15). Such individuals experience a connection or bond 
with a world that exceeds the boundaries of their own 
limited egos, "a sensation of 'eternity,' a feeling as of 
something limitless, unbounded— as it were, 'oceanic'"
(11).
Freud, however, tends to regard the oceanic feeling as
reducible to the original ego-feeling, as a regressive
pattern of ego-development, a recurrence of the infantile,
unrealistic, and erotic wishes of early childhood. Jacques
Maritain, by contrast, has suggested that the content of
poetic knowledge is the kind of intimate bond between self
and world that Freud identifies as a mere residue of
infancy. The reality which the poet suffers is carried by
means of emotion into the depths of his subjectivity.
Thus, the world that he grasps is known not— according to
the law of speculative knowledge— as something other than
himself, "but on the contrary, as inseparable from himself
and from his emotion, and in truth as identified with
himself" (115). "The soul," Maritain writes
is known in the experience of the world and the world 
is known in the experience of the soul, through a 
knowledge which does not know itself . . .  In poetic 
intuition objective reality and subjectivity, the 
world and the whole of the soul, coexist inseparably. 
At that moment sense and sensation are brought back to
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the heart, blood to the spirit, passion to intuition.
(124)
Maritain is careful to point out that poetic knowledge is 
not opposed to reason. Rather, "the realm of rational 
knowledge or logical consciousness is preceded by the 
hidden workings of an immense and primal preconscious life" 
which plays an essential part in the genesis of poetry 
(94). Thus, both poetic and intellectual knowledge share a 
common root in the "spiritual unconscious"5 where "the 
intellect and the imagination, as well as the powers of 
desire, love, and emotion, are engaged in common" (110).
The journey from Troy is not least a process which 
requires the renunciation of the hero's most human passions 
— his nostalgia for Troy, his grief for the mother and wife 
he leaves behind and the father who dies along the way, and 
his love for Dido. Indeed, after his killing of Turnus, 
one wonders if the huge task which Aeneas has undertaken 
has not deprived him of his humanity. "Too long a 
sacrifice / Can make a stone of the heart," Yeats writes in 
his poem, "Easter, 1916" (lines 57-56). By the end of the
5. Maritain credits Freud with "having obliged 
philosophers to acknowledge the existence of unconscious 
thought and unconscious psychological activity" (95). But 
he distinguishes his own notion of a "spiritual 
unconscious" from Freudian unconscious: "There are two 
kinds of unconscious, two great domains of psychological 
activity screened from the grasp of consciousness: the 
preconscious of the spirit in its living springs, and the 
unconscious of blood and flesh, instincts, tendencies, 
complexes, repressed Images and desires, traumatic 
memories, as constituting a closed or autonomous dynamic 
whole” (91-92).
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Aeneid, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the 
deprivations which Virgil's hero has endured have brought 
about the petrification of his soul.
But Aeneas's journey is more than simply a process 
which separates him from others. Certainly/ he is "a man 
apart/" a characteristic which makes him a prototype of the 
modern isolated individual. However, in his depiction of 
the hero's development, Virgil also shows us another 
movement, a counter-movement which leads Aeneas not into a 
state of isolation but towards a deeper recognition of his 
participation in a reality which transcends his own limited 
existence. It is a movement towards the poetic knowledge 
of which Maritain speaks, a knowledge of the world not as 
other than the self but as intimately bound up with its own 
reality.
Freud himself recognized that the boundaries of the 
ego are essentially fictitious. While it "appears to us as 
something autonomous and unitary, marked distinctly from 
everything," the ego actually continues "inwards, without 
any sharp delimitation, into an unconscious mental activity 
which we designate as the id and for which it serves as a 
kind of facade" (13). Thus, Freud's "reality principle" is 
actually predicated upon the repression of a whole other 
dimension of the real. For Freud, however, this repression 
is entirely necessary, even though it inevitably produces a 
certain amount of discontent in individuals. The
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alternative is the anarchic reign of man's unconscious
life, a life which Freud regarded as one of uninhibited
aggression and egoistic self-satisfaction.
Clearly, Freud saw in Virgil's representation of the
underworld an emblem of— and, indeed, a justification for—
his own notion of the unconscious. But in the poem itself,
the underworld is not exclusively the domain of those
anarchic forces— namely, the fury Allecto— which Juno
summons to wreak havoc on the peace established between the
Trojan leader and King Latinus. Aeneas's descent to the
realm of the dead represents the decisive point in his
journey toward the reintegration of his own self. His
development, however, does not leave him locked within a
realm of interiority. "The shape of a man's life,"
Guardini suggests,
is not a growth and unfolding from within, culminating 
in a return upon itself; its figure, its symbol, is 
not the self-enclosed circle, but an arch that reaches 
out toward something that in turn comes to meet it. (18)
For Aeneas, that encounter with the other finds its focal 
point in his reunion with his dead father, Anchises.
Fathers and Sons
Aeneas's descent to the underworld is preceded by his visit 
to the temple of Apollo at Cumae, a temple designed by the 
legendary craftsman Daedalus after his escape from Crete.
It was Daedalus who had created the maze in which Minos, 
the king of Crete, kept the Minotaur. In revenge for the
death of his son, Androgeos, Minos had made war on the
Athenians and eventually forced them "to pay in recompense
each year / The living flesh of seven sons" (6. 32-3).
Among the victims left to die at the hands of the Minotaur
was Theseus, son of the Athenian king, Aegeus. Out of pity
for Minos's daughter, Ariadne, who had fallen in love with
Theseus, Daedalus provided a device— the thread— which
would enable the Athenian to escape from the maze. This
act, however, invoked the wrath of Minos and forced
Daedalus to flee the island, a feat he achieved by his
invention of wings.
Aeneas encounters the events of this drama depicted on
the doors of Apollo's temple. As Page DuBois has noted,
they differ markedly from those which the hero has
previously seen on the walls of Juno's temple at Carthage:
they do not belong to the real history of Aeneas 
and the past of his people, but to the timeless 
realm of myth. The representations have an 
analogical rather than a historical relationship 
to the hero and his situation. Aeneas cannot see 
himself literally depicted, yet he is here in the 
silence in this verbal text. (36)
The scenes depicted on the first door, the death of 
Androgeos and the selection of the Athenian sons to be sent 
to Crete as tribute, offer images of the separation of 
father and son. It is a separation which Aeneas himself 
has endured, not as a result of his own death, of course, 
but of Anchises's. Unlike Androgeos, whose life is 
violently cut short, Aeneas remains behind to fulfill his
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duty to his father. It is the theme of filial
responsibility which underlies the scenes depicted on the
second door. The focus has shifted from Athens to Crete
and the legend of the Minotaur. While Theseus is not
explicitly mentioned in the narrative, he is, as DuBois
notes, "the link between the repeated action of the events
at Athens, the choosing of the victims, and the single
unwinding of the secret of the labyrinth" (38). Moreover,
in Theseus, Aeneas finds an analogue of himself:
Theseus . . . penetrated the maze at Knossos, just as 
Aeneas will penetrate the maze at Hades. Both must 
enter a confusing, deadly place, undergo a trial, and 
emerge, symbolically reborn. Theseus, like Aeneas, 
benefited from the love of a royal princess, then
abandoned her. He is the predecessor in the myth of
Aeneas, who is soon to meet again with his Regina. 
Dido. (38)
The analogy between the two figures, however, is not one of 
direct correspondence. "Theseus," DuBois reminds us, "left 
his homeland, traveled to a deadly land, and returned, only 
to cause his father Aegeus's death through negligence"
(38). Thus, while Theseus, like Aeneas, is a son who has 
out-lived his father, he also presents an example of the 
son's failure to carry out his filial duty. As such, he is 
a negative rather than an exemplary model for Aeneas.
With the mention of Icarus, Virgil gives us another 
figure whose story mirrors his own hero's life. Just as 
Icarus was entrusted by his father Daedalus with a vital 
task— the escape from Crete— so, too, Aeneas receives his 
mission from Anchises. Icarus, however, failed to heed his
father's words and flew too near the sun. As a result, the 
wax which fastened the wings to his body melted and he fell 
into the Aegean Sea and drowned. Icarus's failure accounts 
for his absence from the images depicted on the temple 
doors. It is that absence which Virgil as narrator draws 
to our attention when he addresses the unfortunate youth: 
"In that high sculpture you, too, would have had / Your 
great part, Icarus, had grief allowed. / Twice your father 
had tried to shape your fall / In gold, but twice his hands 
dropped" (6. 47-50). Icarus's voyage ends in disaster 
because his excessive trust in himself leads him to ignore 
his father's advice; his illusion— shattered by the failure 
of his mission— is the illusion of self-sufficiency.* By 
implication, Aeneas's destiny depends not on the 
realization of his own autonomy but on his reunion with his 
father in Hades.
For Freud, it is the appearance of the father which 
signals the end of that intimate bond with reality— and 
specifically, with the mother's body— which the child 
experiences in the earliest stages of its development. The
6. de Certeau suggests Icarus is a prototype of the modern 
urban dweller who desires to transcend the maze of the 
city: "An Icarus flying above these waters, he can ignore 
the devices of Daedalus in mobile and endless labyrinths 
far below. His elevation transforms him into a voyeur. It 
puts him at a distance. It transforms the bewitching world 
by which one was 'possessed' into a text that lies before 
one's eyes. It allows one to read it, to be a solar Eye, 
looking down like a god. The exaltation of a scopic and 
gnostic drive: the fiction of knowledge is related to this 
lust to be a viewpoint and nothing more" (92).
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threat of castration by the father forces the child to 
repress his incestuous desire for the mother; this 
repression prepares the way for his integration into 
communal life. Having relinquished the maternal bond, the 
child identifies with the symbolic role of the father, a 
role which he himself will be able to take up and realize 
in the future.
In some respects, Aeneas's encounter with Anchises 
corresponds to the Freudian model. It represents a crucial 
stage in the hero's development, the change which makes him 
a father rather than a son, and which confirms him in his 
role as father of the Roman people. But for Virgil's hero, 
the father represents more than simply a place—  however 
central— in a system of social relations. Aeneas is, 
rather, the link between the dead and those yet to be born, 
between his ancestral past and his destined future, between 
the old world of Troy and the new world of the Roman city. 
Just before he is reunited with Anchises, Aeneas is shown 
"the ancient dynasty of Teucer, / Heroes high of heart, 
beautiful scions, / B o r n  in greater days: Ilus, Assaracus,
and Dardanus, who founded Troy" (6. 867-70). Subsequently, 
Anchises reveals to him the "glories" which will "follow 
Dardan generations / In after years" and the famous sons 
who will spring from "Italian blood" in his line (6. 1015- 
17).
Thus, the hero's encounter with his father is more 
than a reunion with his immediate ancestor. In the final 
stage of his journey through the underworld, Aeneas 
encounters a life which transcends that of any single 
individual, a common life shared by all the living, the 
dead and those yet to be born. The hero who has undergone 
physical separation from his Trojan homeland realizes his 
part in a larger community, a community which is made 
possible not by any social mechanism but by the 
transcendent nature of each human being. If Aeneas has 
experienced the duration of exile as a kind of isolation in 
the historical present, he now experiences a simultaneity 
of past and future, a glimpse of eternity.
The vision which Aeneas attains in Hades is a vision 
of a community which far exceeds that of the city which he 
is destined to found. Rome will be realized within the 
span of historical time; as such, it will always fall short 
of the ideal community which transcends the boundaries of 
the historical order. At the same time, however, Rome's 
founding depends on this sense of community with which 
Aeneas emerges from his descent to the underworld. While 
the ideal community can never be perfectly embodied in 
Rome, its anticipation provides the new city with the very 
condition of its existence. It is in this sense, as 
Barbara Bono remarks, that Virgil's poem "looks forward to 
Christian eschatology" (39). "The Aeneid." she suggests.
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"exposes an intensity of longing more dynamic and creative 
than nostalgia, one in which Troy, Carthage, and even Rome 
itself function less as places, as a set of material 
conditions, and more as metaphors for the ideal" (40).
Rome anticipates an ideal world. However, unlike the 
cities of archaic culture, it does not represent an attempt 
to transcend the limitations of historical existence 
itself. On the contrary, the vision of community which 
Aeneas attains in Hades is made possible by the acceptance 
of those very limitations. It is instructive, in this 
regard, to contrast the symbolic movement of Aeneas's 
journey through the underworld with that of Icarus's flight 
from Crete. As we have seen, the latter journey ends in 
the son's fatal separation from his father; it represents 
an egocentric movement which denies the communal nature of 
human existence. Icarus's flight removes him not only from 
his father but from his earthly roots. Implicit in his 
attempt to fly near the sun is a rejection of the finite 
world of earthly existence for the infinite world of the 
heavens, the limitations of human time for the 
boundlessness of eternity. Icarus's journey represents a 
childish dream, the dream that man can ascend to the 
condition of the gods, that by leaving behind the created 
world he can realize his own freedom and autonomy.
Icarus's fate serves as a kind of caution for Virgil's 
hero. It warns him that his own growth in understanding
will not be served by the attempt to simply transcend the 
concrete actualities of existence. Hence, Aeneas's descent 
to the underworld is a movement not away from history but 
toward an apprehension of its deepest reality. It is a 
period during which the hero confronts the ghosts of his 
own past and moves beyond them. Unlike Icarus, whose 
flight from history ends in ignominious death, Aeneas 
descends into the depths of time and reemerges with an 
image of eternity. It is, in other words, precisely 
through the entry into the finite that Aeneas acquires a 
vision of the infinite.
Aeneas's journey through the underworld represents an 
intensification of rather than a radical departure from the 
nature of his experience of exile from Troy. In the midst 
of the confusion surrounding the old city's destruction, 
the hero's mother, Venus, promises to reveal to him the 
nature of his destiny: "I'll tear away the cloud / That 
curtains you, and films your mortal sight, / The fog around 
you" (2. 795-7). That revelation, however, does not come 
to Aeneas immediately; it is, rather, a gradual movement 
toward understanding which requires the hero's patient 
endurance of the trials of exile. Aeneas leaves Troy not 
with a map or blueprint of the new city but with only the 
knowledge that his ancient homeland will soon be destroyed 
forever. Thus, the founding of Rome is engendered in 
radical uncertainty. Indeed, it is Aeneas's courage in the
face of that uncertainty that makes him an exemplary hero: 
"We toiled / to build a fleet, though none could say where 
fate / Would take or settle us" (3. 7-9). It is only when 
he sees the story of the Trojans depicted on the walls of 
the great temple at Carthage that the hero's fears for the 
future are allayed; realizing for the first time the extent 
of Troy's fame, he takes "heart to hope / For safety, and 
to trust his destiny more / Even in affliction" (1. 612- 
14).
Model Cities
Aeneas's destiny, then, is revealed to him not in a single 
moment of insight but rather through the slow passage of 
time. That gradual revelation is frequently realized by 
means of indirection rather than by explicit messages from 
the gods. Just as the images carved on the doors of 
Apollo's temple provide the hero with analogues of his own 
destiny, similarly, the time of exile is the occasion for 
encounters with figures whose endeavors parallel that of 
Aeneas. Andromache and Dido are the most significant of 
these. Like Aeneas, they have been dispossessed of their 
native homelands and have taken on the task of building new 
cities. They are heroes in their own right and Aeneas is 
struck by the nobility with which they have borne their 
trials. Ultimately, however, both of these figures are 
more significant for the negative knowledge they provide 
the hero than for any example he can follow. Aeneas must
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finally leave their cities behind, knowing that they do not 
offer him paradigms for the city which he is destined to 
found.
While Aeneas's experience of exile is one of profound 
loss, the fulfillment of his destiny requires that he not 
succumb to nostalgia, to that paralyzing homesickness for 
the lost world of Troy. Andromache's failure is that she 
has. She is a tragic rather than an epic figure because 
she has allowed herself to be completely overcome by her 
grief for her native city and, as a result, has rendered 
herself incapable of envisioning a new future for herself 
and her people. She appears driven by what Edouard 
Glissant has called reversion, "the obsession with a single 
origin," with "the absolute state of being" (16). The city 
over which she presides with her husband Helenus is the 
most visible sign of that ultimately destructive impulse.
As Aeneas approaches the city gates, he finds before him a 
"Troy in miniature, / A slender copy of our massive tower,
/ A dry brooklet named Xanthus . . . and . . .  a Scaean 
gate" (3. 477-80). Unable to come to terms with the loss 
of Troy, Andromache has given herself over to producing a 
scrupulously precise replica of it. Her nostalgia finds 
its outlet in imitation.
According to Glissant, "not only is imitation itself 
not workable but real obsession with it is intolerable.
The mimetic impulse is a kind of insidious violence. A
people that submits to It takes some time to realize its
consequences collectively and critically, but is
immediately affected by the resulting trauma" (18). Virgil
himself implies that the mimetic impulse is a kind of death
drive. When Aeneas first encounters Andromache, she is
offering libations at a replica of great Hector's tomb, a
replica which is in truth nothing more than "an empty mound
of turf" (3. 412). Thus, Virgil suggests that Andromache's
Ilium is founded not on cherished values carried over from
an older order but on absence. Her imitations are
monuments to death, futile attempts to render permanent
something which no longer exists.
According to Bellamy, "Aeneas' personal history of his
own exile from Troy" is also "the larger narcissistic
origin" of the imperial enterprise itself:
Tracing the westward movement of the signifying chain 
of empire, but . . . seeking always to recuperate Troy 
as its origin, the displacement of energy that 
constitutes the translatio Imperil is the narcissism 
of empire— a displacement that represses and flees 
from the destruction of Troy, even as it nostalgically 
yearns to recuperate the tragic Troiana fortuna into a 
narcissistic revision of imperial "wholeness." (34)
Bellamy, however, ignores the fact that the clearest
instance of narcissism can be seen in the figure of
Andromache herself. It is she rather than Aeneas who
creates a world which serves back to her a reflection of
her own private obsession. Andromache is locked within the
deadly circularity of the narcissistic self, the self which
insulates itself from the reality of history and change.
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Aeneas's encounter with her serves to warn him against the 
futility of attempting to recreate the Trojan past.
However, if the founding of Rome constitutes a new 
departure, it does not necessitate the complete repression 
of the memory of Troy. The hero's task is to found a new 
city not by imitation but by intertextuality, a city which 
will contain the "traces"— to use Glissant's term— of the 
old order but without being identical to it. Aeneas takes 
with him only those elements of his ancient home that can 
be carried across, that are capable of being translated 
into a new context. Thus, the household gods are brought 
to Italy's shores not because they are emblems of a local 
culture but precisely because of their universality. The 
new city will have as its basis not simply a past tradition 
but those qualities which are timeless.
Dido's Carthage appears to offer Aeneas a more vital 
model for his own endeavors than Andromache's little Ilium. 
As he descends the long ledge that provides a view of the 
city, he sees
where lately huts had been,
Marvelous buildings, gateways, cobbled ways,
And din of wagons. There the Tyrians 
Were hard at work: laying courses for walls,
Rolling up stones to build the citadel,
While others picked out building sites and plowed 
A boundary furrow. Laws were being enacted, 
Magistrates and a sacred senate chosen.
Here men were dredging harbors, there they laid 
The deep foundation of a theatre,
And quarried massive pillars to enhance 
The future stage. . . .  (1. 576-87)
Inevitably, the sight of the newly rising city reminds 
Aeneas of his own promised destiny and makes him long for 
an end to his difficult exile: "How fortunate these are / 
Whose city walls are rising here and now!" (1. 595-6).
Thus, when Dido invites him to join her "realm on equal 
terms," he is understandably elated (1. 777). The fact 
that both leaders share in common the difficult experience 
of exile— as Dido reminds Aeneas— makes the idea of their 
union seem all the more natural: "My life / Was one of 
hardship and forced wandering / Like your own, till in this 
land at length / Fortune would have me rest" (1. 857-60).
While the attraction of Carthage for Aeneas is 
obvious, Virgil's account suggests from the beginning that 
Dido's city is somehow inimical to the Trojans' destiny.
We are told in the poem's opening invocation how "hard and 
huge / A task it was to found the Roman people" (1. 48-9). 
Yet, Aeneas is struck by the ease with which Carthage is 
emerging. Its builders carry out their tasks
as bees in early summer 
In sunlight in the flowering fields 
Hum at their work, and bring along the young 
Full-grown to beehood; as they cram their combs 
With honey, brimming all the cells with nectar,
Or take newcomers' plunder, or like troops 
Alerted, drive away the lazy drones,
And labor thrives and sweet thyme scents the honey.
(1. 587-94)
It is not insignificant that Virgil should choose imagery 
from the natural rather than the human world to represent 
the efforts of the Tyrians. It suggests that the
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construction of Carthage is the result not of the willed 
effort of human beings but of the kind of instinctual 
behavior which is characteristic of creatures of nature. 
Aeneas's own task, Virgil implies, is radically different 
from that of the worker bees who carry nectar to fill their 
combs. The new city will be the product not of an 
exclusively natural response but of cooperation between the 
human and divine. Moreover, it will be characterized not 
by the sweetness of the honeypot but by the nobility that 
is borne out of the endurance of suffering.
However, it is only after Aeneas has reveled with Dido 
"all the winter long" that he realizes, aided by Mercury's 
admonition, the folly of remaining at Carthage (4. 264). 
Then, he "Burned only to be gone, to leave that land / Of 
the sweet life behind" (4. 384-5). Virgil's account of the 
ritual union of Aeneas and Dido allows us to understand the 
true character of that life:
Now to the self-same cave 
Came Dido and the captain of the Trojans.
Prime Earth herself and Nuptial Juno
Opened the ritual, torches of lightning blazed,
High Heaven became witness to the marriage,
And nymphs cried out wild hymns from a mountain top. 
That day was the first cause of death, and first 
Of sorrow. Dido had not further qualms 
As to impressions given and set abroad;
She thought no longer of a secret love
But called it marriage. Thus, under that name she hid
her fault. (4. 227-38)
The ceremony that Dido calls marriage is in fact a mere
parody of the city's sacred institution. It takes place
not in a temple within Carthage's walls but in a cave
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hollowed out by nature; a lightning storm substitutes for
torches designed by human hand and the "wild hymns" of
nymphs for sacred music. In Dido's mind, this simulated
ceremony provides a cover for her own surrender to her
passion for Aeneas.
The sorrow which Aeneas feels upon leaving Carthage is
the result not so much of a desire to accept Dido's offer
as of compassion for her grief at his impending departure.
That compassion, Victor Poschl has suggested, is a
manifestation of the hero's humanitas: "He suffers more
because of the sorrow of others than for his own
misfortune. His concern to protect those near to him from
grief and pain never slackens" (44). Aeneas's duty,
however, prevents him from relieving Dido's distress,
despite the relentless pleas brought to him by her sister,
Anna. His steadfastness in the face of those pleas is
likened by Virgil to that of a tree which resists the
assaults made on it by a violent storm:
And just as when the north winds from the Alps 
This way and that contend among themselves 
To tear away an oaktree hale with age,
The wind and tree cry, and the buffeted trunk 
Showers high foliage to earth, but holds 
On bedrock, for the roots go down as far 
Into the underworld as cresting boughs 
Go up in heaven's air: just so this captain,
Buffetted by a gale of pleas
This way and that way, dinned all the day long,
Felt their moving power in his great heart,
And yet his will stood fast; tears fell in vain.
(4. 610-621)
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According to Poschl, the simile expresses "not so much the 
contest between Aeneas and Anna" as "the hero's divided 
heart and painful resignation" (46). Just as the falling 
leaves do not affect the stability of the tree, so,
Aeneas's tears "have no effect on his unshakable 
resolution" (46). Like the tree, he suffers while 
remaining steadfast.
It is important not to forget, however, that Aeneas's 
tears are shed. While his duty prevents him from relieving 
Dido's distress, it does not prohibit him from expressing 
his compassion for her fate. If the hero has aligned his 
will with that of the gods, he has not— at least at this 
point— alienated himself from his fellow man. In fact, 
Virgil seems to draw attention to the very integrity of 
Aeneas's person, an integrity which finds its expression in 
the organic image of the tree. The fact that the tree 
sheds its leaves does not detract from its fundamental 
rootedness. Nor does the fact that Aeneas is moved by 
Dido's fate indicate that he is divided within himself.
Just as the leaves themselves are products of the organic 
life of the tree, so Aeneas's tears are signs of the inner 
life of the man, a life which is as much the source of his 
steadfast will as of his compassion. The tree is an image, 
not simply of the hero's resolution, but of that part of 
his soul where feeling and thought and will and desire have 
their common root. If Virgil previously used the tree to
indicate the order of the Trojan world, he uses it here to 
represent the interior order of man. Moreover, it is 
precisely that interior order which will form the basis of 
the new Roman city. Aeneas, as Barbara Bono has Indicated, 
is "the organic medium through which the past will finally 
be resurrected in a more universal form. He is a life- 
tree, uniting an archetypal primitive past with a more 
sophisticated, comprehensive culture" (36).
Like Plato, then, Virgil regards the order of the city 
as an analogue of an order within man himself. But Virgil 
reveals this truth to us, not in the form of a 
philosophical principle, but through the metaphor of exile. 
When we read the Aeneid, we witness the actual journey of a 
man towards interior order, his struggle in history to 
understand the true order of being. Plato's metaphysics 
tends to give us a vision of man in his purely spiritual 
aspects, removed from the body of the world. But, Virgil 
gives us an image of the whole man— body and soul, spirit 
and flesh, the human heart as it moves through the slow 
passage of concrete time.
Ill
THE CITY AND FOOD 
Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment
In book seven of the Aeneld. the Trojans finally reach
the shores of Italy, thus bringing to a close their long
years of restless wandering. After mooring ship on the
banks of the Tiber, they take repose beneath the boughs of
a tall tree and make a feast,
Putting out on the grass hard wheaten cakes 
As platters for their meal— moved to do this 
By Jupiter himself. These banquet boards 
Of Ceres they heaped up with country fruits.
Now, as it happened, when all else was eaten,
Their neediness drove them to try their teeth 
On Ceres' platters. Boldly with hand and jaw 
They broke the crusted disks of prophecy,
Making short work of all the quartered loaves.
(7. 142-150)
More than any other event, the celebration of the meal 
marks the end of exile, a time which the Trojans have 
experienced as a condition of profound rootlessness and 
disconnection. But if Aeneas and his men have long 
hungered "for the firm earth underfoot," now, through the 
medium of food— the earth's fruit— they establish their 
roots in the Italian soil (1. 236).
In fact, Virgil suggests that there is an intimate 
connection between the act of eating and the founding of a 
settlement. When lulus, the hero's son, playfully remarks
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that they have eaten even their tables, Aeneas suddenly 
recalls the prophecy of his own father, Anchises, who said:
My son, when the time comes 
That hunger on a strange coast urges you,
When food has failed, to eat your very tables,
Then you may look for home: be mindful of it,
Weary as you are, and turn your hand
To your first building there with moat and mound.
(7. 164-169)
On the morning after the feast, Aeneas— mindful of his 
father's words— "marked his line / Of walls with a low 
trench, then toiled away / To deepen it, to throw an 
earthwork up / With palisades, camp style, around that 
post, / Their first, on the riverside" (7. 209-213).
Thus, the choice of site for the first settlement is 
the result not of a purely human decision but of a prophecy 
delivered by Anchises from the gods. However, if the Roman 
settlement is founded by supernatural sanction, it does not 
represent an arbitrary imposition on nature. On the 
contrary, the very medium of the prophecy which reveals its 
location is found in the platters which the Trojans produce 
— inspired by Jupiter himself— from the wheat of the 
fields.* Thus, the food which binds them to the earth also
1. According to conventional wisdom, cities are dependent 
for their food upon rural economies which predate their own 
establishment. Jacobs suggests that the reverse is true, 
that "agriculture itself may have originated in cities" 
(17). The precursor of the urban settlement, she argues, 
is not the rural world of the farm but "a hunting and 
gathering world, sparsely dotted by small and simple 
hunting settlements" (36). Thus, cities emerged not after 
but as the same time as a people begins to produce its own 
food.
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puts them in touch with the will of the gods. It is their 
link at once with the natural and the supernatural world.
When the Trojans devour the "crusted disks of 
prophecy," they literally embody the seeds of the new 
settlement. Unlike the cities of archaic culture, which 
represent an attempt to transcend the human condition, the 
Roman city, Virgil suggests, is a profoundly incarnational 
reality. Although established by divine sanction, it takes 
an unmistakably human form. Rome, as we have seen, appears 
to point towards a reality greater than itself, an ideal 
condition beyond the time of history. But if it faces into 
eternity, it does not lack earthly roots. In fact, perhaps 
more than any other city, Rome is an embodied world. 
Raskolnikov's Appetite
The relation between the city and food which we see in the 
Aeneid is inverted in Feodor Dostoevsky's Crime and 
Punishment. One of the defining characteristics of 
Raskolnikov, the novel's hero and perhaps the 
quintessential urban man of modern literature, is his poor 
appetite. When we encounter him for the first time, we 
find that he has "eaten practically nothing for two days" 
(2). On an empty stomach he makes his way through the 
streets of St. Petersburg's slum district to the room of 
the pawnbroker, realizing as he walks that lack of food has 
made his body weak and his thoughts at times confused. We 
later learn that his landlady had actually "stopped
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supplying him with food two weeks earlier" on account of 
his failure to pay the rent (23). The origin of 
Raskolnikov's weak condition, however, appears to be as 
much his own lack of interest in eating as the landlady's 
refusal to feed him. Although he had been left without 
dinner, "it had not yet occurred to him to go down and have 
things out with her" (23). In fact, it is only because the 
landlady's cook, Nastasya, saves him leftovers that 
Raskolnikov eats much of anything at all.
On the morning after his encounter with Marmeladov, a 
local drunk, Nastasya wakes him: "'Get up!— why are you 
still asleep?' she exclaimed, standing over him; 'it's past 
nine o'clock. I've brought you some tea; wouldn't you like 
some? You'll be wasting away!'" (23). On this occasion, 
Raskolnikov accepts the tea and cabbage soup. However, as 
the time of the murder approaches, his appetite 
deteriorates markedly.
On the morning of the fateful day, he is woken again 
by Nastasya with tea and bread:
"Do you want any tea?"
"Afterwards," he said with an effort, closing his 
eyes again and turning to the wall. Nastasya stood 
over him.
"Perhaps he really is ill," she said, turned on her 
heel and went out.
She came back at two o'clock with some soup. He 
was lying there as before. The tea was untouched. 
Nastasya was quite offended and began to shake him 
roughly.
"Whyever do you still go on sleeping?" she 
exclaimed, looking at him with positive dislike. He 
sat up and remained gazing at the floor without a word 
to her.
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"Are you ill or aren't you?" asked Nastasya, and 
again received no answer.
"You want to go out for a bit," she said, after a 
short silence, "and get a bit of a blow. Are you 
going to have anything to eat, eh?"
"Later," he said feebly. "Clear out!" He waved her 
away. (57)
After she leaves, Raskolnikov picks up a spoon and some 
bread and confronts the soup. However, he eats only two or 
three spoonfuls and those, as Dostoevsky tells us, "without 
appetite, and quite mechanically" (58). His appetite is no 
better the day after his murder of the old pawnbroker.
After walking around the city for about six hours, he 
returns exhausted to his room where Nastasya brings him 
another plate of soup. Once again she remarks on his poor 
appetite: "'I suppose you've had nothing to eat since 
yesterday. You've been wandering about all day, and you've 
got a fever'" (98). Finally, Raskolnikov asks for a drink. 
But upon swallowing only a few drops of water, he falls 
into a delirium which lasts for several days.
When he regains full consciousness, he is visited by 
his friend Razumikhin, who informs him of the nature of his 
condition:
You've hardly eaten or drunk anything for three days. 
It's true they did give you tea in a spoon. I brought 
Zosimov to see you twice. Do you remember him? He 
examined you carefully, and said at once that it was 
nothing much— you've just been a bit queer in the 
head. Some sort of nonsensical nervous trouble, and 
the wrong sort of food, he says, not enough beer and 
horse-radish; that made you ill, but it's nothing— it 
will pass, and you'll be all right again. He's a 
clever chap, Zosimov. His treatment was capital.(100)
Razumikhin subsequently asks Nastasya to bring some soup,
which she soon returns with along with "two spoons, two
plates, and a complete set of condiments: salt, pepper,
mustard for the beef, and other things that had not been
seen on his table, in such neat order, for a long time
past" (102). Then, he sits down beside his friend and
begins to feed him: "Raskolnikov eagerly swallowed a
spoonful, then a second and a third" (102). However,
"after a few more mouthfuls," Razumikhin, always concerned
for Raskolnikov's health, stops, "explaining that he must
consult Zosimov about any more" (102).
His concern for the hero doesn't prevent Razumikhin
himself from partaking of the food which Nastasya has
prepared. After agreeing to allow Raskolnikov some tea, he
draws over the soup and beef and begins to eat, as
Dostoevsky indicates, "with as much appetite as though he
had not broken his fast for three days" (102). The gentle
irony of the last remark only serves to emphasize the
difference between the respective attitudes of the two
friends toward food. While Raskolnikov has been wasting
away in bed, Razumikhin— far from fasting— has been a
willing guest at the landlady's table:
"I've been having dinner here at your place every day, 
Rodya, my dear fellow," he muttered as clearly as a 
mouth stuffed with beef would allow, "and Pashenka, 
your nice little landlady, has provided it; she 
delights to feed me. I, of course do not demand it; 
but I don't, as a matter of fact, raise any objections 
either." (102-3)
When Nastasya brings in the tea, Razumikhin leaves his 
luncheon and returns to the sofa where Raskolnikov is 
lying: "As before, he put his left arm round the sick man's 
head, raised him, and began to feed him tea-spoonfuls of 
tea, again blowing on them fervently and incessantly, as if 
this process of blowing were the most important and 
salutary part of the treatment" (103). Not wishing to 
reveal the extent of his recovery, Raskolnikov indulges his 
friend's excessive attentions. However, he cannot "quite 
master his repugnance" (103). After "he had swallowed a 
dozen spoonfuls of tea, he jerked his head free, pettishly 
pushed away the spoon, and lay back again on his pillow" 
(103).
The rest of the novel is similarly characterized by 
abundant references to Raskolnikov's eating habits. Even 
in its closing chapter, as he lies imprisoned in a Siberian 
jail, we are reminded of the lack of interest in food which 
marks his behavior throughout: "And what did he care for 
the food— that thin cabbage soup with cockroaches in it?
In his former life, when he was a student, he had often not 
had even that" (458).
The hero's relation to food alerts us to the radical 
shift which the status of the city undergoes in the novel, 
the most profound virtual expression of modernity. Urban 
life no longer offers a contrast with the nomadic existence 
which for the epic poet predates the city founding. Quite
100
the reverse, the very condition of the city is exile, its 
typical representative the one most separated from the 
living community of humanity. Whereas in the Aeneid the 
celebration of a meal marks the beginning of a communal 
existence rooted in the sacramentality of the earth, in 
Crime and Punishment the hero's inability to partake of 
food is a sign of his profound alienation, his isolation 
within a culture which is grounded not in community but in 
atomistic individualism. This chapter attempts to flesh 
out the relation between the hero and his urban environment 
through a more in-depth exploration of Dostoevsky's use of 
the symbolism of food.
Food and the Novel
Gian-Paolo Biasin has argued that the representation of
food is actually central to the novel as a genre:
If it is true that at the foundation of an entire 
trend of the novel, intended as the bourgeois and 
modern literary genre, there is the fiction of the 
representation of reality, it is equally true that a 
fundamental part of this reality is made up of food, 
nutrition, meals, the various rituals that surround 
and accompany the fulfillment of an elementary, 
biological need like hunger. (3)
The most obvious function of food in the novel, Biasin
indicates, is the achievement of realism: "it produces the
verisimilitude of the text by guaranteeing its coherence at
the referential level and by intimately linking the
literary expression with the pretextual, historical or
sociological level” (11). Thus, the realistic novel
dictates that the food which its characters eat must be
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true to life. That is, it must accurately reflect such 
determinants as their social and economic status, their 
country of origin, whether they are rural or urban and the 
time in which they live. A Moll Flanders eating pizza 
would be perceived as a historical and geographical 
incongruity— a lack of verisimilitude. Similarly, "a too- 
sumptuous meal for a poor character (unless it signals a 
great occasion)" or "a too-frugal meal for a noble or rich 
character (unless there is a moral or economic 
justification)" would make the novel less believable (11). 
By corollary, the "mimetic" function of food "allows the 
novel, in an immediately recognizable and evident manner, 
to reflect the changing contemporary reality" (12).
Dostoevsky, however, was not interested in achieving 
verisimilitude for its own sake. Indeed, the aim of simply 
reproducing the empirical reality of his time— an aim 
which, as we have seen, is characteristic of a large part 
of the novelistic tradition— was something of which he was 
profoundly skeptical. That skepticism, however, did not 
lead him to discount the artist's role as depicter of the 
real. Quite the contrary, Dostoevsky's criticism of his 
realist contemporaries was not that they were too realistic 
but that they were not realistic enough. "My idealism is 
more real than theirs," he wrote to his friend, Maikov: 
"Their realism does not know how to explain a hundredth 
part of the real facts that have actually taken place. But
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we by our idealism have even prophesied facts. It has 
happened" (quoted in Mochulsky 358).
If Dostoevsky called himself "a realist in a higher 
sense," his view was not one which left out the realm of 
concrete actuality. As Donald Fanger has remarked, he 
"took special pains to keep within the bounds of the 
empirically possible, the outer limits of literary realism" 
(223). The food which Raskolnikov eats— or more often than 
not rejects— is not incongruous with the life of an 
impoverished student living in Petersburg in the middle of 
the nineteenth century. Konstantin Mochulsky also notes 
the presence of the empirical level in Dostoevsky's work: 
in him "the greatest flights of fancy are joined with a 
painstaking study of facts. He always began his ascent 
from the low grounds of everyday reality" (358). However, 
as Mochulsky implies, the "low grounds" are only the 
beginning for Dostoevsky. Indeed, if he was interested in 
the external world at all, it was only insofar as man was a 
part of it. "Nothing exterior," Nicholas Berdyaev remarks, 
"whether it belonged to nature, to society, or to manners 
and customs, had any reality in itself for Dostoievsky"
(Dostoievsky 41). His work "knows nothing outside of man" 
(40). If "In all his novels, he shows us towns, with low 
taverns, and stinking tenements," it is because "a town is 
an environment in which man lives, an episode in his
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history. Impregnated by him, the painted scenery against 
which he moves" (40).
Mikhail Bakhtin makes essentially the same point in 
his discussion of Dostoevesky's poetics: "Dostoevsky never 
left anything of any real consequence outside the realm of 
his major heroes' consciousness . . .  he brings them into 
dialogic contact with everything essential that enters the 
world of his novels" (73). As Bakhtin suggests, this is as 
true of Raskolnikov as it is of Dostoevsky's other heroes; 
"Everything that he sees and observes . . .  is drawn into 
dialogue, responds to his questions, and puts new questions 
to him, provokes him, argues with him, or reinforces his 
own thoughts" (75).
For Dostoevsky, then, food is not simply a means of 
grounding the novel in the historical world. Far more 
important is the hero's relation to food, a relation which 
offers an index of his relation to reality itself. Food 
functions as a kind of medium through which Raskolnikov 
encounters— and either accepts or rejects— the world around 
him. It performs what Biasin calls a "cognitive" function: 
"food is used to stage the search for meaning that is 
carried out every time one reflects on the relationship 
among the self, the world, and others— or among the 
subject, nature and history" (17).
It is precisely this function which the French 
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss identifies in his
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analysis of the role of food in the myths of the Bororo and
Ge Indian peoples. In the myths, Levi-Strauss shows, food
is used to distinguish between nature and culture. If raw
food belongs to nature, "cooking brings about the cultural
transformation of the raw" (142). As Octavio Paz indicates
in his discussion of Levi-Strauss, "cooking is itself a
myth, a metaphor of culture" (48). But why do men need to
distinguish between nature and culture in the first place?
"Men do not have to cook food," Edmund Leach remarks; "they
do so in order to show that they are men and not beasts"
(97). Like Freud, Levi-Strauss sees culture as the result
of certain strictures— the incest taboo is a fundamental
one— which regulate the kind of spontaneous behavior that
is characteristic of animals. Both cooking and the incest
taboo are "homologues of language," Paz notes:
The former is a mediation between the raw and the 
decayed, the animal world and the vegetable; the 
latter between endogamy and exogamy, wanton 
promiscuity and the onanism of a solitary individual. 
The model of both is the word, the bridge between the 
shout and silence, between the nonsignificance of 
nature and the insignificance of men. (50)
Clearly, then, the need to distinguish between nature and
culture does not imply a need to separate them entirely.
Although man sees himself as other than nature, in order to
subsist he must retain relations with it. He does not want
to eat like an animal, but he must eat nevertheless. Thus,
cooking is an activity "which at once separates and unites
the natural world and the human world" (50). It "is
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conceived of in native thought," Levi-Strauss says, "as a
form of mediation" (64).
Levi-Strauss identifies two strictly parallel
mythological series among the Ge tribes: "In one series,
culture begins with the theft of fire from the jaguar
[which results in the first cooked food]; in the other,
with the introduction of cultivated plants" (187). But in
both series, Levi-Strauss indicates, "the origin of man's
loss of immortality is linked with the advent of civilized
life" (187). "Death," as Paz remarks,
is the real difference, the dividing line between man 
and the current of life. . . .  To feel oneself and 
know oneself to be mortal is to be different: death 
condemns us to culture. Without it there would be no 
arts or trades: language, cooking and kinship rules 
are mediations between the immortal life of nature and 
the brevity of human existence. (51)
Culture itself, Paz implies, is a process of mediation, an
attempt to introduce a middle term between opposite states,
the raw and the decayed, the animal and vegetable world,
cannibalism and vegetarianism, and most fundamentally, life
and death.
In the myths which Levi-Strauss discusses, then, food 
takes on a cognitive role. It becomes a way of knowing 
reality. But the knowledge of which we are speaking is a 
knowledge which divides up the world, a way of knowing 
which depends on the possibility of making distinctions and 
identifying categories. Thus, it is precisely the 
differentiation of food that allows it to perform its
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cognitive role. The distinction between the raw and the
cooked allows reality to be known as both natural and
cultural. When food is differentiated, though, it becomes
something other than its actual reality. As the raw and
the cooked, food becomes a sign of both nature and culture.
Thus, its cognitive function has as its complement what
Biasin calls a "tropological" function, a function which he
suggests is inherent in literature. The tropological
is the analogic transformation (metaphor), or the 
displacement by contiguity (metonymy), or the linking 
by comparison or similitude . . . whereby a given food 
is also other than what it is literally, and this 
other (a rhetorical figure) often contains within 
itself an entire discourse. A discourse may be moral, 
ideological, affective, or social, but when it is 
expressed within a rhetorical figure it is first and 
foremost a literary discourse— that is, an inquiry, a 
knowledge, and an expression that are literature's 
own, and not historiography's or gastronomy's. (20)
Perhaps Biasin is too quick to reduce literature to simply
the use of figurative language. After all, the poet does
not create symbols ex nihilo. Rather, he has as his raw
material the symbolic life of the culture in which he finds
himself. From that culture he takes his symbols and
refashions them for his own artistic ends. In fact, Biasin
himself suggests this at an earlier point in his book:
"When the novel deals with food, a culinary sign, it adds
richness to richness, it superimposes its own system of
signs and meanings onto the signifying system, variously
codified, of cooking" (4).
One could argue that anthropology deals with reality 
in much the same way. Paz notes that Levi-Strauss' book, 
The Raw and the Cooked, "is a metalanguage and 
simultaneously, a myth of myths" (77). It analyzes a 
symbolic system but at the same time recasts that system in 
the light of its own values, thus creating another system. 
If the anthropologist is a poet of sorts, the poet himself 
is something of an anthropologist. Indeed, Berdyaev 
suggests precisely this of Dostoevsky: he "devoted the 
whole of his creative energy to one single theme, man and 
man's destiny. He was anthropological and anthropocentric 
to almost inexpressible degree" (39). The point is not 
that the anthropologist is as subjective as the novelist, 
as some might have it. Quite the reverse, in fact; each, 
in his particular fashion, is a theorist of reality. To be 
sure, the anthropologist's emphasis is scientific, whereas 
the novelist's is poetic. One is primarily analytical, the 
other intuitive. But it is the fact that both present us 
with symbolic worlds that forms the basis of any comparison 
between them.
The City and Nature
Levi-Strauss provides us with an important pattern against 
which to examine Dostoevsky's use of the symbolism of food. 
But for the nineteenth-century novelist, the nature-culture 
contrast does not possess the epistemological validity 
which it clearly had for the recorder of tribal myths.
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This is to some degree a result of the degeneration of the 
contrast into a simplistic opposition between country and 
city at the hands of the pastoral poets of the previous 
century. Country life, in eighteenth-century pastoral, is 
frequently presented as an existence in which man is wholly 
absorbed into an idyllic nature, into a life as innocent 
and carefree as those of the sheep who roam happily on the 
hillside or of the birds who sing from the branches. In 
other words, it is a life in which the arts of culture are 
no longer necessary.2
This hind of representation reflects the tendency of 
many in the eighteenth century to regard society itself as 
an essentially artificial entity, a tendency which found an 
earlier reflection in the political theory of Hobbes. If 
society is conceived as entirely separate from nature, then 
the appeal of a poetry which offers an escape to a wholly 
natural world is obvious. Of course, for Hobbes, nature is 
a state of war from which society is a necessary 
protection. In much of eighteenth-century pastoral, as 
well as in the writings of Rousseau, the terms remain the 
same but their content is reversed. Nature becomes a 
refuge from a society which is corrupt and warlike.
2. Richard Feingold discusses the divorce of art and 
nature in William Cowper's The Task in chapter five of his 
Nature and Society: Later Eighteenth-Century Uses of the 
Pastoral and Georqlc.
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Each of these versions of the contrast between nature 
and culture is a reduction of that which is most 
characteristic of the tradition of pastoral poetry, a 
tradition which, as Raymond Williams indicates, stretches 
back "many centuries beyond Virgil to the Works and Davs of 
Hesiod, to the ninth century before Christ" (14). What we 
find in Hesiod, Williams notes, is not the depiction of a 
wholly natural world but "an epic of husbandry, in the 
widest sense: the practice of agriculture and trading 
within a way of life in which prudence and effort are seen 
as primary virtues" (14). Although inextricably bound up 
with nature, it is not the perfect life of a distant Golden 
Age. For Hesiod, at the beginning of country literature, 
the Golden Age is already far in the past. "It is,” as 
Williams notes, "the character of his own 'iron age' that 
determines his recommendation of practical agriculture, 
social justice and neighborliness. It is from the 'life of 
pain' that these practices can deliver a working community" 
(14).
In Hesiod, then, there is clearly a tension between 
the natural and the human world, although they are at the 
same time connected. Nature proceeds inevitably, autumn 
following summer and spring following winter in a series of 
endless cycles. Man's life, by contrast, is one of toil 
and suffering. The land must be ploughed and crops sown 
before the harvest can be reaped. The fertility of summer
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Is preceded by the barrenness of winter. Nature goes on, 
but man's life ends with death. Thus, the earliest form of 
country writing is not simply an evocation of nature. 
Rather, one finds within the rural world itself precisely 
the kind of contrast between nature and culture that Levi- 
Strauss identifies in the tribal myths.
From the time that pastoral emerges as a literary form 
during the Hellenistic period, its depiction of the rural 
way of life begins to acquire an idealizing tendency. But, 
Williams remarks, "even in these developments . . . there 
is almost invariably a tension with other kinds of 
experience" (18). At the time Virgil was writing his 
Eclogues, the Italian countryside and its farmers—
Virgil's father was one of them— faced the possibility of 
violence as war veterans were resettled by large-scale 
confiscation. Thus, "the contrast within Virgilian 
pastoral is between the pleasures of rural settlement and 
the threat of loss and eviction" (17). The pressures of 
history threaten to sever the connections which man has 
established with nature.
Williams's criticism of later pastoral poetry is that 
"these living tensions are excised, until there is nothing 
countervailing, and selected images stand as themselves: 
not in a living but in an enamelled world" (18). Williams 
himself, though, is too apt to criticize the idealizations 
of pastoral, and often appears to assume that its only
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valid function is the depiction of the actual social
conditions of country life. As a result, he is led to date
the beginning of the genre's degeneration to as far back as
the Renaissance. E. Kegel-Brinkgreve, however, has
suggested that the very mark of pastoral is the tension it
embodies between the ideal and the actual; the pastoral
world is "contrast and simultaneously mirror of the urban
or courtly one" (581). To simply excise the ideal,
therefore, is to create a world as tenslonless as one that
is exclusively ideal.
The principal target of Williams's criticism, though,
is eighteenth-century pastoral and, in that instance, the
charge of excessive idealization is far from spurious. Two
of the most influential treatises on the subject, which
actually date from the latter half of the previous century,
were written by Thoyras Paul de Rapin and M de Bernard
Fontenelle— both Frenchmen.^ Although each represented a
different school of thought, Rapin the ancients and
Fontenelle the moderns, together they effectively effaced
from the pastoral world the tensions of actual existence.
The main bone of contention, Williams notes, was
whether such an idyll, the delightful Pastoral, should 
be referred always to the Golden Age, as Rapin and the 
neo-classicists argued; or to the more permanent and
3. Rapin's Eclogae sacrae cum Dissertatlone de carmine 
pastoralli was published in 1659. In 1688 Fontenelle wrote 
his Discours sur la nature de 1*eclogue. Both treatises 
were a significant influence on Pope, although his main 
allegiance was to Rapin's neo-classical outlook.
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indeed timeless idea of the tranquillity of life in 
the country, as Fontenelle and others maintained. In 
the former case, because it was the Golden Age, there 
was really peace and innocence. In the latter, there 
could be an idea of these, a conventional literary 
illusion in native and contemporary scenes. (19)
The distinction seems moot, since in both cases the
pastoral world is entirely separated from historical
reality. As Kegel-Brinkgreve remarks, "its appeal is that
of nostalgia pure and simple" (581).
With the enormous changes wrought on the urban
environment by the industrial revolution, the capacity of
the nature-culture contrast to explain reality was further
weakened. Alexander Welsh has suggested that the "greatest
single factor affecting nineteenth-century views of the
city was simply its size" (19). London, for example,
doubled in population between 1801 and 1841 to become a
city of two and a quarter million people, a population
which doubled again over the next forty years. As Welsh
indicates, these kinds of statistics "readily confirmed
what was palpable to the eye and measured by the fact of
anyone born near the beginning of the century" (19).
Moreover, the result of this sort of exponential growth was
that "the word 'metropolis' took on connotations of pride
mixed with anxiety" (19).
That anxiety is reflected in the metaphors which the
nineteenth century developed to express the changed reality
of urban life. One was the idea of the city as a kind of
organic system which had grown beyond the limits of human
control. The feeling that permeates Dickens's Bleak House.
Fred Schwarzbach suggests, "Is that London is a kind of
cancerous growth irreversibly enveloping everything around
it" (Dickens 146). Welsh remarks that such a view of the
city was at once encouraging and frightening. On the one
hand, "the monster . . . might be studied and somehow
mastered" (29). On the other hand, it "seemed to exist for
its own sake, obeying physical laws of its own and growing
incessantly" (29). A similar metaphor is that of the
prison. It figures strongly, for example, in Dickens's
Little Dorrit and in Blake's poem "London," where the city
is depicted as a kind of mental prison which imposes "mind-
forg'd manacles" on its inhabitants. Whereas the city as
system suggests a presence so invasive that it encompasses
the whole of reality, the city as prison suggests a reality
so closed as to make escape impossible. Both metaphors
express the idea that the city cannot be avoided, that
there is no natural world which can offer a contrast to the
hellish urban environment. In fact, as Francoise Choay
notes, in the "new mythology" of the urban imagination, the
city itself occupies the part formerly played by nature:
In pre-industrial times the built up agglomeration—  
hamlet, village, town— was experienced as the 
reassuring element where man discovers himself in 
opposition to nature. Since the industrial 
revolution, the urban fabric itself, the big cities, 
conurbations, etc., have appeared to the collective 
consciousness as another nature, a mysterious 
wilderness, threatening man's existence. (171)
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If the city is imagined as another nature, it is a nature 
gone bad— as in the city as cancerous growth— an abnormal 
nature which expresses the unnatural quality of urban 
life.4
That unnatural quality is one which Dostoevsky 
identifies in the life of Petersburg. Svidrigaylov, the 
bizarre suicide in Crime and Punishment, suggests that 
there "are few places which exercise such strange, harsh, 
and sombre influences on the human spirit” (394). The 
"absence of nature" in the city, Fanger notes, is evident 
from— among other things— the paucity of plant-life: "the 
only vegetation . . . are the pathetic geraniums in 
Raskolnikov's room and the pitiful spruce trees and two 
bushes of the 'pleasure garden'" (203). However, if the 
urban environment is wholly unnatural, Dostoevsky does not 
offer the rural world as an alternative. Crime and 
Punishment. Burton Pike remarks, "is so thoroughly a city
4. The value attached to the new and apparently all- 
encompassing urban reality was not always negative.
Williams points out that for Baudelaire the sense of 
isolation and disconnection felt in the city were the 
conditions of a new and lively perception: "There was a new 
kind of pleasure, a new enlargement of identity, in what he 
called bathing oneself in the crowd" (234). In the 
twentieth century, Williams indicates, this response would 
become the dominant one: "There might still be a contrast 
of the city with the country, drawing on the older sense of 
rural settlement and innocence. But the contrast would 
work the other way: of consciousness with ignorance; of 
vitality with routine; of the present with the past or 
lost. City experience was becoming so widespread, and 
writers, disproportionately, were so deeply involved in it, 
that there seemed little reality in any other mode of life" 
(235).
novel that it allows of no Rousseau-like contrast between 
urban corruption and country idyll" (96). In fact, all of 
the major characters who at the outset of the novel are 
living in the country*— Raskolnikov's mother and sister, 
Luzhin and Svidrigaylov— sooner or later come to the city. 
Not even when we hear of the society of the provincial town 
from which they come are we offered any real contrast with 
urban life. As Pike remarks, "it sounds as demented as the 
Petersburg we see" (96).
The Soul of the City
The very invisibility of a natural alternative to the 
degradation of the city allows the modern writer to turn 
his attention to the problem of man himself. As Lowe 
notes, the shift in modern literature "from the aesthetic 
aspects of earthly delights . . .  to not only the 
antisocial, but the inhumane characteristics of the earthly 
city" involves a new sense of moral purpose: "By portraying 
society in the negative, the moral order yearned for by the 
modern writer is implicit by its ironic absence" (50).
For Dostoevsky, the unnatural quality of life in 
Petersburg is a reflection not so much of culture per se as 
of a disorder in the soul of its people. Escape from the 
city does not solve the problem of man's degradation 
precisely because the problem inheres in man rather than in 
the city itself. "Theories, like cities," Fanger remarks, 
"are made by men and their creators must come to terms with
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them; escape cannot remove the problem of reconciling 
'living life' with the conditions of city life" (194).
As Berdyaev indicates, Dostoevsky's anthropology does 
not posit man "as just a natural phenomenon, like any other 
though rather superior" (39). Of course, man's difference 
from nature, as we have seen, is precisely the focus of the 
thought of Levi-Strauss. But for Levi-Strauss, that 
difference is culture itself; language, cooking, the incest 
taboo— these attributes, which are entirely absent in 
nature, distinguish man from beast. As Edmund Leach has 
noted, Levi-Strauss tends to equate man's difference from 
nature with his very humanity: "the humanity of man is that 
which is non-natural" (121). However, recognizing those 
aspects of man which are absent in nature is merely a 
starting point for any investigation of what it means to be 
human. That man cooks his food is a sign that he is 
different from animals, but it does not define him. Not 
even the total sum of the differences between man and beast 
give us an adequate definition of humanity, since they 
clearly share many attributes.*
Of course, for Levi-Strauss, it is the fact of these 
shared attributes which requires men to distinguish 
themselves from animals in the first place. Man needs 
food, just as do animals. But precisely because eating is
5. William Irwin Thompson offers a provocative discussion 
of this issue in his Imaginary Landscape: Making Worlds of 
Myth and Science (144-146).
a constant reminder of his link with nature, it requires 
some form of mediation. Cooking, therefore, becomes the 
means by which nature is transformed into culture. But it 
is a transformation which is never complete. Cooking is a 
kind of compromise which at once separates and unites man 
and the natural world. That man's food is cooked is a sign 
of his difference from nature, but insofar as he eats at 
all, he resembles an animal. In "The Structural Study of 
Myth," Levi-Strauss maintains that the purpose of myth is 
to provide a logical model capable of resolving this kind 
of contradiction. He adds, though, that this is "an 
impossible achievement if, as it happens, the contradiction 
is real” (229). Paz remarks that the logic of myth, as 
Levi-Strauss defines it, "does not confront reality" and, 
thus "its coherence is merely formal." "I admit," he says, 
"that myth is logical, but I do not see how it can be 
knowledge" (37). If Paz is right, then the myths which 
deal with the origins of humanity, at least as far as Levi- 
Strauss interprets them, evade rather than answer the 
question of what it means to be human.
There is, however, another aspect of Levi-Strauss1s 
work which takes us in a more promising direction. In his 
study of myth, Levi-Strauss rejects the semantic approach 
which remains at the level of manifest content. He seeks 
instead to uncover the hidden structure of unchanging 
patterns and regularities which informs the entire corpus
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of apparently disparate myths. For Levi-Strauss, that 
structure is not the property of any single culture but a 
kind of collective unconscious or pensee sauvaae shared by 
all human beings. Thus, if on the one hand, he suggests 
that the humanity of man is that which is other than 
nature, on the other hand, he points to the existence of a 
reality which is universally true of the human mind; and as 
Leach notes, what "is universally true must be natural" 
(121).
This is a paradox in Levi-Strauss's work, but a useful 
one, nonetheless, since it actually suggests a solution to 
the problem of man's difference from nature. If the 
difference is simply culture, then man's humanity is 
defined in wholly negative terms. Moreover, it is an 
entirely fraught definition, since culture itself requires 
for its continuity a certain relationship with nature; 
man's humanity— that which is non-natural— is forever 
threatened by his dependence on nature. But if 
anthropological research reveals a hidden stratum of 
meaning common to all cultures, as Levi-Strauss suggests it 
does, then culture itself can no longer be understood as 
the term which distinguishes man from beast. Culture does 
not make us human. Rather, it is a manifestation of the 
human spirit itself. Ultimately, it is that spirit rather 
than any cultural mechanism which distinguishes us from 
animals.
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Like Levi-Strauss, Dostoevsky sought to delve beneath 
the surface phenomena of the empirical world to uncover the 
ultimate realities of human existence. For Dostoevsky, as 
Berdyaev indicates, those realities "are not the external 
forms of life, flesh and blood, but their inner depths, the 
destiny of the human spirit" (25-6). His themes inhere in 
the man-made world of the city rather than in nature 
precisely because the city is the place where the human 
spirit finds its expression. In Crime and Punishment.
Fanger remarks, the city which is rendered with such 
"striking concreteness" is also "a city of the mind in the 
way that its atmosphere answers Raskolnikov's spiritual 
condition and almost symbolizes it" (194). Indeed, in some 
of his early sketches of life in St. Petersburg, Dostoevsky 
personifies the city— as a convalescent gentleman, a 
spoiled son and, perhaps most significantly, as a sickly 
child, an image which Fanger notes "recurs throughout his 
work, from Netochka Nezvanova to the Marmeladov children of
Crime and Punishment" (145). Thus, Dostoevsky humanizes
the environment of his hero. If the modern city appears to
reduce man to isolated insignificance, in Crime and 
Punishment the world again becomes his. The city is 
presented not as a reality which determines and delimits 
human existence but as a projection of the human spirit 
itself.
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For Dostoevsky, then, only man's spiritual
regeneration can offer an alternative to the spiritual
degradation of the city. His central concern, as Michael
Holguist observes, is conversion:
in order to be reborn, the old self must die. We are 
here touching on the main theme of Crime and 
Punishment. . . . This radical break in identity is 
present in almost all accounts of conversion (even 
when they are "secondary conversions") experiences: 
Augustine, the rhetor, dies, as the future bishop of 
Hippo is born; Thomas Aquinas, after his experience, 
on the Feast of St. Nicholas in 1273, dies as a 
scholar . . . .  In Raskolnikov's case this mystical 
suppression of self, the death of his old identity 
. . . is just as decisive as was the death of an even 
earlier self, the one that dies in the act of murder. 
Raskolnikov is a completely different person as the 
epilogue closes: "And what were all, all the torments 
of the past? everything, even his crime, even his 
sentence and his exile seemed to him now . . . to be 
something external and strange, as if it had not 
happened to him at all.1' (94-95)
Thus, the ruling contrast in Crime and Punishment is not
between nature and culture but between two conditions of
the soul. It is a contrast, Vyacheslav Ivanov notes,
"between alienation from Earth and oneness with it; between
defection from men and union with them; . . . between the
slow climb towards the light, and the sudden plunge into
darkness" (73).
Unlike the contrast between nature and culture, which
transcends the fact of the human psyche, the contrast which
Dostoevsky draws exists within the hero himself. David
Matual observes that Raskolnikov's behavior
passes through two distinctly and seemingly 
contradictory phases, the one quickly succeeding the 
other: first he shows a profound sympathy toward those
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in need and takes immediate steps to relieve their 
suffering; afterwards he feels disgust with himself 
for having betrayed his intellectual principles. (28)
That Razumikhin, Raskolnikov's only friend, can speak of
"two opposite personalities" in the hero is evidence,
Matual suggests, that his rise to new life in the epilogue
is not "a deus ex machina" concocted by Dostoevsky "in
order to save his hero from a permanent state of alienation
and moral corruption" (26). The more human side of the
hero, which we see at different moments throughout the
novel, indicates that he "is psychologically capable of the
extraordinary events that begin in the epilogue" (27).
However, as Matual notes, the "periodic manifestations
of kindness in his behavior represent only the potential
for rebirth" (30). For Dostoevsky, this potential is only
realized in freedom; Berdyaev remarks that Dostoevsky's
belief in man's freedom is directly associated with what
has been called his cruelty:
He was "cruel" because he would not relieve man of his 
burden of freedom, he would not deliver him from 
suffering at the price of such a loss, he insisted 
that man must accept an enormous responsibility 
corresponding to his dignity as a free being. (67)
Thus, in Dostoevsky's novels, the hero's destiny is not
decided from above. Nor is it pre-determined by his place
in life— his family position, his social class and status,
his age or his past. Bakhtin notes that in the socio-
psychological, the everyday, and the family or biographical
novel, the hero's humanity is revealed only within the
122
strict framework of these stable determinants. But, in 
Dostoevsky's novels, the hero is always represented "on the 
threshold of a final decision, at a moment of crisis, at an 
unfathomable— and unpredetermlnable turning point for his 
soul" (61).
Dostoevsky does not discount the reality of social 
determinants, as the radical existentialists of our own 
century have done. On the contrary, these external 
determinants constitute forces which appear to be 
overwhelming, and give much of the novel the flavor of 
tragedy. But for Dostoevsky, man is not finally reducible 
to the framework of his society. In fact, it is his excess 
over that framework which Dostoevsky attempts to represent 
when he depicts his hero on the threshold. His method, 
which Bakhtin explains so well, was not least a means of 
countering the mechanistic psychology of his own day, a 
psychology in which he saw "a degrading reification of a 
person's soul, a discounting of its freedom and its 
unfinalizability" (61). In Dostoevsky's works, Bakhtin 
indicates, "the hero is not 'he' and not 'I' but a fully 
valid 'thou,' that is, another and other autonomous 'I'
('thou art’)" (63).
The Two Cities
As bowe observes, the nature of urban life and the 
predicament of modern man encourage an apocalyptic vision 
of the city in modern literature: "The very speed with
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which time passes in the modern city creates a sense of 
urgency. Violence is the usual corollary to this state of 
mind" (63). Raskolnikov's murder of the pawnbroker and her 
sister constitutes a desperate attempt to escape the urban 
wasteland. But the very act is both a profound symbol of 
the city's degraded life and a prophesy of its ultimate 
self-destruction.
The "counterpoint to the threat of the City of Dis," 
Lowe remarks, "is the vision of the heavenly city" (63). 
Although this ideal condition is not realized within the 
time-span of Dostoevsky's novel, it finds its human 
embodiment in the person of Sonya. If Raskolnikov's crime 
is an emblem of the falling city, an image of degeneration 
and decay, she offers a symbol of the New Jerusalem.
Of course, the most famous presentation of the idea of 
the two cities is found in Augustine's The City of God. It 
is important to note that Augustine identifies neither the 
heavenly nor the earthly city with any single human 
society. They are essentially mystical entities that 
originated in the choice of the angels to serve or rebel 
against their Creator: "there is no need to suppose four
cities, two of angels and two of men. We may speak of two
cities, or communities, one consisting of the good, angels
as well as men, and the other of evil” (12. 1).
For Augustine, then, the city of history is a dynamic 
reality, one which is continually becoming. Insofar as it
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is oriented towards love of God, it moves towards its 
fulfillment in the heavenly city. Insofar as it is self­
oriented to the point of contempt for God, it becomes an 
image of the earthly city; it is either Babylon or 
Jerusalem. The city, in other words, is never static. It 
is always in motion towards either peace or war, love or 
hate, redemption or destruction.
Augustine, to be sure, reserves the metaphor of the 
journey for those who are citizens of the City of God in 
this life: "in their persons the City is on pilgrimage 
until the time its kingdom comes" (15.1). Abel, he tells 
us, was one of these citizens, "a pilgrim and stranger in 
the world, belonging as he did to the City of God" (15.1). 
Cain, by contrast, founded a city which had "its beginning 
and end on this earth, where there is no hope of anything 
beyond what can be seen in this world" (15.17). Thus, if 
Abel is the archetypal pilgrim, Cain is the archetypal 
settler. However, for Augustine, the idea of earthly 
settlement is ultimately an illusion. The city which 
identifies its ultimate end in this life will not enjoy the 
stability it desires. In fact, Augustine says that "the 
earthly city is generally divided against itself by 
litigation, by battles, by the pursuit of victories that 
bring death with them or at best are doomed to death" 
(15.4).
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Like Augustine, Dostoevsky presents the city as a mode 
of existence which is always at the point of transition.
As Bakhtin indicates, the city in Crime and Punishment is 
shown
on the borderline between existence and nonexistence, 
reality and phantasmagoria, always on the verge of 
dissipating like the fog and vanishing. Petersburg
. . .  is devoid, as it were, of any internal grounds
for justifiable stabilization. (167)
Its indeterminate quality reflects its essentially human
character. As Berdyaev suggests, Dostoevsky's work is "an
anthropology-in-motion" which seeks man out at the point of
crisis, the moment when he is confronted most clearly with
the responsibility of his freedom (45). For Dostoevsky,
that aspect of man cannot express itself in the stable
conditions of everyday life. Hence, the life that he
portrays occurs, not in the insulated world of the urban
bourgeoisie, but in the city's subterrain— in stinking
taverns, amidst the jostling crowds of the streets, in the
dilapidated tenements of the poor. As Bakhtin remarks,
"Dostoevsky 'leaps over' all that is comfortably habitable,
well-arranged and stable, all that is far from the
threshold" (169).
For Augustine, the two cities are defined by their
respective desires: the earthly city by self-love (amor
sui) and the heavenly city by love of God (amor Dei). As
Charles Cochrane explains, "amor sui. accepted as a
principle of order begins with an assertion of the animal
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right to live which resolves itself basically into a 
satisfaction of belly and loins" (489). In fact, in the 
Confessions. food itself is the most common image for the 
objects of selfish desire, "a symbol," as Maggie Kilgour 
notes, "for all earthly substances that prevent man from 
reaching God" (48). Augustine recalls how the Israelites 
in the desert substituted for the glory of God "idols and 
various images 'in the likeness of corruptible man and 
birds and beasts and serpents,' that is the Egyptian food 
. . . for which Esau lost his birthright" (7.9). As 
Kilgour suggests, Augustine presents food as "the 
quintessential temptation that offers instant gratification 
and easy physical satisfaction as a substitute for more 
difficult spiritual fulfillment" (48).
But in the Confessions. food is more than simply an 
image of the material objects which tempt man. It is also 
an image of God himself. In book seven, Augustine recounts 
the vision in which God invites him to feed on his divine 
being:
I found myself far from you "in the region of 
dissimilarity," and heard as it were your voice from 
on high: "I am the food of the fully grown; grow and 
you shall feed on me. You will not change me into you 
like the food your flesh eats, but you will be changed 
into me." (7.10)
Although satisfied in a radically different way, spiritual
desire finds its analogue in bodily hunger. The literal
act of eating, Augustine implies, is a model for man's
spiritual fulfillment in God.
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According to Louis Bouyer, eating belongs to that
realm of "natural symbolism" which brings the ordinary
actions of human life within the sphere of the sacred (63).
In fact, Bouyer suggests that the meal is the richest
instance of this kind of symbolism. In it,
man sees the sacredness of life, of his own life, and 
as a result apprehends himself as being dependent upon 
one who is almighty and all good, or, to express it 
more accurately, upon the singular and superabundant 
fruitfulness of the divinity. To recognize the 
sacredness of a meal as being the highest form of 
human activity is to recognize man's total dependence, 
both for his creation and his continued existence, 
upon a God who is at the same time apprehended as the 
one who possesses the fullness of life. (84)
Thus, the religious symbolism of eating was not something
which developed only after the institution of the Christian
sacrament of the Eucharist— as book seven of the Aeneid
demonstrates. The Fathers of the Christian Church, Bouyer
suggests, never thought that the rite of eating was "a
profane action, bare of any religious significance before
Christ's intervention, but one upon which He bestowed a
particular meaning by a purely arbitrary decision” (64).
Rather, it "gave a new meaning to rites already charged
with meaning. And the new meaning was not forced upon the
natural meaning but rather amplified and enriched by it"
(64).
It is only when the natural symbolism of eating is 
denied that food becomes an image of something other than 
its divine source. When that happens it loses its 
character as a gift which issues from the abundance of God
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and becomes simply a means of satisfying the bodily 
appetite, a substitute for divine food rather than its 
natural analogue. As Kilgour suggests, it is precisely 
this desacralization of eating that Augustine identifies as 
"a form of idolatry" which "prevents the end to exile that 
is achieved through the return to one's proper home" (48). 
Eating is no longer a ritual through which man recognizes 
his dependence on the creator. It becomes instead an image 
of his lust to incorporate the created world unto himself.
As Cochrane suggests, "the point of real significance" 
for Augustine "is not so much the goods of secular life as 
the attitude which secularism adopts towards them" (491).
In The City of God, he explains that divine providence has 
furnished man with certain goods which are suitable to his 
mortal life. Among them are "light, speech, air to 
breathe, water to drink, and whatever is suitable for the 
feeding and clothing of the body, for the care of the body 
and the adornment of the person" (19.13). Food becomes a 
negative symbol only when it is regarded in the wrong 
spirit, when the satisfaction of the bodily appetite is 
accorded a greater value than spiritual nourishment. But 
even then, food remains intrinsically good.
In the myths which Levi-Strauss describes, the 
differentiation of food into raw and cooked allows it to 
signify both nature and culture. But for Augustine, the 
same substance signifies radically different realities.
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Food offers both a sign of the objects which lead man away 
from God and a sign of God himself. The source of 
differentiation, however, is not the appearance of the food 
itself but the inner disposition of individuals. The 
attitude which they bring to eating determines whether it 
is a profane or a sacred activity.
Eating places us on the threshold, most obviously on 
the border between life and death. To eat is to live; to 
refuse to eat is to reject life. But for Augustine, the 
crucial difference is between spiritual rather than 
physical life and death. The implication of the 
Confessions is that one cannot remain neutral towards food, 
that one either eats like an animal or like a human. In 
the tribal myths, the determining factor is whether food is 
raw or cooked. But for Augustine, the difference is 
whether one eats only with an eye to filling the belly or 
with a recognition of the essential sacramentality of food. 
Eating, Augustine suggests, places us not between nature 
and culture but between two kind of worlds, one founded on 
self-gratification (the earthly city), the other on love 
(the heavenly city).
The City as Community of Eaters
In the opening chapter of Crime and Punishment. Raskolnikov 
visits a public house a short time after leaving the room 
of the pawnbroker: "On the bar were sliced cucumbers, rusks 
of black bread, and fish cut into small pieces, all very
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evil-smelling" (8). At first glance, this brief account of
the fare of the house seems like the kind of naturalistic
detail that is the hallmark of the realistic novel. We are
made to feel almost physically present to the stench of the
apparently rotting food. But Raskolnikov's surroundings
are almost too literal. When he enters them, he seems to
descend into a realm of sheer materiality, a realm which is
so utterly carnal that it is revolting: "The atmosphere was
unbearably stuffy and so saturated with alcohol that it
almost seemed that five minutes in it would be enough to
make one drunk" {8).
In fact, Raskolnikov had shrunk from the same
atmosphere earlier that day, as he walked through the
city's slums on his way to the pawnbroker's:
The heat in the streets was stifling. The stuffiness, 
the jostling crowds, the bricks and mortar, 
scaffolding and dust everywhere, and that peculiar 
summer stench so familiar to everyone who cannot get 
away from St. Petersburg into the country, all 
combined to aggravate the disturbance of the young 
man's nerves. The intolerable reek from the public 
houses, so numerous in that part of the city, and the 
sight of the drunken men encountered at every turn, 
even though this was not a holiday, completed the 
mournfully repellent picture. (2)
As Bakhtin Indicates, "absolutely nothing" in Crime and
Punishment "ever loses touch with the threshold" (170). In
"the space of the novel" there is "no interior of drawing
rooms, dining rooms, halls, studios, bedrooms where
biographical life unfolds and where events take place in
the novels of writers such as Turgenev, Tolstoy, and
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Goncharov" (170). Thus for Raskolnikov, there Is no escape 
from extremity. Both at the bar and in the streets, he 
stands at the threshold, between life and death, between 
rebirth and degeneration, between the ideal world of his 
own imagination and the actual world of corruption and 
decay.
Man's relation to food, as we have seen, is an index 
of his relation to reality as a whole. If he sees food as 
simply a means to self-gratification, then he degenerates 
to the level of a cannibal. Everything in the world, not 
least his fellow human beings, becomes mere fodder for his 
own satisfaction. Both Marmeladov and Luzhin are 
characters who— in different ways— have reached this 
extreme, in fact, everything in Crime and Punishment, as 
Bakhtin notes, "the fates of people, their experiences and 
ideas— is pushed to its boundaries . . . everything is 
taken to the extreme, to its outermost limit" (167).
Marmeladov presents an obvious contrast to Raskolnikov 
himself. If one attempts to deny the appetite altogether, 
the other has become completely enslaved to it. Entirely 
lacking in self-control, Marmeladov will do almost anything 
to satisfy his thirst for alcohol. His weakness, though, 
is not something which he denies. On the contrary, he 
proclaims it— in "his florid way"— to everyone who comes in 
contact with him (10). In fact, it is the subject which
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occupies the whole of his conversation with Raskolnikov at
the public house.
Marmeladov's open confession that he is '"an abject
and useless creature"' appears to have its basis in the
Christian idea of humility (10). Ultimately, however,
there is something self-serving about his self-lacerating
rhetoric. His acknowledgement of his utter dependence on
divine assistance seems to be more an excuse for continuing
in his present condition than a sincere plea for help to
overcome it. Moreover, his sense of dependence is so great
that it seems to blur any distinction between himself and
the external world. Indeed, his name, Marmalad-ov,
suggests a jelly-like substance, an identity which lacks
any clear shape or definition. The effacement of any
distinction between self and other is the very mark of
Marmeladov's drinking. It is an activity which consumes
not only himself but also those closest to him— namely his
wife and children, a fact which he acknowledges to
Raskolnikov:
Do you know, sir, that I have drunk her very 
stockings? Not her shoes, for that might have some 
small resemblance to a natural action, but her 
stockings, I have drunk even her stockings, sir! And 
I have drunk her mohair shawl as well, and it was her 
own, a gift made to her in the old days, not mine; and 
the room where we live is cold, and this winter she 
caught a chill and began to cough and even to spit 
blood. We have three small children and Katerina 
Ivanovna is working from morning till night, scrubbing 
and washing and bathing the children, for she has 
become accustomed to cleanliness from a child; but her 
chest is weak and she has a consumptive tendency.(12)
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As Marmeladov himself implies, the uninhibited rule of the 
bodily appetite is ultimately cannibalistic. While he 
attempts to satisfy his endless thirst for drink, his wife 
and children waste away before his eyes. The more he takes 
into himself, the less they become— as if he were actually 
feeding off them.
Ultimately, Marmeladov's selfishness is forgivable 
because it proceeds from a weakness of the flesh. He does 
not set out to deprive his family of their needs. Rather, 
their sorry condition is the result of actions which are, 
in some sense, involuntary. Moreover, Marmeladov himself 
suffers deeply from the knowledge of the distress which he 
has brought upon his family; his sense of remorse is so 
great that, as he informs Raskolnikov, he thirsts "not for 
merriment" but "for affliction and weeping" (19).
It is Luzhin who most clearly embodies the principle 
of self-love in the novel. He "was full of almost morbid 
admiration for himself, set a high value on his own brain 
and capabilities and sometimes, when he was alone, even 
admired his own face in the mirror" (259). As Dostoevsky 
implies, there is something joyless in Luzhin's 
selfishness. Marmeladov, at least, is overtaken by an 
object which gives pleasure and which is intrinsically 
good. Luzhin, by contrast, lusts after something which is 
essentially abstract: "more than anything in the world he 
loved and prized his money, got together laboriously and by
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every means In his power; it raised him to the level of 
everything that had been superior to him" (259). His greed 
is motivated not by the thought of any immediate bodily 
pleasure but by egoistical pride. Money is the means by 
which he separates himself from and elevates himself above 
those around him.
Luzhin's attitude toward the goods of the world is 
precisely the attitude which Augustine identifies as the 
distinctive mark of the earthly city: greed or lust for 
possession. As Cochrane explains, the earthly city "treats 
those goods as 'private'. . . claiming a right to make 
them its own for distribution within the group . . .  a 
claim which presumes at the same time the right of 
exploitation" (492). As a result, conflict is an inherent 
feature of the earthly city; "its ideal of independence is 
at the same time an ideal of isolation, the isolation of 
economic and moral self-sufficiency. Furthermore, the 
greed for property in temporal goods is inevitably 
exclusive and monopolistic" (492). Thus, the earthly city 
"becomes the theatre of a struggle for survival, the law of 
which is 'fish eat fish'. 'This world,' says Augustine,
'is a sea wherein men devour one another in turn like 
fish'" (492).
If cannibalism is the metaphor for a society which is 
founded on economic self-interest, then it finds its human 
embodiment in the character of Luzhin. Money is something
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which completely permeates his view of reality, governing
all of his relationships with people and things. The hero
quickly identifies this aspect of Luzhin's character in the
letter which his mother and sister receive from him upon
their arrival in Petersburg: "it is a legal or a business
style . . . It is not perhaps very illiterate, but it is
not highly literary; it is commercial" (198). It is the
same style which characterizes Luzhin's betrothal to Dunya,
an arrangement which Raskolnikov dismisses as nothing more
than "a common commercial transaction, an undertaking for
mutual profit, with equal shares, and that means expenses
shared equally too" (35). Luzhin himself confirms
Raskolnikov's impression of him when he professes his
belief that the world is based on self-interest:
If you love yourself alone, you will conduct your 
affairs properly, and your cloak will remain whole. 
Economic truth adds that the more private enterprises 
are established and the more, so to say, whole cloaks 
there are in society, the firmer will be its 
foundations and the more will be undertaken for the 
common good. That is to say, that by the very act of 
devoting my gains solely and exclusively to myself, I 
am at the same time benefiting the whole community, 
and ensuring that my neighbor receives something 
better than half a torn cloak. . . . (126-127)
After listening to this theory triumphantly proclaimed to
the company in his room, Raskolnikov reveals to Luzhin the
real meaning of his rhetoric: "Carry to its logical
conclusion what you were preaching just now, and it emerges
that you can cut people's throats" (129). Of course,
Raskolnikov himself has reached the same conclusion by
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other means. But, at least he has thought his theory 
through with some rigor and accepts the license to murder 
as a logical consequence of its founding premise. By 
contrast, Luzhin's ideas are, as Razumikhin indicates, 
wholly received and unexamined, "monotonous repetitions 
over and over again of the same old commonplaces" (127).
John Crowe Ransom has suggested that when man's 
relationships with others are based exclusively on 
"economic forms," then he becomes "a predatory creature to 
whom every object is an object of prey and the real or 
individual object cannot occur" (34). Luzhin is such a 
predator and Raskolnikov's sister and mother are his prey. 
In them he sees not the genuine individuality of real human 
beings but simply a means of furthering his own advantage 
and prestige. While they seem all too ready to accept his 
motives at face value, Raskolnikov recognizes that Luzhin's 
willingness "to take a wife out of poverty" is based on his 
desire to "dominate over her afterwards" and "reproach her 
with the benefits . . . heaped on her" (129). In fact, he 
seems to physically thrive on their helplessness and 
dependence on him. At one point, we find him inspecting 
"his pale and distinguished face" in the mirror and 
noticing that it "had of late grown rather fat" (304).
Luzhin's cannibalism is the result not so much of 
overwhelming sensuality as of a mind which knows the world 
in exclusively rational terms. Significantly, the
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sociologist Georg Simmel suggests that the dominance of the 
Intellect is intrinsically connected with the money 
economy:
They share a matter-of-fact attitude in dealing with 
men and with things; and, in this attitude, a formal 
justice is often coupled with an inconsiderate 
harshness. The intellectually sophisticated person is 
indifferent to all genuine individuality, because 
relationships and reactions result from it which 
cannot be exhausted with logical operations. In the 
same manner, the individuality of phenomena is not 
commensurate with the pecuniary principle. Money is 
concerned only with what is common to all; it asks for
the exchange value, it reduces all quality and
individuality to the question: How much? All intimate 
emotional relations between persons are founded in 
their individuality, whereas in rational relations man 
is reckoned with like a number, like an element which 
is in itself indifferent. (411)
Luzhin's tendency to see everything in monetary terms,
then, is the very mark of a mind which has lost its roots
in the deepest recesses of the soul. Unlike Marmeladov,
who knows no distinction between himself and the world,
Luzhin knows only a world which is other than himself, a
wholly objectified world— emptied of its rich individuality
— which he manipulates and exploits for his own ends.
Perhaps paradoxically, the cannibalistic quality of
life in the city is not evidence of a return to a state of
nature. For Dostoevsky, as we have seen, man is always
more than just a natural phenomenon. If his actions
resemble those of animals, it is because his soul is
disordered— a condition of which animals themselves are
incapable. In fact, the cannibalism of the city is
evidence of its very alienation from the natural world.
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Dominated by rational relations, it knows that world— and
by extension the world of human beings— as something wholly
other than itself, as pure object. It is this reified
world— which includes both man and nature— upon which the
city preys. When the city becomes "wholly intellect,"
Oswald Spengler indicates, then the "Culture-man whom the
land has spiritually formed is seized and possessed by his
own creation, the City, and is made into its creature, its
executive organ, and finally its victim" (99).
Luzhin, however, does not represent the soul of the
city. In his author’s note to The Brothers Karamazov.
Dostoevsky remarks that
Not only is an eccentric "not always" a particularity 
and a separate element, but, on the contrary, it 
happens sometimes that such a person, I dare say, 
carries within himself the very heart of the whole, 
(xvii)
Thus, in Crime and Punishment, it is Raskolnikov, the one 
who has "cut himself off from everybody and withdrawn . . . 
completely into himself," who presents the sign of the new 
epoch (1). It is he who embodies in the most complete and 
profound way the awful suffering and torment which the 
urban environment produces in its inhabitants.
When Raskolnikov rejects food, he appears to 
reject the cannibalistic world of the city, a world which 
reeks of corruption and death. In fact, he does something 
else. Man's need for food is a constant reminder that he 
has a body and that he is rooted in the earth. "As our
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most basic need," Kilgour indicates, "eating . . . reveals 
the fallaciousness of the illusion of self-sufficiency and 
autonomy" (9). When Raskolnikov refuses to eat, then, he 
severs himself from his earthly roots and locks himself in 
the prison of his own self. Repeatedly we find him lost in 
thought, incapable of focusing his attention on the world 
outside himself: "He kept relapsing into abstraction, and 
when he again raised his head with a start and looked 
around, he could remember neither what he had just been 
thinking nor which way he had come" (45).
Food is a medium through which man encounters reality. 
It places him upon the border between consciousness and 
world, self and other. As Kilgour indicates, "taste," as a 
mode of knowing, "is not only the most basic and bodily way 
of making contact with the world outside of the individual 
but also the most intimate and intense way" (9). The 
rejection of food, therefore, is also a rejection of the 
possibility of communion with others. Indeed, both eating 
and human fellowship find a common etymological root in the 
word companion, the Latin derivation of which is com and 
panis. to share bread with. Eating is an inherently 
communal activity and communion itself find its central 
expression in the ritual of the meal.
When Raskolnikov rejects the corruption of the city, 
he simultaneously cuts himself off from the realm of the 
human itself. The New Jerusalem of which he speaks is
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essentially an Idea, a wholly mental construction which
transcends the body of man and of the world. Moreover, by
severing his relations with others so completely, he comes
to regard them as less then human, as beings emptied of
individuality who can be dispensed with for the sake of his
grand design. Raskolnikov regards the life of his victim
as no "more than the life of a louse or a cockroach— less,
indeed, because she is actively harmful" (56). But if he
sees in the pawnbroker the embodiment of the city's
corruption, by murdering her he makes himself its most
profound symbol. Indeed, in his confession to Sonya, he
suggests the essentially cannibalistic nature of his crime:
I did not commit murder in order to use the profit and 
power I gained to make myself a benefactor to 
humanity. Rubbish! I simply murdered; I murdered for 
myself, for myself alone, and whether I became a 
benefactor to anybody else, or, like a spider, spent 
the rest of my life catching everybody in my web and 
sucking the life-blood out of them, should have been a 
matter of complete indifference to me at that moment!
(354)
However, that Raskolnikov comes to symbolize the deepest 
reality of the city is the result not simply of his crime 
but of its effects on his soul. If before the murder he is 
alienated from the world outside himself, after it he 
experiences a "new and irresistible sensation of boundless, 
almost physical repulsion for everything round him, an 
obstinate, hateful, malicious sensation" (93). His sense 
of repulsion extends not least to his family members: "My 
mother, my sister, how I loved them! What makes me hate
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them now? Yes, I hate them, hate them physically; I cannot
bear them near me" (234). Even in the course of his
confession to Sonya, "a bitter hatred" for her suddenly and
unexpectedly "seemed to flood his heart" (345).
Raskolnikov's rejection of food, however, does not
define him completely. As Bakhtin has noted, Dostoevsky's
heroes are always in a state of unfinalized transition:
"They all acutely sense their own inner unfinalizability,
their capacity to outgrow, as it were, from within and to
render untrue any externalizing and finalizing definition
of them" (59).
Raskolnikov cannot completely deny his bodily
appetite, realizing that he must eat if only to muster up
the strength necessary to carry out his murderous plan. As
early as the opening chapter, we find him entering a tavern
to stave off the weakness which has overcome him on his way
through the city streets:
He felt a need for cold beer, especially as he now 
attributed his sudden weakness to having had nothing 
to eat. He sat down in a dark and dirty corner behind 
a small sticky table, ordered his beer, and drank the 
first glass thirstily. He began to feel better at 
once, and his thoughts grew clearer. "This is all 
nonsense," he said to himself hopefully, "and there 
was no need to get so agitated. It was simply 
physical weakness. One glass of beer and a rusk and 
my mind grows keen, my thoughts clear, my resolution 
firm. Bah, how paltry it all is I" (7).
Implicit in Raskolnikov's concession to his appetite is the
recognition that he cannot exist apart from the world
outside himself.
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Raskolnikov's dependence on the external world,
however, extends to more than simply the need for bodily
nourishment. He also feels the need— albeit infrequently—
for communion with others, despite his recent avoidance of
all social contacts. In fact, it is precisely because "he
suddenly felt drawn to people" that he visits the public
house on his way home from the pawnbroker's:
Something as it were new had been accomplished in his 
soul, and with it had come a thirst for society. He 
was so weary after a whole month of concentrated 
misery and gloomy agitation that he longed to breathe, 
if only for a moment, the air of some other world, and 
so, in spite of the filthy surroundings, he took 
pleasure in this visit to the public house. (8)
In his desire for "some other world," Raskolnikov reveals
his own potential for regeneration. He recognizes— at
least implicitly— that the world of the isolated self is a
deadly one. In fact, Raskolnikov's thirst for company
increases after he has carried out his crime. At the same
time as his sense of "almost physical repulsion for
everything round him" reaches a new extreme, he feels an
inexplicable desire to communicate his secret to others
(93). However, if he occasionally escapes from the private
world of his own tormented mind, Raskolnikov finds the
space of the city equally claustrophobic. Thus, by
himself, he appears incapable of making the transition from
death to life. "Something more powerful," Matual
indicates, "is required to arouse him from his spiritual
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lethargy and lead him towards the events of the epilogue” 
(30).
The City and the Feminine
If Levi-Strauss suggests that the role of culture is to 
mediate between man and the natural world, Dostoevsky gives 
us an image of a culture which has forsaken that role. The 
city in Crime and Punishment is a deracinated world. It 
lives an entirely separate existence, having no roots in 
the earth or in the surrounding landscape.
This aspect of the city is reflected in the historical 
Petersburg which presented Dostoevsky with the raw 
materials for his literary creation. As Pike notes, St. 
Petersburg was essentially a planned city which "sprang 
like a latter-day Minerva from the head of Peter the Great" 
(89). Although situated on the periphery of Europe, in a 
country whose culture and traditions hearkened back to a 
distant past, it was patterned "on Western rather than 
native models" and "intended as a window on the west for a 
backward and profoundly non-European culture" (89). While 
at one stage Dostoevsky seemed to embrace Petersburg's 
westernizing influence, he later came to regard the city, 
like the narrator of Notes from Underground, as "the most 
abstract and intentional . . .  in the whole world" (1.2).
It was a product of the random imposition of mind over 
matter and its arbitrary character that made it a prototype
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of the rootless— and therefore interchangeable— cities
which seem so typical of modern life.*
In Crime and Punishment, perhaps the most important
sign of the city's alienation from nature is the
displacement of the feminine. The fertility of women—
their capacity to bear and nurture new life— suggests a
stronger link with the generative processes of nature than
men possess. Woman, Eliade remarks,
is mystically held to be one with the earth, 
childbearing is seen as a variant, on the human scale 
of the telluric fertility. All religious experiences 
connected with fecundity and birth have a cosmic 
structure. The sacrality of woman depends on the 
holiness of the earth. Feminine fecundity has a 
cosmic model— that of Terra Mater, the universal 
Genetrix. (Sacred 144)
This is not to say that the difference between masculine
and feminine corresponds with the difference between
culture and nature. On the contrary, if the role of
culture is to mediate between the human and the natural
worlds, as Levi-Strauss suggests, then it is precisely in
women that that role is most clearly realized. Women, in a
sense, are the very bearers of culture. Of course, culture
6. Holguist notes that one of the most profound symbolic 
acts of Peter was his introduction of the Julian calendar 
on January 1, 1770. It marked "the end of an old 
chronology that dated events from the creation of the 
world, and the first day of a new epoch. . . . The new 
calendar was another of Peter's attempts to break down the 
differences between Russia and the West, and its adoption 
is perhaps the most comprehensive symbolic act of his 
reign. It is an emblem of Peter's attempt to Europeanize 
not only Russian culture and space— to change the course of 
history, in other words— but to change the native sense of 
time itself" (3).
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also requires the kind of rational qualities that are 
typically associated with masculinity. But it is defined 
in a more profound way by its relation to the feminine, 
since its very existence depends on its connection with the 
life-giving processes of nature— a connection which women 
themselves embody. Once it loses that link with the 
natural world, culture atrophies and dies.
That the ancient Romans were aware of this is evident 
from the sanctity they accorded the realm of the hearth, 
the symbolic locus of the values of the feminine. In Crime 
and Punishment, though, the hearth is the realm not of life 
and unity but of sickness and division. It is represented 
most significantly in the Marmeladov household. When 
Raskolnikov visits there for the first time, he finds 
living quarters that are as cramped and stifling as his 
own:
The grimy little door at the head of the stairs stood 
open. A candle-end lighted up a poverty-stricken room 
about ten paces long; all of it could be seen from the 
landing. It was disordered and untidily strewn with 
various tattered children's garments. A torn sheet 
was stretched across the corner at the back of the 
room. The bed was probably behind it. There was 
nothing in the room but two chairs and a sofa covered 
with ragged oilcloth, with an old deal kitchen table, 
unpainted and uncovered, standing before it. On the 
edge of the table stood the stump of a tallow candle 
in an iron candlestick. (20)
The squalor in which the family lives indicates not only
their material deprivation but the lack of value accorded
to the domestic sphere by the culture of the city. Indeed,
the atmosphere of the cramped room is as profane as that of
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the public house from which Raskolnikov and Marmeladov have
just returned: "The room was stuffy; . . .  a foul smell
came from the stairs, but the door to the landing was not
shut; clouds of tobacco-smoke blew in from the other rooms
through the half-open door" <21).
But the desacralization of the household realm is most
evocatively symbolized in the figure of Katerina Ivanovna,
Marmeladov's wife:
She was terribly wasted, a fairly tall, slender, 
shapely woman with still beautiful dark-brown hair and 
cheeks flushed with hectic red. She was walking up 
and down the little room with her hands pressed to her
breast. Her lips looked parched and her breathing was
harsh and uneven. Her eyes had a feverish glitter, 
but their gaze was fixed and hard. The consumptive 
and agitated creature was a painful spectacle, with 
the last light of the guttering candle flickering on 
her face. She appeared to Raskolnikov to be about 
thirty years old, and she and Marmeladov were 
certainly ill-matched . . . She did not hear or notice 
them as they entered; she seemed to be in a sort of 
stupor, deaf and blind to everything. (20-1)
In her, Dostoevsky presents a sign not of the abundance of
nature but of its scarcity in a culture which has alienated
itself from the generative processes of the earth.
Katerina Ivanovna's consumptive body is the most obvious
index of that scarcity. Over the course of the novel, she
grows progressively thinner and the red stains on her
cheeks— a symptom of her fatal condition— appear even
brighter than before. As a result of her illness, she is
incapable of nourishing her emaciated children and her
agitation with them increases daily.
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The failure of the child-mother relationship in the
Marmeladov household is itself a symptom of the breakdown
of communal relations which we witness in the city
generally. Indeed, one of the central images of that
breakdown is the meal which Katerina Ivanovna hosts to
commemorate her husband's death. Typically intended as a
sacred ritual to mark the passing of a loved one from this
life to the next, the funeral meal on this occasion turns
into a fractious encounter between the widow and her
neighbors. In fact, Dostoevsky suggests that Katerina
Ivanovna hosts the meal precisely to draw attention to her
difference from those around her:
most probably Katerina Ivanovna wished . . . just at 
this moment when she seemed to be abandoned by 
everyone on earth, to show all these "nasty 
contemptible lodgers" not only that she "knew how 
things ought to be done, and how to entertain guests," 
but also that she had not been brought up for her 
present lot in life, but in the "household of an 
officer and a gentleman, in what might almost be 
called aristocratic surroundings," and had never been 
meant for sweeping floors, or washing her children's 
rags at night. (319)
Of course, the final irony of the meal is that it becomes
the occasion for the eviction of the widow and her family.
The woman who had boasted of her aristocratic origins ends
up a pathetic beggar in the filthy streets of Petersburg.
One of Katerina Ivanovna's most marked characteristics
is her obsessive cleanliness. Dostoevsky tells us that she
"was willing to wear herself out with work that was beyond
her strength, at night, while everybody was asleep, so as
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to be able to dry the wet things by morning and give them
back clean, rather than see dirt in the house” (153). That
she "could not tolerate dirt" suggests, at first glance,
that she is the very emblem of modern civilization.
According to Freud,
Dirtiness of any kind seems to us incompatible with 
civilization. We extend our demand for cleanliness to 
the human body too. We are astonished to learn of the 
objectionable smell which emanated from the Roi 
Soleil; and we shake our heads on the Isola Bella when 
we are shown the tiny wash-basin in which Napoleon 
made his morning toilet. Indeed, we are not surprised 
by the idea of setting up soap as an actual yardstick 
of civilization. (40)
It may be more accurate, however, to suggest that dirt
itself is an invention of modernity, a devaluation of the
natural fecundity of the earth.^ In fact, for Dostoevsky,
Katerina Ivanovna is a figure of Mother Earth, Russia's
most ancient and revered deity, who is reduced to
impoverishment and despair by the forces of modernity. In
this light, Katerina's intolerance of dirt is precisely a
rejection of the reduction of earth to mere dirt.
Like her stepmother, Sonya is a sign of the
displacement of the feminine within a culture which locates
all of its values in rationality. Her body, the symbolic
7. Illich remarks that complaints "that cities can become 
dirty places go back to antiquity" (46). But, "the 
perception of the city as a place that must be constantly 
washed is of recent origin. It appears at the time of the 
Enlightenment. The reason most often given for this 
constant toilette is not the visually offensive features of 
waste or the residues that make people slip on the street 
but bad odors and their dangers. The city is suddenly 
perceived as an evil-smelling place" (47).
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locus of love, has been transformed into an object of
exchange in the cruel economy of prostitution. However,
although she is the victim of a system which is founded
entirely on the principle of rational self-interest, Sonya
never allows that principle to take over her own being. In
her, the values of the feminine remain untainted. The
prostitute, John Layard suggests,
is the archetype of the free woman, the woman 
untrammeled by man's laws. For dreams are on this 
level the complementary opposite of life in the flesh. 
In external life she has to pay a price much heavier 
than that paid by the man, but in dreams she 
represents the bountiful earth-mother, uncontaminated 
by thinking, who offers good things to all men and who 
is to be had for the asking, though the asking 
involves toiling with the sweat of one's brow, to dig, 
harrow, manure, and plant the soil. She is in fact, 
the ultimate anima. the temple priestess who marries 
the god and bestows her favors upon devout men, thus 
raising them also to semi-divine status. On this 
spiritual level she is also Our Lady, who showers her 
gifts freely upon all men and who is profligate (note 
the word) with her divine favors. In fact she is the 
psyche, the Virgin Unspotted, pregnant with the 
boundless pregnancy of nature, translated into this 
spiritual sphere. (178)
Raskolnikov himself recognizes precisely this virginal
quality in Sonya: "All her shame had obviously touched her
only mechanically; no trace of real corruption had yet
crept into her heart" (273). If at a literal level the act
of prostitution is a moral evil, at a symbolic level it
becomes an image of the kind of unselfishness which is the
very mark of Sonya's character. Within the cannibalistic
space of the city, where— as Raskolnikov suggests— people
"eat one another alive," she freely gives her body over to
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others (43). Within a system which is rooted in the 
rational relations of the money economy, she offers a sign 
of the giftedness of creation.
It is in Sonya, more than any other character, that 
Dostoevsky shows us a mode of knowledge that is 
fundamentally different from the epistemology of the city. 
She knows others not as objects wholly separate from 
herself but as beings whose nature she shares in the depths 
of her own person. Although she suffers terribly, she does 
not allow her suffering to alienate her from those around
her. On the contrary, it gives her a knowledge of them
which has its source within herself. The very mark of 
Sonya is compassion— the capacity to suffer with others. 
When Raskolnikov asks her whether she loves the stepmother 
who used to mistreat her, she reacts not with anger but 
with sorrow at Katerina Ivanovna's sad fate:
"Love her? But of course!" Sonya almost wailed, 
clasping her hands together in distress. "Oh, you
speak of her . . .  If only you knew! She is really
just like a child . . .  I suppose she has lost her 
reason . . . from grief. But how clever she used to 
be . . . how generous . . . how good! You know 
nothing, nothing at all . . .Oh!"
Sonya said this almost despairingly, wringing her 
hands in excitement and distress. Her pale cheeks had 
flushed again, and her eyes looked full of anguish.
She was plainly very deeply moved, and longing to 
speak, to plead, to find expression for something. An 
almost Insatiable compassion, if one can use that 
expression, was depicted in every feature of her face. 
(268)
It is exactly her capacity for compassion which enables 
Sonya to reach the alienated soul of Raskolnikov. In him
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she recognizes not simply a murderer— although she doesn't 
deny that he has committed a terrible evil— but someone who 
has suffered in the very depths of his soul: "There is no 
one, no one, unhappier than you in the whole world!" (347). 
As he confesses his crime to her, Raskolnikov repeatedly 
draws attention to their separate natures: "Oh, we are such 
different people!" (350). But Sonya keeps urging him to 
confess, saying "I shall understand, I shall understand it 
all inside me!" (350).
Sonya's is a connatural knowledge, a knowledge from 
within which, as Karl Stern indicates, is possible because 
"we share our human nature with other human beings" (51). 
This connatural knowledge is an epistemology which Stern 
suggests is basically feminine in its aspect: "All 
knowledge bv union: all knowledge by incorporation 
(incorporating or being incorporated); and all knowledge 
through love has its natural fundament in our primary bond 
with the mother" (54). However, although in Crime and 
Punishment it finds its principal expression in Sonya, 
connatural knowledge is not exclusive to women. In fact, 
it is precisely Raskolnikov's rejection of connaturality 
which alienates him so profoundly from his fellow human 
beings, a rejection which, as we have seen, finds its 
symbolic expression in his refusal to eat.
In the midst of the degradation of the city, Sonya 
offers the sign of the New Jerusalem— not the abstraction
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upon which the mind of Raskolnikov has seized— but a 
community founded on a love which is selfless. Through 
her, and together with Razumikhin, Nastasya and 
Raskolnikov's mother and sister, the seed of that community 
is planted within Petersburg itself. Their presence in the 
city implies that the hegemony of ideological systems is 
never quite complete; there is always something left over, 
something which remains unaffected by the prevailing urban 
reality. In Sonya, though, this contradictory movement 
does not represent an alternative operation of power, a 
movement of resistance which seeks to gain control for 
itself. On the contrary, it manifests itself precisely in 
her acceptance of suffering and her self-abnegation, in her 
meekness and her compassion for others. Although opposed 
to power, those qualities alone have the capacity to move 
the estranged and hate-encrusted heart of 
Raskolnikov.
What Sonya sees in Raskolnikov more than anything else 
is the deep suffering of another soul. It is the same 
suffering that leads Svidrigaylov— who, as Bakhtin notes, 
"is one of Raskolnikov's parodic doubles"— to the despair 
of suicide (89). Sonya's compassion for the suffering hero 
gives us the very mark of the spirit in which the novel 
itself depicts him. Dostoevsky's task was not simply to 
expose the folly of the rationalistic ideologies which
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prevailed In the Petersburg of his own day. As N. Strakhov
notes, it was a task
very much deeper and more difficult than that of 
ridiculing the ugliness of empty and anemic natures. 
His Raskolnikov may suffer from youthful depression 
and egoism, but he represents a man gifted with a 
strong mind and warm heart. He is not a phrase-monger 
devoid of blood and nerves; he is a real man. This 
young man also constructs a theory, but a theory which 
because of the force of his greater vitality and 
larger power of mind runs more deeply and more 
definitely counter to life. . . . For the first time, 
an unhappy nihilist, a nihilist suffering in a deeply 
human way is depicted before us. (485)
Like Sonya, Dostoevsky knows the hero within himself. The
knowledge he gives us is the knowledge which, Maritain
suggests, all great novelists give us— "that poetic
knowledge of other subjectivities in and through his own,
that knowledge through affective connaturality which makes
him penetrate his characters and foresee their actions
through the medium of his own inclinations" (397).
Dostoevsky's Petersburg is a place where people only
suffer, and Raskolnikov, who suffers more deeply than
anyone else, is its most profound symbol. He is saved by
Sonya, who makes only one request of him:
Go at once, this instant, stand at the cross-roads,
first bow down and kiss the earth you have desecrated, 
then, bow down to the whole world, to the four corners 
of the earth, and say aloud to the whole world: "I 
have done murder." Then God will send you life again.
(355)
When Raskolnikov performs this symbolic act, he
acknowledges the fundamental reality of the world outside
himself. As George Gibian Indicates, it marks
154
the beginning of his change into a complete, organic, 
living human being, rejoining all other men in the 
community. By his crime and ideas, he had separated 
himself from his friends, family, and nation, in one 
word, he had cut himself off from Mother Earth. By 
the gesture of kissing the earth he is reestablishing 
all his ties. (538)
An onlooker who witnesses the gesture mistakes Raskolnikov
for a drunk and ridicules him saying, "he's going to
Jerusalem, lads, and he's saying goodbye to his family and
his country" (445). As Gibian indicates, however, the
mocking words are deeply Ironic;
Raskolnikov is indeed saying goodbye— to Petersburg, 
for he will be sent to Siberia. At the same time he 
is taking farewell of his false ideal of the new 
Jerusalem. In another sense, he is now about to 
embark on a search for a new ideal, another New 
Jerusalem— and in this sense he will be a pilgrim, 
seeking personal regeneration which is to replace his 
earlier social-rationalistic ideal. (539)
Although Raskolnikov's pilgrimage is initiated at the
crossroads, he does not come to a full awareness of its
meaning until several years later. Indeed, his life in
Siberia appears to be marked by the same alienation which
marked his Petersburg existence, an alienation which— as
before— is symbolized by his lack of interest in food: "He
was almost indifferent to what he ate" (457). We are told
that a "terrible unbridgeable chasm" separated him from
everyone, "as if he and they belonged to different races"
(460).
Only after he has spent eight years in Siberia does 
Raskolnikov reach an awareness of the new life that lies 
before him. It is an awareness, however, which comes not
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from within himself but through an image revealed to him on
the bank of the river where he happens to be working one
morning during the season of Easter:
From the high bank a broad landscape was revealed.
From the other bank, far away, was faintly borne the 
sound of singing. There, in the immensity of the 
steppe, flooded with sunlight, the black tents of the 
nomads were barely visible dots. Freedom was there, 
there other people lived, so utterly unlike those on 
this side of the river that it seemed as though with 
them time had stood still, and the age of Abraham and 
his flocks was still the present. (463)
The image, which recalls the nomadic existence of the
Hebraic people of the Old Testament, suggests that
Raskolnikov's final destiny lies not in this world but the
next. Like the onlooker, who mocked him many years before
at the crossroads, it indicates that his earthly life is
essentially a pilgrimage, a time of exile which lasts as
long as earthly life itself. The character of that exile,
however, is fundamentally different from the exile which
Raskolnikov has previously endured within the space of the
city. If the latter meant alienation from the earth, the
former means a closeness to it which is even greater than
that felt by the settler.
There is, of course, a certain paradox here. One
would think that the settler who tills and sows the land
has deeper earthly roots than the nomad whose existence is
characterized by constant movement. But precisely because
he never settles the nomad experiences a greater sense of
dependence on the earth than the farmer. He does not have
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the advantage of the relatively permanent structures which 
mark the settled way of life. Unlike the farmer, who works 
to protect himself against the unpredictable realities of 
nature, the nomad is more frequently left exposed and 
vulnerable. The farmer subdues the earth and harnesses its 
productive powers for his benefit. But the nomad simply 
works alongside it, tending its creatures but not 
transforming it in any way.
Because the farmer has a greater dominion over the 
earth, he may be tempted to think that he actually owns it 
and that its fruits are his own creations. In fact, as the 
fourth chapter of Genesis suggests, it is to this 
temptation that Cain, the elder son of Adam, succumbs.
Cain, who is a tiller of the land, makes an offering of his 
produce to God. That the offering is rejected is a sign, 
as various ancient interpreters of the account indicate, 
that it was made in the wrong spirit. Augustine suggests 
that Cain "gave to God something belonging to him, but gave 
himself to himself" (15. 7). In fact, he raises the 
possibility that Cain may even have kept "back for himself 
the choicer portions" of his produce (15. 7). Augustine 
implies, then, that the offering is not freely given, that 
Cain measures out that portion which he thinks is God's 
due. As Lewis Hyde has noted, the failure to perceive the 
giftedness of creation results in the loss of the organic 
connection between man and the world: "To count, measure,
reckon value . . . is to step outside the circle/ to cease 
being 'all of a piece' with the flow of gifts and become 
instead, one part of the whole reflecting upon another 
part" (152). Thus, Cain's treatment of the things of the 
earth as possessions suggests that he is actually less 
rooted in them than is Abel. He knows them as other than 
himself, as a reality to be dominated and possessed rather 
than a reality which includes him as part of an organic 
whole. Abel, the younger son of Adam, lives the nomadic 
life of a shepherd. That his offering, the first of his 
flock, is accepted suggests that, unlike Cain's, it is 
freely given. Abel recognizes that the creatures of the 
earth, although under his care, are not his own; rather, 
they are a manifestation of divine superabundance, a gift 
from God to man which can never be taken for granted. When 
God accepts Abel's offering, Cain becomes jealous and 
murders his brother. As a punishment for this sin, Cain 
himself is condemned to a nomadic existence.
But that existence is only superficially similar to 
that which his dead brother led. In fact, it is the very 
inverse of the life of Abel. Cain is a different kind of 
nomad, a dark figure whose crime makes him "a fugitive and 
a vagabond" on the earth (4. 12). Outcast from the life of 
the community, Cain fears his exposure to those dangers to 
which the outsider is especially subject. Thus, God places 
a mark upon him, "lest any finding him should kill him" (4.
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15). He Is separated not only from the community of men 
but from the earth itself; God tells him that when he tills 
the ground/ it shall not henceforth yield unto him her 
strength" (4. 12). Of course, the most obvious difference 
between the lives of the two brothers is that Cain 
eventually founds a city, Enoch, a city which Augustine 
suggests "was the earthly city . . . the city which is not 
just a pilgrim in the world, but rests satisfied with its 
temporal peace and felicity" (15. 17).
Until he bows down and kisses the earth at the 
crossroads, Raskolnikov is a figure of Cain, a murderer, an 
outcast from the community, a hater of the earth and a 
constructor of utopian system— the very symbol of the 
earthly city. However, the image revealed to him on the 
river bank in Siberia suggests that his ultimate destiny 
lies in the heavenly city. Like Abel, the spiritual 
ancestor of the people of Abraham, Raskolnikov is to be a 
pilgrim in the world. But if the life of the pilgrim is a 
journey, it is not a journey which separates him from the 
things of the earth. As the life of Abel suggests, it is 
precisely those earthly things which at once unite him to 
the human community and remind him of his true home.
IV
THE CITY AND KINSHIP 
Melville's Pierre
At the end of his journey through the underworld, 
Aeneas is reunited with his dead father who reveals to him 
the "Dardan generations" of the future and the "famous 
children" who will follow in his line (6. 1015-17).
Of the descendants he sees, the first is a "young man
leaning on a spear unarmed . . . his allotted place nearest 
the light" (6. 1021-22). Aeneas is told that the boy
will be the first to take the upper air,
Silvius, a child with half Italian blood
And an Alban name, your last born, whom your wife,
Lavinia, late in your great age will rear
In forests to be king and father of kings.
Through him our race will rule in Alba Longa.
(6. 1023-28)
Thus, the hero learns that the future Roman people will not 
simply be transplanted Trojans but the product of an 
alliance— a marriage— with another people. Unlike 
Andromache's city, which is a scrupulous imitation of the 
lost world of Troy, Rome will constitute an authentic
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beginning, a metamorphosis of the old into something new.
The alliance which Aeneas and his men propose upon 
reaching Italy, however, is more than simply a means to 
guarantee their own future. In the Laurentines, Virgil 
gives us an image of a people whose own culture appears to 
have run its course. Their king, Latinus, "had no son or
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male descendant, / Death having taken one in early youth" 
(7. 68-69). Hence, "A single daughter held that house’s 
hopes, / A girl now ripe for marriage, for a man" (7. 70- 
71). But while Lavinia's affections have been widely 
sought by the sons of Latium, Latinus has learned from the 
oracle of his father that the renewal of his people will 
come not from within his own circle of kin but through 
contact with foreigners:
Men from abroad will come 
And be your sons by marriage. Blood so mingled 
Lifts our name starward. Children of that stock 
Will see all earth turned Latin at their feet,
Governed by them, as far as on his rounds 
The Sun looks down on Ocean, East or West.
(7. 127-132)
In fact, the Trojans themselves promise the same benefits 
in their first meeting with the Laurentines. As Ilioiieus, 
one of Aeneas's men, tells Latinus, "Ausonians who take 
Troy to their hearts / Will not regret it" (7. 311-12).
Even before the arrival of the Trojans, Latinus*s 
queen, Amata, has been working against the prospect of an 
alliance. Among her daughter's suitors, "the handsomest by 
far / Was Turnus, powerful heir of a great line" (7. 73-4). 
Amata, we are told, "pressed for their union,/Desiring him 
with passion for a son” (7. 75-6). In fact, Juno finds in 
Amata a ready Instrument to realize her own plans to 
disrupt the progress of the Trojans in Italy. When 
Allecto— Juno's assistance from the underworld— finds 
Amata, she is "Burning already at the Trojan's coming,
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/ The plans for Turnus's marriage broken off" (7. 472-3). 
After she has been infected with the fury's venom, her 
opposition to the Trojan leader sends her into an 
uncontrollable frenzy, a frenzy which paradoxically recalls 
the grief of Dido after she learns of Aeneas's impending 
departure from Carthage.
At first, though, Amata attempts to reach her husband 
with a mother's soft words:
Have you no pity for your daughter,
None for yourself? No pity for her mother,
Who will be left alone by the faithless man,
The rover, going to sea at the first north wind 
With a girl for booty? Was that not the way 
The Phrygian shepherd entered Lacedaemon 
And carried Helen off to Troy's far city?
What of your solemn word, your years of love
For your own people, your right hand so often
Given to Turnus, our blood-kin? (7. 497-506)
The queen's desperation becomes evident when, having just
reminded Latinus of his duty to his own kin, she attempts
to suggest that Turnus himself is as much a foreigner as
Aeneas: "I maintain that every separate country / Free from
all rule of ours, is foreign land, / And this is what the
gods mean. Turnus, too, / If we seek origins, had Inachus
/ And Acrisius as forebears at Mycenae" (7. 510-14). Her
husband, however, stands firm against her barrage of
arguments and, as a result, "the poor queen, now enflamed /
By prodigies of hell, went wild indeed / And with insane
abandon roamed the city" (7. 518-20).
In the person of Amata and, of course, in Juno
herself, Virgil appears to represent an impulse which is
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Inimical to the very processes necessary for Rome's 
founding. According to Robert Parks, a leading member of 
the Chicago School of urban studies, the development of 
civilization not only militates against the conservation of 
racial differences but may be said to flourish at their 
very expense:
if it is true that races are the products of isolation 
and inbreeding, it is just as certain that 
civilization, on the other hand, is a consequence of 
contact and communication. The forces which have been 
decisive in mankind are those which have brought men 
together in competition, conflict and co-operation. 
(132)
It is precisely those forces which Amata and Juno oppose. 
Although their respective plights elicit our sympathy, 
their fierce loyalty to their own kin makes them obstacles 
to the realization of the Roman ideal. At the very core of 
civilization, Virgil suggests, is a movement beyond the 
narrow confines of kin, a movement towards the other. The 
founding of Rome is made possible not by the preservation 
of an original purity but by the creative mixing of peoples 
and cultures.
The City in America
The development of American civilization, a development 
which would hardly have been possible without the Influx 
and intermingling of countless peoples from Europe, Africa 
America itself and elsewhere, presents perhaps the clearest 
latter-day instance of the process which Virgil suggests in 
the Aeneld. In fact, as Theodore Ziolkowski notes, it is
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in America rather than Italy that the Virgilian epic has
had the most profound influence. In comparison "with the
cooptation of Virgil as a national property in Italy"
during the regime of Mussolini in the 1930s,
we can observe a process of popularization in the 
United States, where ever since the beginning of the 
republic Virgil had belonged among the most beloved 
school-authors, where his epic about "the pilgrim 
fathers of the Romans" was regarded as the archetype 
of every voyage of discovery, where twenty-two states 
could boast of a town named Troy, and where even the 
dollar bill bore Latin phrases based on quotations 
from Virgil (novus ordo seclorurn, annuit coeptls, and 
e pluribus unum). (19)
However, if America has welcomed the archetype of its own
experience in the image of exile from Troy, it has not
accorded the same reception to the image of the city
itself. In fact, at times America appears to be
characterized by a peculiar ineptitude for the urban way of
life. As Leo Marx suggests, "an inchoate longing for a
more 'natural' environment enters into the contemptuous
attitude that many Americans adopt towards urban life (with
the result that we neglect our cities and desert them for
the suburbs)" (5).
As Lewis Simpson has observed, American popular
mythology views "the English people who began to make their
homes in Massachusetts and Virginia in the first half of
the seventeenth century" as "the advance guard of the
radical forces of modernity," "a brave and restless progeny
who during the new three centuries transformed a huge
expanse of virgin continent into . . . the first fully
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modern nation" (1). According to Simpson, this image of
the first settlers is entirely misleading:
The settlements they made in a "new world" were in one 
way or another responses to the dispossession of the 
integral and authoritative community of an "old world" 
by modern history. If they sowed the New World 
gardens with the seeds of modernity, the initial 
makers of these gardens did so unwittingly. They 
intended to make their new homes in Massachusetts and 
Virginia— save of course for their possible 
destruction by the hand of Providence— places of 
permanence, not jumping-off places for something else. 
This at any rate is what the Massachusetts and 
Virginia plantings are conceived to be in the writings 
of those who attempted to imagine what these novel 
places meant. (2)
Thus, the American founding— or this version of it— was
precisely an idealized reaction to the historical forces
which modernity represented. The New England settlers
brought with them a vision of America as a second paradise,
a new Garden of Eden, in which the American Adam could live
out his existence free of the trials and evils of past
history. Whereas Virgil's Rome is founded through contact
and communication with other peoples, the New World is
understood as a virgin land, unspoiled and untainted by
human presence. Like the societies of archaic man, it is
situated at the primordial time of beginnings, the locus of
an original innocence and purity.
With the arrival of industrialization in America in
the nineteenth century, the lure of an idealized pastoral
world was given new life. Christine Bolt notes that urban
growth which
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occasioned only moderate hostility in the first half 
of the nineteenth century aroused increasing alarm 
from the 1880s. The speed of urbanization then seemed 
threatening, and the process was more than formerly 
associated with social segregation and class conflict, 
with a massive immigrant influx, commercialized vice 
and political corruption, and with the alienation of 
the individual from the supports and restraints 
provided by traditional societies. (13-14)
By the early twentieth century "a diverse nation which
shared many of the social evils and ambitions of the also
urbanizing Old World" had developed in the place of "a
relatively homogeneous rural 'utopia'" (14). The
"industrial cities" which formed the center-piece of this
new reality, Bolt remarks, "were often seen as symbols of
the loss of American youth and innocence" (14).
In 1851, the year he began writing Pierre, his seventh
book, Herman Melville already sensed the immensity of the
gap between the emerging urban reality and the pastoral
ideal which had been present in the American consciousness
since its inception. In fact, the idyllic world of Saddle
Meadows, the rural home of his young hero Pierre, is
defined precisely by its distance from the vulgar life of
the city. The difference between the two worlds, however,
is not simply a difference between reality and fantasy. On
the contrary, for Melville, the very isolation of Saddle
Meadows makes it a more profound symbol of the deepest
tendencies of his society than he could find in the city
itself.
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Like the society of the Laurentines, Saddle Meadows is 
a world which clearly requires regeneration. Pierre, its 
representative, is "not only the solitary head of his 
family, but the only surnamed male Glendinning extant" (7). 
A family which was once "powerful and populous," we are 
told, "had by degrees run off into the female branches; so 
that Pierre found himself surrounded by numerous kinsmen 
and kinswomen, yet companioned by no surnamed Glendinning, 
but the duplicate one reflected to him in the mirror"
(7-8). In Saddle Meadows, then, Melville provides a 
symbolic representation of a culture of isolation, a 
culture which—  because it has severed its links with the 
outside world— has become introverted and narcissistic.
In the Aeneid, of course, the impediment to the 
renewal of Latin society is ultimately overcome, and a new 
life with the Trojans begins. But the very existence of 
that impediment means that the future is realized only at a 
great price. In her resistance to her daughter's marriage 
to Aeneas, Latinus' queen brings about both her own 
destruction and a bloody war between the Trojans and the 
forces of Turnus. Pierre is ultimately a tragic novel 
because the psychic obstacles which prevent regeneration 
cannot be removed, because the inward turn of the hero's 
society is so deeply ingrained that catastrophe is the only 
possible outcome. As Myra Jehlen indicates, the world 
which Pierre has inherited is "already ideal" (218). As a
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result, "the confrontation of ideal world and ideal hero is 
apocalyptic, a final apocalypse of which even the record 
disappears" (218).*
In his young hero's relentless progress towards self- 
destruction, Melville revealed the catastrophic potential 
latent in his own society. Thus, Pierre is not simply an 
account of the author's contemporary social world but a 
projection of that world to the point of its ultimate self- 
realization. Unlike the Aeneid. which prophesies an ideal 
future, Pierre brings us to the brink of the abyss, to the 
nothingness which is glimpsed when a stagnant and decaying 
society collapses in upon itself.
In Pierre. however, Melville was looking not only 
toward the future but back to the origins of American 
civilization. In fact, one of the definitive marks of 
Pierre's world is its sense of proximity to those 
beginnings. The very landscape of Saddle Meadows makes 
present the historic past, "the popular names of its finest 
features" appealing to "the proudest patriotic and family 
associations of the historic line of Glendinning" (6). A
1. Chapter six of Jehlen's American Incarnation: the 
Individual, the Nation, and the Continent provides an 
excellent discussion of the tragic aspects of Pierre. She 
notes that the hero's tragedy "produces no catharsis, has 
no purgative effect, implies no later resumption of even a 
diminished order. It is literally, as Isabel says, all 
over in the end, and we know him not: that is, not even his 
story is left, the tragedy itself has been destroyed. Not 
just a hero, but the all-representative American man in a 
universal Gaza, he has pulled down the pillars of the 
universe" (217).
168
day's walk beyond the mansions and the village brought 
Pierre into contact with the "storied heights, where in the 
Revolutionary war his grandfather had for several months 
defended a rude but all-important stockaded fort,, against 
the repeated combined assaults of Indians, Tories, and 
Regulars" (6). All these associations, we are told, "were 
full of pride to Pierre" (6).
For Melville, however, what makes Pierre the very 
incarnation of America is not so much his link with its 
revolutionary past as his contemporaneity with it. For 
Pierre, there is no past— or future for that matter. Like 
the man of archaic societies, he lives only at the 
primordial moment, at a beginning untainted by the 
processes of history. Thus, as a symbolic world, Saddle 
Meadows does not simply represent those tendencies which 
Melville saw latent at his own historical moment; rather, 
it roots those tendencies in the paradisiac myth which 
America's first settlers brought with them to the New 
World, the myth of an absolute beginning, of a return to 
the Edenic state which preceded the fall of man.
Of course, nearly one hundred and fifty years after 
the publication of Pierre. Melville himself is regarded as 
perhaps the quintessential American writer. That fact 
alone suggests that the world of Pierre Glendinning does 
not by any means exhaust the content of America's psychic 
landscape. Both Pierre and Nathaniel Hawthorne's The
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Marble Faun, Diane Long Hoeveler suggests, are themselves 
"particularly American works in criticizing the notion that 
a new order can replace the corrupt and rejected world of 
the fathers" (247). But if Melville questioned the false 
optimism of the American ideal, he did not neglect to hope 
for the renewal of his people. D.H. Lawrence, who himself 
professed a deep admiration for Melville's work, remarks 
that "underneath, and contrary" to America's "open ideal" 
are
the first hints and revelations of it. It, the 
American whole soul. You have got to pull the
democratic and idealistic clothes off American
utterance, and see what you can of the dusky body of 
It underneath. ( Studies 18)
In Pierre. Melville gives us the image of an alienated and
fragmented soul. But in Mobv Dick— where a redemptive
future for society is foreseen— he gives us another
America, an America which is founded not on the denial of
the fact of man's baser nature but, to cite Lawrence again,
on the "the deepest whole self of man, the self in its
wholeness, not idealistic halfness" (17). Ultimately, this
America is equally if not more significant than the version
which is represented in the overwrought world of the
Glendinnings.
Incest and Civilization
Perhaps the most definitive characteristic of the world of 
Saddle Meadows is the incestuous quality of its familial 
relations. Critics, however, have disagreed on the meaning
of incest in the novel, a fact which may reflect the 
paradoxical quality of the concept itself. While its 
common definition is straightforward— incest means sexual 
intercourse between persons so closely related that they 
are forbidden by law to marry— a deeper analysis yields two 
apparently opposed meanings. Its Latin derivation is 
incestum, the noun use of the adjective incestus (in-not + 
castus pure) which means unchaste or impure. On the one 
hand, then, incest is the violation of something untainted, 
a pollution or mixing of categories which ought to be 
separate precisely because they are already closely 
related. It is an instance of what Levi-Strauss calls "the 
underrating of blood relations" ("Structural Study of Myth" 
215). Incest implies an entirely undifferentiated state, a 
state in which anyone— kin and non-kin— can be chosen as a 
mate. It results, as its Latin root implies, from a lack 
of sexual restraint or chastity, an uninhibited desire 
which ignores socially-sanctioned boundaries. It is this 
sense of incest which Freud identified as antithetical to 
civilization; "incest," he wrote, "is anti-social and 
civilization consists in a progressive renunciation of it" 
(quoted in Strachey 6).
On the other hand, incest suggests an excessively 
strict differentiation between kin and non-kin, what Levi- 
Strauss calls an "overrating of blood relations" (215). It 
is the result of an overly developed sense of exclusivity,
a fear of the other or the stranger; a person within the 
family circle is chosen as a mate precisely because of the 
horror of mixing with those outside it. Thus, if incest 
suggests the pollution of relations within the circle of 
kin, it also suggests the fear of pollution from sources 
outside that circle. This meaning is also present in the 
Latin derivation. Castus, the Latin word for pure, is the 
root of the word caste, commonly defined as a hereditary 
social class or unmixed race. Thus, if the incest taboo is 
the very mark of civilization, as Freud and Levi-Strauss 
suggest, civilization itself can appear to be incestuous 
when it becomes a system of rigid social stratification. 
Incest, in this sense, is the result of an intellectual 
rather than a sensual disorder, a disorder which causes the 
mind to sever its connections with the world outside itself 
— with both the human body and the body of humanity. When 
incest is understood as not simply a literal but a symbolic 
condition, it is this latter sense which is most frequently 
invoked. We see it not only in the tragedies of the 
ancient Greek dramatists but in a wide array of modern 
literary works— in Edgar Allan Poe's "The Fall of the House 
of Usher," in W. B. Yeats's Purgatory, in Faulkner's 
Absalom. Absalom, in Gabriel Garcia Marquez's One Hundred 
Years of Solitude, as well as in Pierre itself.
Many critics, however, have interpreted the incest 
motif in Pierre in a more or less literal fashion. In
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fact, S. Foster Damon, an early critic of the novel, argues 
that literalism is the very mark of Melville's treatment of 
incest. For Hawthorne, he suggests, it was merely a symbol 
of sexual sin, "made specific only because incest was 
literary, unreal, and mystifying" (15). Melville, on the 
other hand, "was interested in the thing for its own 
puzzle" (151). His treatment of incest, Damon remarks, "is 
such that Pierre takes its place in literary history as the 
first novel based on morbid sex" (149).
Thus, while Damon recognizes the presence of incest as 
a specifically literary theme in Hawthorne, he praises 
Melville for his non-literary— that is, his realistic—  
approach to the subject. His remarks, however, imply a 
misunderstanding of the nature of literature itself. As 
Victor Shklovsky suggests, an image in a literary work is 
"not a permanent referent for those mutable complexities of 
life which are revealed through it; its purpose is not to 
make us perceive meaning, but to create a special 
perception of the object" (18). It is this mediated 
quality of the literary work— its deformation of lived 
reality— which Damon dismisses in Hawthorne and fails to 
recognize in Melville.
In fact, a literal interpretation leaves Melville open 
to the charge which many reviews raised against him when 
the novel was first published, that is, that he had a
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prurient interest in "morbid sex." A review in Graham's
Magazine. for example, announced that
the spirit pervading the whole book is intolerably 
unhealthy, and the most friendly reader is obliged at 
the end to protest against such a provoking perversion 
of talent and waste of power. The author has 
attempted seemingly to combine in it the peculiarities 
of Poe and Hawthorne, and has succeeded in producing 
nothing but a powerfully unpleasant caricature of 
morbid thought and passion. Pierre, we take it, is 
crazy, and the merit of the book is clearly presenting 
the psychology of his madness; but the details of such 
a mental malady as that which afflicts Pierre are 
almost as disgusting as those of physical disease 
itself. (55)
The American Whig Review called the plot of the novel 
"repulsive, unnatural and indecent" (58). , It went on to 
suggest that
there are certain ideas so repulsive to the general 
mind that they themselves are not alone kept out of 
sight, but, by a fit ordination of society, every 
thing that might be supposed to even collaterally 
suggest them is carefully shrouded in decorous 
darkness. Nor has any man the right, in his morbid 
craving after originality, to strip these horrors of 
their decent mystery. But the subject which Mr. 
Melville has taken upon himself to handle is one of no 
ordinary depravity; and however he may endeavor to 
gloss the idea over with a platonic polish, no matter 
how energetically he strives to wrap the mystery in a 
cloud of high-sounding but meaningless words, the main 
conception remains still unaltered in all its moral 
depravity. (60-61)
If Melville was interested in the fact of incest simply for
its own sake, then the charge of prurience might not be
altogether inappropriate. But as Hoeveler reminds us, some
critics have asserted that "there is no actual physical
incest between Pierre and Isabel" (251). Of course, this
omission might simply be the result of Melville's
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unwillingness to risk offending his readers even more than 
the published novel actually did. But the lack of direct 
evidence of incest in the novel does present a problem for 
those who interpret the motif in a purely literal fashion.
A literal interpretation also raises the problem of 
reconciling the various aspects of Melville's hero. If 
Pierre's desires are incestuous, they have as their object 
the kind of disembodied feminine ideal which is typically 
associated with the tradition of courtly love. Faced with 
what seems like a contradiction, critics have tended to 
dismiss the hero's idealizations of his mother and half- 
sister as simply disguised manifestations of an unconscious 
incest relation. The hero's "romanticism," Damon suggests, 
"constitutes the visible plot" only (149). If that were 
all,
the book could easily be forgotten. But that was not 
all: the real plot is invisible. The cause of all 
this intense behavior is a sexual complication 
involving living and dead, the real facts of which are 
unknown to all four antagonists. This hidden motive 
is incest. (149)
For Damon, incest is the secret cause of everything that
happens to Pierre rather than a symbol of his actual
condition.2 Lewis Mumford, whose comments on the novel
2. It was precisely this kind of hermeneutics that 
Lawrence criticized as the craze for "the dirty little 
secret," a craze which he— perhaps unfairly— saw as typical 
of all French literature. Gilles Deleuze and Claire 
Parnet, who have drawn extensively on Lawrence's insights, 
argue that American literature, unlike its French 
counterpart, is marked precisely by the absence of 
psychological introspection: "American literature operates
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are generally insightful, also suggests this view: "in 
Pierre's relations with his mother, and in his espousal of 
Isabel he is driven by an unconscious physical passion - in 
both cases a disguised incest relation" ("Catnip" 153).
While Melville hints that Pierre experiences some 
degree of physical desire for Isabel, his treatment of 
incest— as more recent critics have indicated— ultimately 
implies a psychological condition rather than an actual 
sexual relation. Jehlen, for example, suggests that 
Incest between brother and sister, "through which a man may 
reproduce himself in union with the female version of his 
own body, has a strictly individualist logic; it incarnates 
the self-made man" (185).3 Similarly, Gillian Brown links 
incest with the denial of man's need for community, his 
refusal of the fact that human existence is by definition a 
coexistence:
according to geographical lines: the flight towards the 
West, the discovery that the true East is in the West, the 
sense of frontiers as something to cross, to push back, to 
go beyond. The becoming is geographical. There is no 
equivalent in France. The French are too human, too 
historical, too concerned with the future and the past.
They spend their time in in-depth analysis" (37).
3. Other critics have expressed similar views. Hoeveler, 
for example, suggests that "the relationship between Isabel 
and Pierre can best be described as psychological incest, a 
love affair between the ideal light and the actual or 
masochistic dark elements in Pierre's mind" (251). Warner 
Berthoff argues that "the situation of incest, curiously 
underplayed, is principally a sign of the fearful 
tautologies of consciousness as it goes its natural course, 
and especially of its bottomless capacity for self- 
violence" (220).
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Incest and parricide are crimes against relation, 
violations of the social . . . boundaries defining the 
family. Pierre would destroy these boundaries to rid 
himself of these relations, of the very idea of 
relationship. (163)
As these critics imply, the motif of incest was not simply
an emblem of the hero's condition but the very means which
Melville used to criticize the ideological content of the
American ideal.
In the imaginary worlds which works of literature
offer us, the locus of incest is typically the ancestral
house of an aristocratic or noble family, a family which
either by design or default has severed its links with the
common body of humanity. As the French philosopher Gaston
Bachelard has indicated, however, the image of house does
not immediately suggest alienation. In fact, at the heart
of his exploration of the house-image is Bachelard's
rejection of the Heideggerean notion that man inherits a
world into which he has been cast:
Before he is "cast into the world," as claimed by 
certain hasty metaphysics, man is laid in the cradle 
of the house. And always, in our daydreams, the house 
is a large cradle. A concrete metaphysics cannot 
neglect this fact, this simple fact, all the more, 
since this fact is a value, an important value, to 
which we return in our daydreaming. Being is already 
a value. Life begins well, it begins enclosed, 
protected, all warm in the bosom of the house. (4)
For Bachelard, then, the house is a vital image of the fact
that human life is rooted in the world from the start:
"Without it, man would be a dispersed being. It maintains
him through the storms of the heavens and through those of
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life. It is body and soul. It is the human being's first 
world" (7).
Only within the landscape of tragedy does the image of 
the house take on an entirely different— almost juxtaposed 
— aspect to that which Bachelard identifies. Instead of 
rooting its inhabitants in the world, it separates them 
from it, presenting an image not so much of shelter as of 
isolation. For Bachelard, there is "a dynamic rivalry 
between house and universe" (47). Like the human body 
itself, the house enables man to confront the cosmos: "It 
braces itself to receive the downpour, it girds its loins. 
When forced to do so, it bends with the blast, confident 
that it will right itself, again in time, while continuing 
to deny any temporary defeats" (46). It allows us to say: 
"I will be an inhabitant of the world, in spite of the 
world" (47). In tragedy, by contrast, the house no longer 
exists in a relation of tension with the universe. Its 
role is not to mediate between man and the world but to 
insulate him from it. The house becomes a wholly 
alternative world, an idealized sanctuary where man can 
have the illusion of a life apart from actual historical 
existence. As such, it loses its humanity. The house is 
no longer "body and soul," as Bachelard suggests, but a 
disembodied abstraction. Its maternal qualities, its 
capacity to nourish and protect, are replaced by features 
which manifest themselves when the world becomes
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exclusively patriarchal— alienated from the earth and a 
morbid obsession with the purity of origins. It is into 
this world— severed so completely from the sources of its 
possible regeneration— that Melville's young hero is born. 
Pure and Impure Worlds
Saddle Meadows, the Glendinning ancestral home, is situated
away from the city, the very locus of civilization. The
eccentricity of Saddle Meadows, of course, is more a matter
of psychological than physical separation from the reality
which the city presents. In short, if the Glendinnings are
different, it is because they think they are other than
common humanity. The very linchpin of their aristocratic
society is a belief in the purity of their origins, a
conviction that they are untainted by relationships with
the world beyond their own circle. "Pierre's pedigree,"
Edgar Dryden notes,
seems straight and unflawed. We meet the young hero 
"issuing from the high gabled old home of his father" 
and entering a world where the "very horizon [is] to 
him as a memorial ring," where all the "hills and 
swales seemed as sanctified through their long 
uninterrupted possession of his race.” Unlike the 
orphaned Ishmael, he seems to find himself in a world 
where he truly belongs, a world where his identity, 
place, and destiny are confirmed by the self- 
reflecting environment of a "powerful and populous 
family." (77)
As Dryden suggests, Saddle Meadows constitutes a kind of 
closed system, an entirely self-referential world which 
signifies nothing beyond itself— precisely because it
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thinks that it is already complete, that it is a total 
world.*
Melville's narrator acknowledges— with some irony, of
course— that genealogical purity of the kind which the
Glendinnings represent is not typically regarded,
particularly by monarchical Europe, as a characteristic of
the New World. In "demagoguical America," it is generally
imagined, "the sacred past hath no fixed statues erected to
it, but all things irreverently seethe and boil in the
vulgar caldron of an everlasting crystallizing present"
(8). Of course, that perception, the narrator concedes, is
undoubtedly true of the common body of men:
In our cities families rise and burst like bubbles in 
a vat. For indeed the democratic element operates as 
a subtile acid among us; forever producing new things 
by corroding the old; as in the south of France 
verdigris, the primitive material of one kind of green 
paint, is produced by grape-vinegar poured upon copper 
plates. (9)
4. The implicit analogy here is between kinship and 
language, an analogy which Levi-Strauss explores in much of 
his work. See Structural Anthropology 31-96. Simply put, 
both kinship and linguistic systems establish relations 
between different parts of reality. Language itself allows 
us to see the world akin, as a reality knitted together by 
intricate analogies and correspondences. Fred See, in 
chapter three of his book Desire and the Sign, argues that 
Melville calls into question this notion of language: 
"Pierre . . .  is a text which turns language back upon 
itself, in order to discover the point at which man may 
recommence to think, and to write, free of the illusion of 
metaphorical affinities" (90). The model for language, in 
other words, is not exogamy but incest. See's remarks are 
illuminating; but my own view is that the discontinuity of 
language, its inability to signify beyond itself, is more 
specifically a characteristic and, indeed, Melville's 
indictment of Pierre’s self-enclosed world.
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However, if the life of "the commonality" appears to be 
governed by the natural processes of death and decay, there 
are, we are told, "things in the visible world, over which 
ever-shifting nature hath not so unbounded a sway" (9). 
While the "grass is annually changed," the "limbs of the 
oak, for a long number of years, defy that annual decree" 
(9). The great mass of families is like the blades of 
grass. But there are a few which, like the oak, "instead 
of decaying, annually put . . . forth new branches; whereby 
Time, instead of subtracting, is made to capitulate into a 
multiple virtue" (9). The estates of such families "seem 
to defy Times's tooth, and by conditions which take hold of 
the indestructible earth seem to cotemporize their fee- 
simples with eternity" (11).
The condition of purity, the narrator implies, can 
only be maintained by the abolition of history itself. To 
subject oneself to the processes of time is to depart from 
the origin, to open oneself up to the possibility of 
change, to the onset of corruption and decay. When archaic 
societies attempted to purify themselves through the 
"annual expulsion of demons, diseases and sins," they were 
essentially attempting to rid themselves of the effects of 
history itself, to return to the sacred time of beginnings 
(Eliade Cosmos 53).
Saddle Meadows, of course, is one of those family 
estates which "seem[s] to defy Time's tooth" (11). We
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first meet Pierre on the kind of summer morning "when he
who is but a sojourner from the city shall early walk forth
into the fields, and be wonder-smitten with the trance-like
aspect of the green and golden world" (3). If the city is
the very embodiment of temporality, the countryside, the
narrator suggests, is the locus of "a wonderful and
indescribable repose" (3). It displays not the ongoing
processes of life and death but the unchanging face of an
Edenic nature; "Not a flower stirs; the trees forget to
wave; the grass itself seems to have ceased to grow" (3).
However, if on the one hand, the world of Saddle
Meadows seems to exemplify the kind of atemporal, rural
existence which the narrator describes, on the other hand,
it seems to undercut the very validity of that life.
Richard H. Brodhead suggests:
When cattle become "brindled kine . . . followed, not 
driven, by ruddy-cheeked, white footed boys," the 
golden haze is, we must feel, being laid on rather 
thick; when horses are "kind as kittens" we can 
suspect that nature has been too thoroughly 
domesticated, too easily humanized. This place is too 
soft a pastoral; like the paradise of Blake's Book of 
Thel. it seems overripe, its very lushness a symptom 
of unresolved and unrecognized problems. (226)
In fact, the overripeness of which Brodhead speaks conceals
its very opposite— a scarcity of growth, an infertility.
While the Glendinning lineage may be one of those which
"stand as the oak," it hardly perpetuates itself by putting
forth new branches each year (9). Indeed, as we have
already seen, Pierre himself is the last surviving
182
representative of the ancient family, "the only surnamed
male Glendinning" (7). The world of Saddle Meadows, It
seems, Is on the verge of extinction.
By contrast, life in the cities, while subject to the
corrosive processes of history, is at the same time the
beneficiary of a complementary process of regeneration:
Now in general nothing can be more significant of 
decay than the idea of corrosion; yet on the other 
hand, nothing can more vividly suggest luxuriance of 
life, than the idea of green as a color; for green is 
the peculiar signet of all-fertile Nature herself.
(9)
This paradoxical quality, suggesting both decay and 
rebirth, makes the democratic element in America seem to be 
governed by the processes of nature herself. Whereas in 
other lands political institutions "seem above all things 
intensely artificial," in America they "seem to possess the 
divine virtue of a natural law" (9). For, the narrator 
concludes, "the most mighty of nature's laws is this, that 
out of Death she brings Life" (9). Thus, if the contrast 
between life at Saddle Meadows and life in the cities is a 
contrast between pure and impure worlds, at a deeper level 
it suggests a contrast between fertility and stagnation.
We have seen that for archaic man, life— in its most 
real sense— is only possible at the origin, at the 
primordial time of beginnings. That portion of his life 
which is passed in profane time, in the state of 
"becoming," is without meaning (Eliade, Cosmos 35). By 
contrast, the condition of the Glendinning family suggests
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that to remain at the beginning— to attempt to preserve an 
original purity--is precisely to stagnate. To revert to a 
single origin, Edouard Glissant indicates, "is to 
consecrate permanence, to negate contact" (16). By 
corollary, the processes of history allow for the 
possibility of communion with others, a communion which is 
necessary for fruitful growth and development. Indeed, the 
generative quality of urban life, Melville's narrator 
implies, is precisely a consequence of the fact that the 
city is a "vulgar cauldron" in which "all things 
irreverently seethe and boil" rather than a pristine vessel 
which contains only pure elements (8).
Essentially the same point is made by Augustine in The 
City of God. Neither the earthly nor the heavenly city, he 
indicates, is fully realized within the span of history. In 
fact, the two cities "are interwoven and intermixed in this 
era, and await separation at the last judgement" (1. 35). 
Augustine's formulation seems to allude to one of the most 
well-known New Testament parables, the parable of the wheat 
and the tares (Matt. 13-24). According to Matthew's 
narrative, a farmer who has recently planted a field of 
wheat discovers that an enemy has come in the night and 
sown tares among the good seed. Thus, when the good 
plants— which stand for "the children of the kingdom"—  
eventually appear, so do the bad plants— "the children of 
the wicked one" (13. 38). Despite the wishes of his
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servants, the farmer allows both crops to grow alongside 
each other until the time of the harvest— which represents 
"the end of the world" (13. 39). Only then are the two 
plants separated, the tares bound up and burnt while the 
wheat is gathered into the barn.
The City of God is in one sense an extended exegesis 
on this very short parable. Augustine recognizes that the 
citizens of the City of God in this life cannot live apart 
from the earthly city. In the first place, the goods of 
the earthly city are necessary to citizens of both cities. 
As Augustine notes, both kinds of men "make use of the 
things essential for this mortal life," although "each has 
its own very different ends in making use of them" (9. 17). 
But Augustine also recognizes that in the midst of 
Christians are some "who are united with her in 
participation in the sacraments, but who will not join with 
her in the eternal destiny of the saints" (1. 35). Yet he 
indicates that "we have less right to despair of the 
reformation of some of them, when some predestined friends, 
as yet unknown to themselves are concealed among our own 
open enemies" (1. 35).
Augustine's attitude towards the earthly city, then, 
is fundamentally one of hope. He sees it not as a 
predetermined reality but as the very space in which men 
work out their salvation. That the city is impure is not a 
reason for despair. On the contrary, it is a sign that it
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Is still becoming, that its ultimate destiny has yet to be 
realized. To attempt to purify the city— to purge it of 
its ambiguities— is essentially to deny man's capacity for 
growth and ultimately to despair of his redemption.
The debate over pure and impure cities is still played 
out in our own times. Jane Jacobs advances the argument 
that multiformity is an inherent feature of urban 
development. The cities which survive and develop, she 
suggests, are those which allow for diversification and 
complexity. Thus, the cities of the future will be "more 
intricate, comprehensive, diversified, and larger" rather 
than "smaller, simpler or more specialized" than those of 
today (249). In fact, the second set of attributes, 
although frequently advocated by city planners and urban 
designers, tends to be those of stagnant settlements: 
"Conformity and monotony, even when they are embellished 
with a froth of novelty, are not attributes of developing 
and vigorous cities" (249).
Of course, the increased complexity of the modern city 
brings its own problems. But to attempt to solve those 
problems by rationalizing or streamlining the processes of 
city development is, as Jacobs suggests, profoundly 
reactionary. Rationalization, however, has been the 
preferred solution ever since the industrial revolution 
began to effect its changes on urban life at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. As Alexander Welsh notes, the
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historical forces felt by the nineteenth-century mind— the 
exponential growth of the city, the displacement of the 
urban dweller, his loss of economic independence— led to a 
new "awareness of the city as a systemic problem, and 
therefore as a treatment or eventual cure for the city that 
is scientific" (25). That awareness continues to influence 
the analyses of urban sociologists. Whereas Freud held 
that a certain amount of discontent is inevitable in 
civilized life, sociologists have tended to assume that 
rational planning can create an environment free of 
psychological disorder.
The other response to the problems of the city is 
simply to abandon it. Although not an option available to 
most urban dwellers, escape from the city is given a 
symbolic expression, as we have seen, in the idealized 
rural world depicted in a certain kind of pastoral poetry. 
What is really involved in such poetry, as Raymond Williams 
has indicated, is an ideology of the country, an ideology 
which presents the rural world as an alternative to the 
human condition itself.
Country Innocence
It is Pierre's "fate," we are told, "to have been born and 
nurtured in the country, surrounded by scenery whose 
uncommon loveliness was the perfect mould of a delicate and 
poetic mind" (5). The very mark of Pierre's rural
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upbringing is his innocence, a quality which— the narrator
indicates— can only exist undisturbed in the country:
So choicely, and in some degree, secludedly nurtured, 
Pierre, though now arrived at the age of nineteen, had 
never yet become so thoroughly initiated into that 
darker, though truer aspect of things, which an entire 
residence in the city from the earliest period of 
life, almost inevitably engraves upon the mind of any 
keenly observant and reflective youth of Pierre's 
present years. (69)
On the one hand, the contrast between innocence and
experience suggests the contrast between presence and
absence. Innocence implies a fullness of vision, a
capacity to perceive the world in its original freshness
and beauty. Experience is the loss of that capacity. To
be marked by it is to acquire a certain world-weariness, a
lowered expectation of the potential of earthly life.
Melville's narrator, however, suggests that if the city is
the locus of dark experience, the Innocence which the
country allows its inhabitants is not entirely sweetness
and light. In fact, it appears as a lack rather than an
indication of the fullness of youth. If Pierre's mind is
untainted, it is because it is cut off from the world. His
innocence suggests the isolation of the self from others,
the absence of community which will ultimately
result in his own destruction.
On the surface, however, the self-enclosed world of
the hero is one of blissful contentment. Pierre, as Dryden
observes "seems to enjoy the security of a family circle
within which he can define and fix himself and at the same
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time remain free of any challenge to his originality and 
authority" (77). Yet as the only surviving male member of 
the Glendinning line, he sometimes experiences a strange 
feeling of loneliness, a feeling which the narrator 
speculates is at least in part the origin of his "yearning" 
for a sister:
So perfect to Pierre had long seemed the illuminated 
scroll of his life thus far, that only one hiatus was 
discoverable by him in that sweetly-writ manuscript.
A sister had been omitted from the text. He mourned 
that so delicious a feeling as fraternal love had been 
denied him. (7)
Implicit in Pierre's sense of denial is the recognition
that the world of self-sufficiency is finally characterized
not by plenitude but by absence. If on the one hand, he
luxuriates in his own idealized self-presence, on the other
hand, his separation from others leaves him profoundly
unfulfilled. Without community, the self knows only a
world which is both empty and devastatingly silent.
However, Pierre seems fated to remain within the kind
of closed world which belongs to him by virtue of the
Glendinning name. If his yearning for a sister suggests an
attempt to transcend the boundaries of his own ego, it also
suggests incestuous desire. For in Pierre's mind, sister
and wife are barely distinguishable categories, a confusion
which the narrator indicates when he rather wryly states
that
a gentle sister is the second best gift to a man; it 
is first in point of occurrence; for the wife comes 
after. He who is sisterless, is as a bachelor before
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his time. For much that goes to make up the 
deliciousness of a wife, already lies in the sister. 
(7)
In fact, the narrator suggests that for Pierre a sister not 
only anticipates but actually fulfills the role of wife. 
Thus, his yearning for a sibling is precisely a denial of 
marriage and, thus, of contact with the world beyond his 
own family.
Until the appearance of Isabel, though, Pierre's
desire remains unfulfilled. So, in an attempt to supply
the "absent reality," he bestows the "fictitious title" of
sister upon his mother (3). Their relationship, of course,
is more like the courtship of young lovers than the
friendship of siblings. While Mrs. Glendinning's unspoilt
charms made it possible for her to choose from a train of
infatuated suitors, "a reverential and devoted son seemed
lover enough for this widow" (5). She tolerates Lucy only
because she believes her marriage to Pierre will not change
her own relationship with him. She reflects:
His little wife, that is to be, will not estrange him 
from me; for she too is docile,— beautiful, and 
reverential, and most docile. . . . How glad am I that 
Pierre loves her so, and not some dark-eyed 
haughtiness, with whom I could never live in peace; 
but who would be ever setting her young married state 
before my elderly widowed one, and claiming all the 
homage of my dear boy. (20)
Pierre is as possessive of his mother as she is of him. We
are told that "the too ardent admiration of the handsome
youths" who seemed to entertain the insane hope of marrying
his mother caused him more than once to jealously swear
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that the man who dared to propose marriage to her "would by 
some peremptory unrevealed agency immediately disappear 
from the earth" (5).
The community of mother and son is incestuous not so 
much because it is the locus of a socially-unsanctioned 
desire but because it is regarded by both as a wholly self- 
sufficient world. At least on the surface, Pierre and Mrs. 
Glendinning feel that they are completely fulfilled in each 
other's company. Their existence together is apparently 
one of "perfect confidence and mutual understanding at all 
points" (5). In their eyes, it represents not the 
pollution of the relationship between mother and son but an 
"unclouded love" which is free from the blemishes of 
earthly existence." For both, the narrator indicates, "the 
pure joined current of life" flowed on "freely and 
lightsomely" (5).
Their mutual fulfillment, of course, is ultimately 
narcissistic. There was, we are told, "a striking personal 
resemblance between them" and in "the clear-cut lineaments 
and noble air of the son," the mother "saw her own graces 
strangely translated into the opposite sex" (5). In the 
closed world of Saddle Meadows, mother and son reflect back 
to each other the pristine images of their own selves.
On the face of it, the world of Melville's hero is a 
highly— perhaps excessively— feminine one. Pierre is the 
only living male in his family and his closest relations
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are with women: his mother, Lucy and Isabel (5). However,
the object of his love in each instance is not the
authentic reality of another person but a disembodied ideal
which is ultimately unattainable. If women have frequently
been reduced to the status of wholly bodily creatures, they
have— under the influence of neo-platonism— been elevated
to the status of exclusively spiritual ones. Both images
entail the denial of the full humanity of women. It is the
latter, though, that of woman as pure spirit, which
dominates the mind of Melville's hero.
For Pierre, Lucy is an "invoking angel" whose delicate
feet have never touched the earth (4). Indeed, at one
point, in the early part of the novel, we actually find her
"hovering near the door" of the Glendinning dining hall
(58). With Pierre watching,
the setting sun, streaming through the window, bathed 
her whole form in golden loveliness and light; that 
wonderful, and most vivid transparency of her clear 
Welsh complexion, now fairly glowed like rosy snow.
Her flowing, white, blue-ribboned dress, fleecily 
invested her. Pierre almost thought that she could 
only depart the house by floating out of the open 
window, instead of actually stepping from the door.
All her aspect to him, was that moment touched with an 
indescribable gayety, buoyancy, fragility, and an 
unearthly evanescence. (58)
While idealised images appear to pay homage to women, such
images actually offer a sign of the absence of the very
values of the feminine. When culture spiritualizes woman
to such an extent that she appears unearthly, then she can
no longer fulfill the role of mother— of giving birth,
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nurturing, and providing shelter and protection. Indeed, 
without a body she loses her capacity to act as an 
independent human agent, becoming instead a static ideal 
removed from the reality of history. With the displacement 
of the maternal function, culture itself loses its vital 
link with the generative processes of the earth. As Brown 
indicates, Pierre eventually rejects his own mother, 
eschewing “the nurture of the maternal breast, for Isabel's 
fare: poverty, anonymity, and finally her 'death-milk,' the 
vial of poison secreted between her breasts 'where life for 
infants lodgeth not'" <149).5
The psychologist Karl Stern has indicated that the 
role of motherhood "is not exhausted with sheltering, 
protection and dependence" (19). From the beginning the 
mother is involved in establishing the child's relation 
with reality:
By the very act of birth she puts us into the world; 
you might almost say that the first encounter with her 
involves being pushed away by her. At birth the 
umbilical cord is severed, and if the mother's love 
for the child is healthy, a gentle process of severing 
continues, not only physically but mentally. The 
mother shows the child that he is not the exclusive 
recipient of her love. She teaches him to share her 
affection with others. She turns his gaze away from 
her. He has to face reality. (19)
That Pierre appears incapable of making this turn is most
obviously the result of the fact that his own mother has
maintained him in a state of dependence and fixation.
5. Brown offers an excellent discussion of the role of 
food in Pierre. See 147-152.
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But it is also caused by his transformation of the object
of his affections into a celestial ideal which, as he puts
it, belongs only to "the regions of an infinite day" (4).
In fact, for Pierre the difference between men and women .is
the difference between the terrestrial and the celestial.
Of course, such a polarized understanding of the relation
between the sexes implies that real communion between them
is impossible. Indeed, for Pierre, it is sacrilegious:
This to be my wife? I that but the other day weighed 
an hundred and fifty pounds of solid avoirdupois;— 1 
to wed this heavenly fleece? Methinks one husbandly 
embrace would break her airy zone, and she exhale 
upward to that heaven whence she hath hither come, 
condensed to mortal sight. I can not be; I am of 
heavy earth, and she of airy light. By heaven, but 
marriage is an impious thing. (58)
It is precisely because he idealizes woman as the wholly
other that Pierre condemns himself to the circle of the
same. Far from being a cover for latently incestuous
desires, his "romanticism" is what makes it impossible for
him— and perhaps to his own ultimate satisfaction— to
escape the self-referential world of Saddle Meadows.
If the world of Saddle Meadows has a feminine aspect,
Melville's narrator indicates— in an account which is
clearly satirical— it is that of the spotless queen whose
purity places her above the reaches of common humanity:
the country is not only the most poetical and 
philosophical, but it is the most aristocratic part of 
this earth, for it is the most venerable, and numerous 
bards have ennobled it by many fine titles. Whereas 
the town is the more plebeian portion: which, besides 
many other things, is plainly evinced by the dirty 
unwashed face perpetually worn by the town; but the
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country, like any Queen, is ever attended by 
scrupulous lady's maids in the guise of the seasons, 
and the town hath but one dress of brick turned up 
with stone; but the country hath a brave dress for 
every week in the year; sometimes she changes her
dress twenty-four times in the twenty-four hours. (13)
There is, of course, something contrived in the version of
femininity which the country presents. In fact, implicit
in this account is a reversal of the conventional wisdom
which suggests that the town is a more artificial mode of
existence than the rural way of life. Whereas, in its
grubby appearance, the town reveals its imperfections for
all to see, the country presents a cosmetic face, a facade
which through daily embellishments offers a veneer of
perfection.
It would be a mistake, however, to regard this 
contrast too literally. The artificial quality which is 
frequently identified with modern urban life can hardly be 
denied. Nor can the rural world be literally understood as 
the locus of a reactionary ideology. But in the world of 
Melville's Pierre, the city and the country are more than 
simple reflections of actual historical realities. For 
Melville, the imperfections of the city make it a symbol of 
the human condition itself. By contrast, the country is 
the symbolic locus of a culture whose defining 
characteristic is the rejection of that condition. The 
world of Saddle Meadows is fatally flawed not because it 
strives for an ideal perfection but, as Lewis Mumford
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indicates, because its aspiration causes it to forsake its
earthly roots:
the effort to concentrate upon an ideal experience, 
that seeks no nourishment through these roots, may be 
quite as disastrous to spiritual growth as the failure 
to push upwards and to rise above the physical bed in 
which these roots are laid. In Pierre, Melville 
explored and followed such a fixation to its 
conclusion: disintegration and suicide. (Herman 
Melville 210)
In fact, the rejection of earthly existence for the sake of 
an ideal one is the characteristic of a culture which has 
become excessively masculine. Pierre's ambitious pursuit 
of the ideal is expressed with Imagery which is distinctly 
phallic: "in the ruddiness, and flushfulness, and 
vaingloriousness of his youthful soul, he fondly hoped to 
have a monopoly of glory in capping the fame-column, whose 
tall shaft had been erected by his noble sires" (8).
As Fred See notes, the memorial which Pierre imagines 
involves "the optimism of a national history, the sanctity 
of a pastoral estate and the tradition for which it stands, 
and, especially, the unbroken sequence of a genealogy whose 
source is ultimately a divine paternity" (77). Perhaps 
most fundamentally, it involves the illusion that man can 
complete himself, that through his own efforts he can 
become a total architecture, a finished construction, that 
he can cap his own "fame-column." (8) The myth which the 
hero ultimately embodies is the myth of ideal selfhood. 
Thus, as Brown observes, Pierre attempts to deny not only
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his relations with those outside his family but with the
family itself:
He marries his "sister" to divest himself of his 
family, including his sister. A sister qua sister 
reminds her brother of parental origins, thereby 
checking the autobiographical fantasy of self- 
generation that subtends the myth of the author.
Incest with the sister, violating sibling relation and 
family law, enables Pierre's renovation of family for 
the establishment of his literary economy, a mode of 
authorship embedded in a self-contained family, in the 
notion of the self as its own family. (159)
What Pierre finally seeks is to become "his own Alpha and
Omega," to "feel himself in himself, and not by reflection
in others" (261).
For Melville, this is a deadly illusion which can only
lead to cultural disintegration. Among Palmyra's ruins, we
are reminded,
is a crumbling, uncompleted shaft, and some leagues 
off, ages left in the quarry, is the crumbling 
corresponding capital, also incomplete. These Time 
seized and spoiled; these Time crushed in the egg; and 
the proud stone that should have stood among the 
clouds, Time left abased beneath the soil. Oh, what 
quenchless feud is this, that Time hath with the sons 
of Men!
As Fred See observes, "the architectural metaphor which 
Pierre's fancy uses to create a structure of the glorified 
self is negated by another voice which reduces the ideal of 
self . . .  to zero" (78). Quite literally, the ruined 
shaft— like the tower of Babel which it resembles— stands 
as a monument to man's illusory hope for self-completion.
In fact, it serves as an appropriate metaphor for the novel
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Itself which makes us witnesses to the apocalyptic 
destruction of a world.
The Foreigner
The term "creolization" has been used by Glissant to
describe the phenomenon of the mixing and blending of
cultures. Glissant makes it clear, however, that he is not 
simply speaking of those cultures usually designated as 
creole:
Creolization as an idea is not primarily the 
glorification of the composite nature of a people; 
indeed, no people has been spared the cross-cultural 
process. The idea of creolization demonstrates that 
henceforth it is no longer valid to glorify "unique" 
origins that the race safeguards and prolongs. . . .
To assert peoples are creolized, that creolization has
value, is to deconstruct in this way the category of 
the "creolized" that is considered as halfway between 
two "pure" extremes. It is only in those countries 
whose exploitation is barbaric (South Africa, for 
instance) that this intermediate category has been 
officially recognized. (140)
Creolization, then, is a generalized phenomenon which
invalidates the notion of racial or ethnic purity. It is a
sign of a reality which the multiplicity of the earth's
peoples hold in common. The mere fact of contact between
cultures implies that at some fundamental level they
possess a shared nature. Thus, whereas racist ideologies
are inherently dehumanizing, the phenomenon of creolization
is a verification of the humanity of the other.
But when that humanity is not recognized— when the
foreigner is not welcomed into the polis— then the other
becomes uncanny and destructive, threatening to undermine
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the very foundations of the world which refuses it. It is
this function which Isabel fulfills in the world of Pierre.
"In the charged atmosphere of Saddle Meadows," Jehlen
indicates, "incest is in suspension, and Isabel is first
the catalyst that causes it to precipitate, then a
surrogate for its enactment" (191). In this fall from
paradise, the "real drama" is "between Pierre and his
godlike (though, perhaps ungodly) parents" (191).
Ultimately, Pierre's yearning for a sister represents
a desire for completion, a desire to supply the "absent
reality" which will render whole the almost total world of
his own self. As Brown observes, "Pierre accepts Isabel as
his sister because she makes the claim most appealing to
his ideal of self-hood,” embodying his hidden fantasy of
removing himself from the family (137). But the face of
Isabel, even before he learns of its identity, serves not
to secure Pierre's identity but to divide it. It was "one
of those faces," the narrator informs us,
which now and then appear to man, and without one word 
of speech, still reveal glimpses of some fearful 
gospel. In natural guise, but lit by supernatural 
light; palpable to the senses, but inscrutable to the 
soul; in their perfectest impression on us, ever 
hovering between Tartarean misery and Paradisaic 
beauty; such faces, compounded so of hell and heaven, 
overthrow in us all foregone persuasions, and make us 
wandering children in this world again. (43)
Thus, Isabel does not supply the "absent reality" for which
the hero yearns. Rather, she unveils the emptiness vaguely
sensed by Pierre at the heart of his existence. Her
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"girlish shriek/' which he first hears in the midst of
merriment at the old spinsters' sewing meeting, affects him
as no human voice had ever done before: "Though he saw not
the person from whom it came, and though the voice was
wholly strange to him, yet the sudden shriek seemed to
split its way clean through his heart, and leave a yawning
gap there" (45). In Isabel, then, all hopes which Pierre
has had for a sister are reversed. In fact, Isabel might
be seen as an agent of reversal— of what Aristotle calls
peripety— because she appears opposite of what Pierre
desires in a sister. While he yearns for someone who can
complete his world, she appears to represent that foreign
influence against which Saddle Meadows has defined itself.
However, as Julia Kristeva states, the foreigner is never
entirely other than ourselves; the foreigner is:
neither the romantic victim of our clannish indolence 
nor the intruder responsible for all the ills of the 
polls. Neither the apocalypse on the move nor the 
instant adversary to be eliminated for the sake of 
appeasing the group. Strangely, the foreigner lives 
within us: he is the hidden face of our destiny, the 
space that wrecks our abode, the time in which 
understanding and affinity founder. (1)
An essentially ambiguous phenomenon, the foreigner suggests
both an identity separate from our own and a hidden aspect
of our own identity.
It is this ambiguity which Pierre finds so perplexing
in the mysterious face which he encounters amidst the
company of the old spinsters:
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What, who art thou? Oh! wretched vagueness— too 
familiar to me, yet inexplicable,— unknown, utterly 
unknown! I seem to founder in this perplexity. Thou 
seemest to know somewhat of me, that I know not of 
myself,— what is it then? . . . Now, never into the 
soul of Pierre, stole there before, a muffledness like 
this! (41)
In his essay, "The Uncanny," to which Kristeva's own
discussion of the foreigner is indebted, Freud shows that
the simultaneous presence of the strange and the familiar—
of the kind which Pierre identifies in the face of Isabel—
is the very mark of das Unheimliche. Indeed, Freud
attempted to demonstrate that this ambiguity was actually
present in the etymology of the German adjective heimllch
and its antonym unheimlich. As Kristeva explains,
a negative meaning close to that of the antonym is 
already tied to the positive term heimllch. "friendly, 
comfortable," which would also signify "concealed, 
kept from sight," "deceitful and malicious," "behind 
someone's back." Thus, in the very word heimllch. the 
familiar and intimate are reversed into their 
opposites, brought together with the contrary meaning 
of "uncanny strangeness" harbored in unheimlich.
(182)
At a literal level, heimllch means homely or belonging to 
the house. Thus Isabel is a figure of the uncanny: she is 
neither wholly separate from nor wholly a part of Pierre's 
ancestral home. She exists on the border, an essentially 
liminal figure who, like a ghost, haunts the world of 
Saddle Meadows without ever fully belonging to it.
For Pierre, the ambiguous quality which marks Isabel 
is confirmed when he discovers that she is his half-sister, 
the illegitimate daughter of his father and a young
Frenchwoman. Once her identity is revealed, he sees in her 
imploring face "not only the nameless touchingness of that 
of the sewing-girl, but also the subtler expression of the 
portrait of his then youthful father, strangely translated, 
and intermarryingly blended with some before unknown, 
foreign feminineness" (112). If Isabel disrupts the 
apparently harmonious world of Saddle Meadows, then, it is 
not because she is entirely separate from it. On the 
contrary, she is a threat because she embodies an unholy 
union between the purity of Saddle Meadows and the 
corruption of the world beyond. Or as Mrs. Glendinning 
puts it, a mixing of "the choicest wine with filthy water 
from the plebeian pool" which eventually turns "all to 
undistinguishable rankness" (194).
It is because she is not wholly other— but both 
strange and familiar— that Isabel threatens to blur the 
strict demarcation which Saddle Meadows has drawn between 
itself and the external world. Conversely, Lucy is 
unthreatening because she is idealized as the other, an 
idealization which makes the consummation of her 
relationship with Pierre impossible. As an entirely 
spiritualized creature, Lucy is at once at a safe distance 
from the world of Saddle Meadows and a projection of its 
most pristine self-image. Isabel, by contrast, "was not of 
enchanted air" but of "mortal lineaments of mournfulness" 
(43). Thus, if the image of Lucy shelters Pierre from the
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knowledge of his own mortality— in fact, Lucy herself
"rather cherished a notion that Pierre bore a charmed life,
and by no earthly possibility could die from her, or
experience any harm, when she was within a thousand
leagues"— the face of Isabel serves as a reminder of a
reality which his world has attempted to deny (22). It is
this capacity which marks her out as a figure of the
uncanny. As Freud indicates, the uncanny "is that class of
the frightening which leads back to what is known of old
and long familiar" (220). If Saddle Meadows is a society
which has attempted to forget the fact of death, Isabel
recalls to it the repressed knowledge of its own mortality.
The contrast between Isabel and Lucy, however, is not
simply a contrast between the real and the unreal. It is
true that those aspects of the feminine which are absent in
Lucy are given expression in the figure of Isabel. If one
is a disembodied creature, removed from her earthly and
bodily roots, the other is a creature of the senses.
However, it is the very sensuality of Isabel which makes
her a figure of death in the eyes of the world of Saddle
Meadows. Indeed, Isabel herself seems to have internalized
this very notion:
Say, Pierre; doth not a funerealness invest me? Was 
ever hearse so plumed?— Oh, God! that I had been born 
with blue eyes, and fair hair! Those make the livery 
of heaven! Heard ye ever yet of a good angel with 
dark eyes, Pierre?— no,no,no— all blue, blue, blue—  
heaven's own blue— the clear, vivid, unspeakable blue, 
which we see in June skies, when all clouds are swept
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by.— But the good angel shall come to thee, Pierre. 
(314)
In fact, both Isabel and Lucy are the symbolic creations of 
a culture which has rejected the qualities of the feminine. 
But while in Isabel those qualities are demonized, in Lucy 
they are excised. In their strict polarity, Melville gives 
us an image of the kind of psychic fragmentation which 
afflicts the society of Saddle Meadows itself, a society 
which has lost its sense of the correspondence between 
earthly and heavenly realities.
The Exile of Pierre
At first glance, the advent of Isabel at Saddle Meadows
seems to offer Pierre an escape route from the closed world
of his own consciousness. As Kristeva remarks,
"uncanniness . . .  is a destructuration of the self" which
may, on the one hand, "remain as a psychotic symptom," but,
on the other, constitute "an opening toward the new, as an
attempt to tally with the incongruous" (188).
With the revelation of Isabel's origin, Pierre
experiences the disintegration of the world of Saddle
Meadows. At the center of that world— serving as its very
linchpin— had been the cherished image of his dead father:
There had long stood a shrine in the fresh-foliaged 
heart of Pierre, up to which he ascended by many 
tableted steps of remembrance; and around which 
annually he had hung fresh wreaths of a sweet and holy 
affection. . . .  In this shrine, in this niche of this 
pillar, stood the perfect marble form of his departed 
father; without blemish, unclouded, snow-white, and 
serene; Pierre's fond personification of perfect human 
goodness and virtue. (68)
As the narrator indicates, some diminution of this kind of 
idealization is brought about in the usual course of the 
child’s progress towards adulthood: "The eye-expanded boy 
perceives, or vaguely thinks he perceives, slight specks 
and flaws in the character he once so wholly reverenced" 
(68). In Pierre's soul, however, the "venerated form” of 
his departed father remains wholly intact until the very 
moment of Isabel's self-revelation. Even the secret 
painting, which contrasts so obviously with the drawing­
room portrait given pride of place by his mother, had not 
effected any change in his heart. The story of the 
portrait's origin and its depiction of the Glendinning 
patriarch as a gay-hearted young bachelor seems to Pierre 
to hint at undisclosed meanings and ambiguities. Yet, "his 
father's beatification remained untouched; and all the 
strangeness of the portrait only served to invest his idea 
with a fine, legendary romance" (85).
Because Pierre's image of his father remains 
untarnished for so long, he experiences the breach between 
the actual and the ideal brought about by Isabel's 
revelation as an "all-desolating and withering . . . blast" 
which "stripped his holiest shrine of all overlaid bloom, 
and buried the mild statue of the saint beneath the 
prostrated ruins of the soul's temple itself" (69).
Although Pierre is dispossessed of his cherished paternal 
ideal, the discovery of his illegitimate half-sister does
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not inspire him to reject his father. On the contrary,
Pierre rebels against his mother for her intolerance of the
illegitimate offspring of Ned and Delly, a peasant couple
who live on the estate, and rejects the worldly-wise
Reverend Falsgrave for his refusal to condemn Mrs.
Glendinning's lack of charity.
Pierre's rejection of these two authority figures
would seem to exile him from the world of Saddle Meadows.
Yet his righteous attitude towards their human foibles only
demonstrates his kinship with them: he is truly the product
of a culture which cannot tolerate the imperfections of
earthly life. Moreover, the break with his mother does not
signify a movement toward a more communal form of
existence, as one might expect. Rather, it marks the
beginning of an isolation more profound than any he has yet
experienced. With the "apparently wholly superegotary
resolution to hold his father's memory untouched," Pierre
decides not to reveal the paternity of Isabel to either his
mother or any living person:
Unrecallably dead and gone from out the living world, 
again returned to utter helplessness, so far as this 
world went; his perished father seemed to appeal to 
the dutifulness and mercifulness of Pierre, in terms 
far more moving than though the accents proceeded from 
his mortal mouth. And what though not through the sin 
of Pierre, but through his father's sin, that father's 
fair fame now lay at the mercy of the son, and could 
only be kept inviolate by the son's free sacrifice of 
all earthly felicity;— what if this were so? It but 
struck a still loftier chord in the bosom of the son, 
and filled him with infinite magnanimities. (177)
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As the narrator implies, Pierre's compassion for his father 
only allows him to foster that sense of his own pure virtue 
which— in his mind— separates him from the rest of men. 
Indeed, since the moment of Isabel's revelation to him, 
Pierre "felt that deep in him lurked a divine 
unidentifiableness, that owned no earthly kith or kin"
(89). If his resolve to defend his father's honor bolsters 
his own self-ideal, it also offers him a rationale for 
entering more fully into the kind of incestuous world which 
he has previously Inhabited at Saddle Meadows. Having 
sworn his "lasting fraternal succor to Isabel," he finds 
that the only way he can fulfill his duty to her is through 
"the nominal conversion of a sister to a wife" (177).
Thus, Pierre's eventual departure for the city with 
Isabel represents not so much a break with the world of 
Saddle Meadows as the inevitable realization of its 
incestuous conditions of existence. In other words, the 
city does not initiate Pierre into a world of alienation; 
rather, it renders complete that with which he was marked 
from the very outset. In Pierre's case, the journey from 
the country to the city does not represent a movement from 
community to isolation. It represents the fulfillment of 
an isolation latent in him at Saddle Meadows. "The nature 
and speed of Pierre's response to X's disruptive note," 
Dryden observes, "makes explicit the status" of those 
"hidden desires" which he has fostered from the beginning:
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In Pierre's mind the note completely undermines the 
dignity and authority of the father and forces him to 
abandon all the "hereditary beliefs" he has been 
unconsciously resisting all along. "I will have no 
more father," he says, as he rejects all "earthly kith 
and kin" and orphan like "stagger[s] back upon himself 
and find[s] support in himself." (79)
But in denying his kinship with the world outside himself,
Pierre is ultimately repeating the deepest impulse of the
closed society which has produced him. At the heart of
Saddle Meadows— and perhaps at the heart of America's
explicit ideal— is the myth of the self-made man.
Thus, although the city is the scene of Pierre's
ultimate self-destruction, it is not the origin thereof.
Even when the city threatens to become an impersonal
system, it remains unmistakably human. As Blanche Gelfant
indicates, the density of urban space makes it impossible
to escape the presence of other bodies: "crowds of total
strangers are herded together in a limited space, forced
into a physical proximity that belies their social
isolation" (25). While at a structural level the city may
appear rigidly stratified, at a street level it denies the
wish for exclusivity: "One shares a few feet of space with
people with whom he may have no shared tradition or common
background" (26). The city confronts one with the broadest
possible spectrum of humanity. While the urban dweller can
mentally refuse contact with others, his physical proximity
to them is a stubborn reminder of their shared nature.
Even if the urban system is dehumanizing, the body of the
208
city remains irreducibly human. As Michel de Certeau
suggests, "urban life increasingly permits the re-emergence
of the element that the urbanistic project excluded" (95).
It is this re-emergence which ultimately transforms the
city into the space of comedy in Crime and Punishment. In
the stinking streets, taverns, and backrooms of Petersburg,
the hero's redemption depends upon his encounters with
others: Marmeladov, Razumikhin and most importantly Sonya.
Saddle Meadows, by contrast, is the locus of tragedy
because it has completely cut itself off from the other.
On account of its utter isolation, the redemption of Saddle
Meadows is impossible.
On Pierre's first night in New York City, the other
confronts him in the form of the corrupt body of humanity:
The sights and sounds which met the eye of Pierre on 
re-entering the watch-house, filled him with 
inexpressible horror and fury. The before decent, 
drowsy place, now fairly reeked with all things 
unseemly. Hardly possible was it to tell what 
conceivable cause or occasion had, in the 
comparatively short absence of Pierre, collected such 
a base congregation. In indescribable disorder, 
frantic, diseased-looking men and women of all colors, 
and in all imaginable flaunting, immodest, grotesque, 
and shattered dresses, were leaping, yelling, and 
cursing around him. . . .  On all sides, were heard 
drunken male and female voices, in English, French, 
Spanish, and Portuguese, interlarded now and then, 
with the foulest of all human lingoes, that dialect of 
sin and death, known as the Cant language, or the 
Flash. (240)
If what Pierre sees in the "combined babel of persons and 
voices" at the watch-house is the very embodiment of the 
earthly city, the sense of utter revulsion which overcomes
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him at that sight marks him as the product of a culture of 
isolation. His rejection of the earthly city— sordid 
though it may be— involves him in a rejection of the human 
condition itself and ultimately leads to his catastrophic 
demise.
Critics of the novel have frequently seen the
prediction of Pierre's end in the pamphlet which he reads
on his journey to New York. According to its author,
Plotinus Plinlimmon, a "virtuous expediency" is "the
highest desirable or attainable earthly excellence for the
mass of men, and is the only earthly excellence that their
Creator intended for them" (214). Moreover, for most men,
"the highest abstract heavenly righteousness is not only
impossible, but would be entirely out of place, and
positively wrong in a world like this" (213).
Many critics of the novel have attributed this view to
Melville himself. Raymond M. Weaver, for example, suggests
that his intent was
to show that the more transcendent a man's ideal, the 
more certain his worldly defeat; that the most
innocent in heart are those most in peril of being
eventually involved in "strange, unique follies and
sins, unimagined before." (98)
Like Weaver, J. W. N. Sullivan argues that Pierre points to
the impossibility of idealism in this life: "The world is a
lie, through and through a lie, is Melville's final
conclusion. In this world it is hopeless to distinguish
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good from evil, or even to know whether there is any
distinction" (433).
At first glance, the fate of Pierre appears to support
these views. However, Melville's narrator warns that
Plinlimmon's lecture "seems more the excellently
illustrated re-statement of a problem, than the solution of
the problem itself" (210). Moreover, the reason he offers
for including the lecture is not that it accurately
foretold the final outcome of Pierre's life but that it may
have influenced it:
Seeing then that this curious paper rag so puzzled 
Pierre; foreseeing, too, that Pierre may not in the 
end be entirely uninfluenced in his conduct by the 
torn pamphlet, when afterwards perhaps by other means 
he shall come to understand it; or, peradventure, come 
to know that he, in the first place, did— seeing too 
that the author thereof came to be made known to him 
by reputation, and though Pierre never spoke to him, 
yet exerted a surprising sorcery upon his spirit by 
the mere distant glimpse of his countenance;— all 
these reasons I account sufficient apology for 
inserting in the following chapter the initial part of 
what seems to me a very fanciful and mystical, rather 
than philosophical Lecture. . . . (210)
At first glance, the content of that lecture resembles the
argument made in The Citv of God. Like Plinlimmon,
Augustine recognizes that a gap exists between earthly and
heavenly existence, between the imperfections of time and
the state of perfect being which is eternity. As Romano
Guardini indicates— in a remark which is Augustinian to the
core— that separation is the mark of history itself: "the
fact remains that as long as we live within the historical
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order, the intended order and the actual order do not
coincide" (83).
But for Augustine, the gap between the two orders is
not absolute; that is, the relation between them is not one
of opposition but of prefiguration and fulfillment. While
earthly existence is clearly not given over to love,
neither is it wholly dominated by selfishness. In fact,
the impure nature of earthly existence— its status as a
mixed reality— makes it a sign of a promised future.
"History," as Guardini writes, "cannot . . .  be its own
fulfillment. It points beyond itself" (83).
Although superficially similar, Plinlimmon*s argument
is actually the reverse of Augustine's. Whereas Augustine
argues that the earthly and the heavenly exist alongside
each other in this world, Plinlimmon argues that the two
realities must be kept entirely separate:
in things terrestrial (horological) a man must not be 
governed by ideas celestial (chronometrical); that 
certain minor self-renunciations in this life his own 
mere instinct for his own every-day general well-being 
will teach him to make, but he must by no means make a 
complete unconditional sacrifice of himself on behalf 
of any other being, or any cause, or any conceit.
(214)
For Plinlimmon, then, man is condemned to act out of self- 
interest in his mortal life. Plinlimmon implies that an 
absolute breach exists between the actual and the ideal 
orders; there is no relation or kinship between the two.
The total absence of love in the world means that it cannot 
present a sign of anything beyond itself. Thus, the
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reality of historical existence/ like Saddle Meadows, is 
essentially a closed system, a wholly self-referential 
world which, from its inception, is finalized and complete.
The content of the lecture is not entirely new to 
Pierre. The disparity between the official portrait of his 
father and the secret one given to him by his aunt has 
already alerted him to the separation between terrestrial 
and celestial realities. Like Plinlimmon, Pierre regards 
that separation as absolute. He recognizes no 
correspondence between the image of his father as a 
fallible human being and the idealized image presented by 
the drawing-room portrait.
While the ostensible purpose of the pamphlet is to 
discourage youthful idealism, its effect on Pierre is 
precisely the reverse. First, it confirms his impression 
that the world is completely given over to self-interest. 
But rather than adjusting his ideals to accommodate this 
reality— as Plinlimmon would apparently have him do—
Pierre ends up rejecting the world itself. It is this very 
rejection which leads to his descent into an abyss of 
disillusion and despair. In Pierre, the narrator suggests, 
we see "the apparent anomaly of a mind, which by becoming 
really profound in itself, grew skeptical of all tendered 
profundities" (354). For in rejecting the world, Pierre 
simultaneously rejects any tangible sign of the very ideals 
to which he has fervently committed himself. In "the utter
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isolation of his soul/" he inhabits that absolute breach 
between the actual and ideal worlds which— in his eyes—  
exists between the two images of his father. Within this 
space, profoundly disconnected from both worlds, Pierre's 
idealism withers and dies.
Pierre's failure is ultimately a failure of 
perception. The blindness which begins to afflict him once 
he reaches the city is not a paradoxical symbol of the 
insight which comes with tragic suffering— as it is for 
Sophocles's Oedipus. His crisis, as recent critics 
suggest, is essentially a crisis of representation. Most 
fundamentally, Pierre cannot see that the earthly city—  
however corrupt and degraded— is a sign of something 
greater than itself. Because it signifies nothing in his 
eyes, Pierre can only experience the city as an earthly 
inferno, a prison from which the only possible escape—  
since the paradisal existence at Saddle Meadows has been 
obliterated— is suicide.
V
THE CITY AND CLIMATE 
Faulkner's Light in August
In the closing pages of Virgil's epic, we find Aeneas 
before Turnus, the leader of the Italian resistance against 
the Trojans. Burning for the fight, he shakes "his heavy 
pine-tree spear" and calls out to his enemy from "his hot 
heart":
Rearmed now, why so slow?
Why, even now, fall back? The contest here
Is not a race, but fighting to the death
With spear and sword. Take on all shapes there are,
Summon up all your nerve and skill, choose any
Footing, fly among the stars, to hide
In caverned earth. (12. 1206-12)
The note which Aeneas strikes is remarkable for its lack of
hesitation. Gone apparently is the reluctance with which
he has often moved to fulfill his duty in the past. This
is not the man who prepared to leave Carthage, his "great
heart" torn by the "moving power" of Dido's pleas, his
tears falling even as he resigned himself to carry out the
will of the gods (4. 620-21). At that moment, Aeneas's
turmoil allowed us to see the humanity of a hero who has
frequently been accused of emotional frigidity. We knew,
then, that he was not cold-hearted.
But now Aeneas's "hot heart" is the very source of the
speed with which he moves to consummate the final victory
over his enemy. Nothing can inhibit him. While at
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Carthage his passions have prevented him from too quickly 
moving to reject Dido, on the Italian battlefield they 
allow him to act directly, without delay. In his actions, 
we see an economy— a terrible efficiency— which makes him 
appear cruel and ruthless. The climate of Aeneas's heart 
has clearly changed since those early days at Dido's court.
In fact, in the battle which precedes their duel, both 
Aeneas and Turnus are likened to "fires begun / On two 
sides of a dry wood, making laurel / Thickets crackle (12. 
708-10). "With no less devastating power," Virgil 
indicates,
Aeneas and Turnus cut their way through battle.
Now with fury rising, now again
With bursting hearts and reckless of defeat,
They spent their whole strength running upon danger. 
(12. 713-17)
Of course, the devastation caused by the fires is a result 
of drought. With the prolonged absence of rain, heat 
easily bursts into flames upon contact with dry vegetation, 
wreaking destruction indiscriminately. But the hot fury of 
the two assailants is the result of an interior rather than 
exterior climate, an aridity which, as K. W. Gransden 
observes, makes them "alike in their destructive power, in 
their violence, in their lack of control" (204). "The 
whole emphasis of the paragraph," he remarks, "is on the 
indistinguishable conduct of the two sides and the two 
leaders" (137).
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The medieval philosophers, Tom Moore reminds us, spoke 
of the "vegetative soul," a "plant psyche" made of those 
"unformed, unmoving, yet living green psychic realities 
beyond reason and beyond self-movement" (42). When it 
become arid, however, the soul's vegetative life withers 
and dies and, as a result, it loses its connection with the 
earth and with its fellow souls. The arid soul is static, 
finalized, no longer capable of becoming. It is this 
climate which seems to characterize the soul of Aeneas in 
this last section of the poem.
By the time the two leaders meet, Aeneas is still 
"blazing" (12. 1289). But Turnus has been abandoned by 
both the goddess Juno and his sister Juturna. As a result, 
he is essentially helpless in the face of Aeneas's wrath. 
Only when he attempts to hurl an enormous stone at his foe, 
however, does he begin to realize the fate which awaits 
him:
as he bent and as he ran 
And as he hefted and propelled the weight 
He did not know himself. His knees gave way,
His blood ran cold and froze. The stone itself, 
Tumbling through space, fell short and had no impact. 
(12. 1226-31)
The cold shudder which runs through Turnus when he sees 
that his strength is gone anticipates the image of his 
dying moments in the poem's closing lines: "all the body 
slackened in death's chill, / And with a groan for that 
indignity / His spirit fled into the gloom below" (12. 
1296-98). Virgil's imagery serves to accentuate the
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radical difference between the conditions of the two men at
this final moment; while the heart of the killer is
overcome with a blazing fury, the chill of death overtakes
the body of his fallen enemy.
As Gransden indicates, however, the dying Turnus
actually recalls our first encounter with Aeneas
when he was cold, tired, frightened and wishing he had
died in Troy. "His limbs were numb with cold,"
soluuntur frigore membra: the allusion here, and in 
the speech which follows, the o terque quaterque 
beati, "o thrice and four times blessed,” is to 
Odvssey 5, where Odysseus is also lost in a storm and 
far from the goal of his nostos. Odysseus wished he 
had died when the Trojans tried so hard to get him 
after Achilles' death. Aeneas wishes he had not 
survived Diomedes' onslaught, and died alongside 
Sarpedon and Hector, deaths closely linked with the 
sage of Achilles' wrath, deaths fated to be reenacted 
in the Italian Iliad. Those words far away in book 1, 
soluunter frigore membra, recur in the last line but 
one of book 12: now they describe Turnus, and the cold 
is not that of the elements, or of a wished for and 
elusive death, but of the thing itself, inescapably 
there. (210)
Of course, that this symbolic link between the two men is 
made immediately after Aeneas sinks "his blade in fury in 
Turnus' chest" makes it a terrible irony (12. 1295). But 
the irony lies not simply in the fact of Turnus's death but 
in the manner in which it is inflicted.
Aeneas has already severely wounded his enemy with a 
spear that flew "Like a black whirlwind bringing 
devastation, / Pierced the cuirass' edge, and passed clean 
through / The middle of Turnus' thigh" (12. 1256-59). As 
Turnus lies on the ground, he raises his eyes and makes a 
final plea to the Trojan leader. In fact, like Virgil in
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the poem’s closing lines, he attempts to draw an analogy
between himself and the man upon whose mercy he depends:
If you can feel a father's grief— and you, too,
Had such a father in Anchises— then 
Let me bespeak your mercy for old age 
In Daunus, and return me, or my body,
Stripped, if you will, of life, to my own kin.
You have defeated me. The Ausonians 
Have seen me in defeat, spreading my hands.
Lavinia is your bride. But go no further 
Out of hatred. {12. 1268-76)
The plea is a powerful one, since it asks Aeneas to imagine
himself in the place not simply of Turnus but of his
father, Daunus. Thus, in this reversal of roles, Turnus
himself becomes the son of the Trojan.
Until he recognizes the swordbelt on Turnus's
shoulder— "the strap / Young Pallas wore when Turnus
wounded him / And left him dead upon the field"— Aeneas
appears to be swayed by his enemy's words (12. 1283-85).
But the sight of the belt, "Shining with its familiar
studs," rekindles his rage (12. 1283). Rather than taking
on the role of Turnus's father, he takes on the role of the
slain Pallas to exact revenge upon the killer: "This wound
will come / From Pallas: Pallas makes this offering / And
from your criminal blood exacts his due" (12. 1294-93).
But Aeneas also occupies the role of Turnus himself: "You
in your plunder, torn from one of mine, / Shall I be robbed
of you?" (12. 1290-91). Just as Turnus robbed the life of
Pallas, Aeneas himself will now kill Turnus. Thus, he
makes the identification which his enemy has been seeking
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from him all along. But there is a deadly symmetry 
involved here which makes it almost impossible for Aeneas 
not to take the life of the man who lies before him. If 
Turnus wants to be seen as son, Aeneas cannot see him as 
anything other than the thief who stole his young friend's 
life.
Aeneas may be a victim of his own strict economy of 
representation. But that economy is fundamentally a 
reflection of his own heart, a heart which has become 
unyielding, which has lost the capacity to alter or modify 
its response to others, which can no longer show mercy.
Yet our sorrow at the end of Virgil's poem is with Aeneas 
as much as it is with the slain Turnus. It is he whom we 
have accompanied on the difficult journey from the lost 
world of Troy. We have seen how "hard and huge / A task it 
was to found the Roman People" and we have seen the 
nobility with which Aeneas has borne the struggle (1. 48- 
9).
The burden which Aeneas has carried for so long 
appears to have exacted the kind of price of which Yeats 
speaks: "a stone of the heart." The final images of the 
poem— Aeneas's deadly spear, the rim of sevenfold shield 
which takes the blow, the shining studs of Pallas's belt, 
the blade which sinks into Turnus's chest— suggest a 
hardness which makes them metonyms of the hero's heart.
For Aeneas, the experience of exile has involved a process 
of Interior growth, a state of becoming which Rome requires 
for its realization. But now, as he stands on the verge of 
a new beginning, he is characterized by a finality, a 
rigidity which seems to contradict everything he has so far 
learned on his passage from Troy. It is as if the burden 
of history has hardened him, as if he has not been able to 
take its blows and remain open and vital. Perhaps this is 
not altogether surprising, since he has had to contend not 
simply with the obstacles posed by nature but by those 
presented by the gods themselves. Apparently, it has all 
been too much for one man.
Dry Towns
"Dry September," a short story published by Faulkner in 
1930, presents many of the themes and concerns which are 
developed more fully in the novel Light in August, 
published two years later. At the heart of the story is a 
false rumor about an assault upon a white woman by a black 
man. The woman, Minnie Cooper, is an obvious anticipation 
of the novel's Joanna Burden, the middle-aged New England 
spinster who lives for some years with Joe Christmas before 
losing her life to him. Like Joanna, she is a symbol of 
sterility. A once "slender nervous" girl with "a sort of 
hard vivacity," she now wore a "bright, haggard look" and 
"went out in the evenings only with women, . . . neighbors, 
to the moving pictures (174-75). Unlike Joanna, though,
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Minnie is never actually assaulted. Her rape, as Eric 
Sundquist indicates, "is clearly suggested to be a product 
of her own diseased imagination" (84). Minnie also 
prefigures Lena Grove in her violation of the town's strict 
social code. Minnie "had been relegated into adultery by 
public opinion" twelve years earlier as a result of her 
relationship with a local bank cashier, "a widower of about 
forty" (174-75). Her alleged rapist, Will Mayes, is a 
version of Joe Christmas. Mayes too becomes the town's 
scapegoat, eventually ending up in the hands of a crazed 
lynch mob which kills him and dumps his body in a vat of 
deep water.
Even more interesting than these analogues, however, 
is the preponderance of images of aridity which occur 
throughout the story.1 At the start, we hear that the 
alleged incident occurs after a long period of drought—  
"sixty-two rainless days"— and that the rumor "had gone 
like a fire in dry grass. . . . Something about Miss Minnie 
Cooper and a Negro" (169). The absence of rain has 
produced a lifeless atmosphere in the town. In the barber 
shop— the initial setting of the story— "the ceiling fan 
stirred, without freshening . . . the vitiated air,"
1. Gail Mortimer notes this in her book Faulkner's 
Rhetoric of Loss: "The portions of the story dealing with 
Will Mayes's murder and the passionate hatred leading up to 
it are saturated with references to the atmosphere (dry, 
rainless, dusty, suffocating) and to sweating, blood, 
intense smells, choking and ubiquitous dust" (55-6).
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sending back upon the men of the town "their own stale 
breath and odors" (169). The men, gathered there to talk 
about the rumor, have— with the exception of Hawkshaw, the 
barber— arbitrarily decided that Will Mayes is the rapist. 
In fact, one of them speculates that the drought itself may 
have caused his action: "It's this durn weather. . . . It's 
enough to make a man do anything. Even to her" (170).
Later, we find Hawkshaw walking "swiftly up the 
street where the lights, insect-swirled, glared in rigid 
and violent suspension in the lifeless air" (175). It is 
now evening, the day having "died in a pall of dust" (193). 
As he walks, Hawkshaw overtakes a group of men— some of 
whom were at his shop earlier that day— as they prepare to 
seek out Will Mayes. He is hailed and eventually pressured 
into riding with them. After the car stops at the iceplant 
where Mayes works, "there is no sound save their lungs as 
they sought air in the parched dust in which for two months 
they had lived" (177).
Once seized, Mayes is driven outside the town 
to an "abandoned brick kiln— a series of reddish mounds and 
weed and vine-choked vats without bottom" (179).
Recognizing the purpose of the journey, Hawkshaw jumps out 
of the car after a brief struggle: "The impetus hurled him 
crashing through dust-sheathed weeds, into the ditch. Dust 
puffed about him, and in a thin, vicious crackling of 
sapless stems he lay choking and retching" (179). We never
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witness the murder itself. "Unlike Light in August.11 
Sundquist observes, "the crisp power of ’Dry September* 
derives from Faulkner's not depicting the 'attack' or the 
lynching but dwelling instead on the surrounding actions"
(170n).
John B. Vickery argues that the story is "an ironic
rendering of the primitive scapegoat ritual" (202). In
ritual societies, he indicates,
the choice of victim was based on all the religious, 
social and scientific knowledge possessed by man; a 
catastrophe affecting existence itself— such as 
drought or blight— demanded immediate and drastic 
remedies. The contemporary crisis, on the other hand, 
involves only society's mores, not its struggle for 
physical survival. And not only is the occasion 
intrinsically less significant, but there is even the 
likelihood that it has not actually taken place. In 
short, unlike primitive man, who could actually see 
the disaster he was seeking to remove, "none of them 
gathered in the barber shop . . . knew exactly what 
had happened." (202-3)
In fact, the drought itself is more real than the alleged
incident. But since the purpose of the scapegoating is to
defend the town's honor— particularly that of its white
women— and not to dispel the bad weather, the meaning of
the drought motif in the story still needs to be clarified.
Most obviously, it provides the narrative with a kind
of mythic backdrop, linking the social world of Faulkner's
South with the ritual societies of the ancient past. But
as Mortimer suggests, it also presents an image of human
limitations:
The 'dust to dust' imagery of the Bible that reminds 
us of our ultimate mortality and the vanity of those
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distinctions that seem so important to us in life 
serves a similar function here by counterpointing the 
prejudice, hypocrisy, and violence— all based on the 
illusion of distinctions, of boundaries— that make up 
the story. (56)
But there is even more to it than this. If as an emblem of
physical death the drought serves as a counterpoint to the
false consciousness of the townspeople, as an emblem of
spiritual death— or dryness— it encompasses their very
condition. John McLendon, the leader of the lynch mob, is
himself characterized in terms of aridity: "in his frothy
beard he looked like a desert rat in the moving pictures"
(170). As he and the other men await Hill Mayes, we are
told that "where their bodies touched one another they
seemed to sweat dryly, for no moisture came" (177).
Vickery notes that "traditionally the scapegoat was
beaten by the warrior priests who sought to prevent or
dispel vegetative infertility such as drought" (201). In
Faulkner's story, by contrast, Will Mayes's scapegoating is
precisely a sign of a society which has itself become arid
and infertile. The scapegoating, in other words, is merely
the ultimate manifestation of a social disease rather than
its cure.
The nature of that disease can be seen to a lesser 
extent in the treatment of Minnie Cooper. As Vickery 
notes, "she is the scapegoat in a minor key and suffers its 
rites in a more 'civilized' form." Moreover, the "ratio­
nale for her election to the role is social rather than
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racial" (201). We are told that she "was of comfortable 
people— not the best in Jefferson, but good people enough" 
and that "she was still on the slender side of ordinary 
looking" (173-74). Because she was vivacious, she was able 
"for a time to ride upon the crest of the town's social 
life as exemplified by the high school party and church 
social period of her contemporaries while still children 
enough to be unclassconscious" (174). But as the children 
grew older, they began "to learn the pleasure of snobbery—  
male— and retaliation— female" (174). Minnie herself was 
the last to recognize their changed attitude towards her.
It was only when one evening at a party "she heard a boy 
and two girls, all schoolmates, talking" that she under­
stood that she was no longer one of them (174). As a 
result, she never accepted another invitation. Her "ritual 
punishment and expulsion," as Vickery remarks, is verbal 
instead of physical" (201).
The difference between moisture and aridity— as 
spiritual states— can be seen in the changed attitude of 
Minnie's contemporaries toward her. As children, they have 
yet to be initiated into the rigidly stratified world of 
Jefferson. Thus, they have no sense that Minnie is in any 
way their social inferior. But if as children their 
attitudes are essentially fluid and open, as young adults—  
when they begin to take up their own predetermined roles in 
the society's structure— their responses undergo a process
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of hardening, an atrophication. As a result, they come to 
see Minnie not as their equal but as other than themselves. 
This transformation reaches its apex when— as an adult—  
Minnie is relegated to the status of adulteress by the very 
peers who accepted her when she was a child.
McLendon, the leader of the lynch mob, presents the 
most vicious form of the kind of closed consciousness which 
seems to characterize the townspeople of Jefferson. When 
Hawkshaw suggests that Will Mayes was not actually the 
attacker, "McLendon whirled upon him his furious rigid 
face" (190). It is the representative face of a town which 
is grounded not in the values of community— of openness 
toward the other— but in a set of strictly defined social 
demarcations. The alleged assault of Minnie Cooper is the 
most serious violation of this structure because it 
transgresses the always already fraught distinction between 
black and white. The act of miscegenation is understood as 
the ultimate threat to a society which has come to define 
itself by its own difference from the racial other. In 
fact, the scapegoating of Will Mayes has the paradoxical 
effect of placing Minnie Cooper back at the center of her 
society, as the symbol of pristine white womanhood. In the 
light of the more serious— albeit imagined— violation of 
racial boundaries, her own transgressions are forgotten.
The same reintegration is accorded Joanna Burden after 
her death at the hands of Joe Christmas. Like Minnie,
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Joanna has lived in Jefferson as an outcast— in her case—  
because of her work on behalf of the oppressed black 
population. In fact, it is her advocacy of this cause that 
seems to lead her— perhaps at an unconscious or intuitive 
level— to befriend Joe Christmas in the first place. Their 
secret relationship would be a scandal to the townspeople. 
But once Joanna is murdered, she undergoes a metamorphosis 
from outcast to victim, "supplying the town at last with an 
emotional barbecue," an outlet for its own deep-seated need 
to see the reenactment of the scapegoat ritual (289).
The horrible castration of Joe Christmas toward the 
end of the novel indicates that his worst crime— like the 
alleged one in "Dry September"— is not murder but 
miscegenation. After Percy Grimm flings back "the bloody 
butcher knife," he announces: "Now you'll let white women 
alone, even in hell" (464). But Joe Christmas is clearly a 
more complex and developed symbol than Will Mayes, about 
whom we actually hear very little. Most obviously, 
Christmas actually commits the crime of which he is 
accused. His guilt, however, is not simply a matter of 
personal sin. More fundamentally, it indicates that 
Christmas is not outside the structure which has made him 
its scapegoat. In his criminal status we are given a sign 
of his own complicity in the very society which has 
victimized him.
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Unlike Will Mayes, of course, Christmas is assumed to 
have mixed blood, as Joe Brown— his cabin mate— eventually 
convinces the men of the town after the murder of Joanna 
Burden. On the one hand, this is another sign of 
Christmas's entanglement with white society. On the other 
hand, it makes him the symbol of the very reality which 
most threatens that society. Not only in his relationship 
with Joanna Burden but in his actual person, Christmas 
embodies the transgression of the strict racial demarcation 
upon which the social order of Jefferson has based itself. 
"Being neither black nor white," Donald Kartiganer 
observes,
Christmas is doomed to indefiniteness. And yet he is 
more than blankness. On the one hand he is. a life, a 
structure, a single character— difficult yet visible, 
lacking the clarity of Hightower and Lena and Joanna, 
yet capable of being summoned up in our minds by the 
words "Joe Christmas." On the other hand, he is the 
disorder that lives always at or near the surface of 
Light in August, the chaos of mixed bloods that brings 
forth from the life of Jefferson an inevitable 
violence. (10-11).
But if Jefferson cannot admit the mixture which Joe
Christmas represents, neither can Christmas himself. In
fact, the deeply stratified character of the town finds its
most profound symbol in the fragmented consciousness of the
scapegoat. What ultimately makes Christmas significant, as
Andre Bleikasten observes, "is not at all his supposedly
mixed blood, but his divided self, for it is through the
splitting of his psyche . . . that he comes to stand as a
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starkly truthful symbol of the tensions and contradictions 
of Southern society" (51).
The final act of Joe Christmas before he murders 
Joanna Burden is to visit the two sections of the town.
He goes first to the white section which is mostly empty of 
people:
He went on, passing still between the homes of white 
people, from street lamp to street lamp, the heavy 
shadows of oak and maple leaves sliding like scraps of 
black velvet across his white shirt. Yet though he 
was not large, not tall, he contrived somehow to look 
more lonely than a lone telephone pole in the middle 
of a desert. In the wide, empty, shadowbrooded street 
he looked like a phantom, a spirit, strayed out of its 
own world, and lost. (114)
More usually a symbol of communication, in this instance
the telephone pole indicates Joe's utter isolation from
those around him. Indeed, Carolyn Porter suggests that Joe
"constitutes one of the most alienated men in modern
literature" (73). That the pole is in the desert is a sign
of the aridity of the social world which he ultimately
represents. There is no fertile ground from which he can
begin to reintegrate his own self. Even if the telephone
pole were replanted in fertile soil, it could not take root
like a tree. Christmas, of course, is often identified as
an analogue of Christ, who experienced his own exile in the
desert. But whereas Christ is the Tree of Life, Joe is a
lifeless tree, incapable of accepting nourishment from
either the earth, the human community, or even— one is led
to wonder— the divine. As Byron Bunch recognizes, "there
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was something definitely rootless about him, as though no 
town nor city was his, no walls, no square of earth his 
home" (31).
If Christmas senses that there is no place for him in
the white community, he feels equally alienated when he
visits the black section of the town:
He was standing still now, breathing quite hard, 
glaring this way and that. About him the cabins were 
shaped blackly out of blackness by the faint, sultry 
glow of kerosene lamps. On all sides, even within 
him, the bodiless fecundmellow voices of negro women 
murmured. It was as though he and all other manshaped 
life about him had been returned to the lightless hot 
wet primogenitive Female. He began to run, glaring, 
his teeth glaring, his inbreath cold on his dry teeth 
and lips, towards the next street lamp. (115)
Among the cabins of the black people, Christmas is
confronted with the reality which he seems to fear most—
the generative qualities of the feminine. Whereas he is
characteristically arid— his teeth and lips are dry— the
bodies of the women are moist.
"Moistening in dreams," the depth psychologist James
Hillman suggests, "refers to the soul's delight in its
death, its delight in sinking away from fixations in
literalized concerns" (152). To enter water "relaxes one's
hold on things and lets go of where one has been stuck"
(152). But this kind of self-abandonment is something
which Christmas appears incapable of realizing in his own
life. In his rigidity— also suggested in the image of the
telephone pole— he represents the town's prevailing
reality, its atrophied structure of social distinctions.
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Perhaps the most profound sign of Joe's alienation is
his hatred of his foster mother, Mrs. McEachern. His
rejection of her is a rejection of the most fundamental
human connection and the one in which all the others find
their prototype— the bond between mother and child. In
contrast with the brutality which her husband shows Joe,
she "had always tried to be kind to him" (165). However,
her attenuated body is a sign her own displacement within a
body politic which places little value on the kind of
acceptance which she accords her foster son: "she had been
hammered stubbornly thinner and thinner like some passive
and dully malleable metal, into an attenuation of dumb and
frustrated desires now faint and pale as dead ashes" (165).
Joe's own treatment of her is yet another blow to her
already beaten self.
When he first arrives at the McEachern household, she
attempts to bathe him:
Kneeling before him she was trying to take off his 
shoes, until he realized what she wanted. He put her 
hands away and removed the shoes himself, not setting 
them onto the floor though. He held to them. She 
stripped off his stockings and then she fetched a 
basin of hot water, fetching it so immediately that 
anyone but a child could have known that she must have 
had it ready and waiting all day probably. He spoke 
for the first time, then. "I done washed just 
yesterday," he said. (166)
"Contact with water," as Eliade observes, "always brings a
regeneration— on the one hand because dissolution is
followed by a new birth, on the other hand because
immersion fertilizes and multiplies the potential of life"
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(Sacred 130). For Joe, however, rebirth is impossible
because he cannot allow the old self to be dissolved, to be
washed away by the purifying waters which his foster mother
attempts to bestow upon him. When he holds onto his shoes,
he is refusing to let go of the brutalized existence which
he has led up to this point.
In fact, Joe appears to prefer the kind of strict
justice which McEachern metes out to him to the mercy shown
him by his wife:
He was used to that before he ever saw either of them. 
He expected no less, and so he was neither outraged 
nor surprised. It was the woman: that soft kindness 
which he believed himself doomed to be forever victim 
of and which he hated worse than he did the hard and 
ruthless justice of men. "She is trying to make me 
cry," he thought, lying cold and rigid in his bed, his 
hands beneath his head, moonlight falling across his 
body, hearing the steady murmur of the man's voice as 
it mounted the stairway on its first heavenward stage; 
"She was trying to make me cry. Then she thinks that 
they would have had me." (169)
It is precisely Joanna Burden's misguided attempt to save
Christmas— as his foster mother had earlier done— that
causes him to kill her: "She would have been all right if
she hadn't started praying over me. It was not her fault
that she got too old to be any good any more. But she
ought to have had better sense than to pray over me" (106).
Joe's refusal of both her and his foster mother is a
refusal of any external influence upon his own life, and
ultimately of the possibility of redemption itself.
Joe Christmas is at once the scapegoat and the symbol
of the social order of Jefferson. According to Rene
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Girard, the purpose of the scapegoat ritual is to put an 
end to the reciprocal violence which breaks out when the 
crucial distinctions upon which society is founded 
disintegrate— the crisis of non-differentiation: "The 
sacrificial process prevents the spread of violence by 
keeping vengeance in check" (IB). However, as Sundquist 
remarks, Christmas "is no more selected to die as a way of 
warding off further violence than he is, in his death, able 
to do. The violence continues to spread— in the lives of 
the novel and in Faulkner's novels of the next twenty 
years" (93).
Joe Christmas becomes Jefferson's scapegoat because he 
is the ultimate threat to the system of distinctions upon 
which its social structure is based. He embodies the 
disease of miscegenation. But for Faulkner, the disease is 
not the fact of Joe's impure blood but the societal 
structure which attempts to rigidly maintain the 
distinction between pure and impure in the first place.
The disease, in other words, is the sacrificial mentality 
itself, a mentality which can only conceive of society as a 
structure founded on the arbitrary creation of a victim.
As a scapegoat, Joe does not represent the panacea which 
will restore the town's self-identity. Rather, his own 
psychic fragmentation makes him a persistent sign of the 
sickness which exists at its heart. It is to another 
outsider, Lena Grove, that Faulkner looks for the cure.
City Expected
Like Joe Christmas, Lena Grove is an outcast from society, 
her illegitimate, unborn child a violation of its strict 
sexual mores. Both characters literally embody the reality 
which has set them apart from their communities— in Joe's 
case his blood and in Lena's her child. Only Lena's body, 
however, presents a visible sign of her transgression.
When her brother finds out that she has been leaving the 
house at night, "he remarked her changing shape, which he 
should have noticed some time before" (6). Paradoxically, 
Lena does not attempt to hide "her swelling and 
unmistakable burden" as she moves along her route to 
Jefferson (9). Twelve miles outside the town, two farmers, 
Armstid and Winterbottom, spot her passing in the road: 
"They saw at once that she was young, pregnant, and a 
stranger. 'I wonder where she got that belly,'
Winterbottom said" (9).
Joe Christmas has perhaps less reason to hide himself 
than Lena does, since his supposedly mixed blood does not 
manifest itself in his outward appearance. In fact, it is 
only when they hear his name that the other workers at the 
mill take notice of him, "as though there was something in 
the sound of it that was trying to tell them what to 
expect; that he carried with him his own inescapable 
warning, like a flower its scent or a rattlesnake its 
rattle" (33). Despite the augur, however, "none of them
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had sense enough to recognize it," assuming that he was
just "a foreigner" (33).
Nevertheless, Joe keeps a strict distance from the
other men, living an essentially anonymous existence on the
furthermost border of society. In contrast with the
garrulousness of Brown, he
still had nothing to say to anyone, even after six 
months. No one knew what he did between mill hours. 
Now and then one of his fellow workers would pass him 
on the square down town after supper, and it would be 
as though Christmas had never seen the other before.
He would be wearing then the new hat and the ironed 
trousers and the cigarette in one side of his mouth 
and the smoke sneering across his face. No one knew 
where he lived, slept at night, save that now and then 
someone would see him following a path that came up 
through the woods on the edge of town, as if he might 
live out that way somewhere. (35-36)
The difference between Joe and Lena, however, is not simply
that Lena's identity is visible whereas Joe's is hidden.
Rather, the very mark of Joe's identity— much more than his
mixed blood— is his invisibility. It is the most outward
sign of the profound alienation which strikes at the core
of his being. Virginia V. James Hlavsa observes that like
Christ, Christmas lives for many years "in obscurity" (22).
But Joe's obscurity is not a preparation for a public life
spent in the service of others. His invisibility is a
scar, the sign of a deep psychological wound which— sooner
or later— will surface in the fatal violence inflicted upon
Joanna Burden.
The paradox of Lena Grove is that while she bears the
visible mark of her transgression, she is essentially
236
unmarked— or more properly, unscarred— by the society which 
has rejected her. While it has marked her out, she— unlike 
Christmas— does not bear its mark within herself. In fact, 
her visibility is precisely a sign that her sufferings have 
not alienated her from others. Although physically 
separated from the community, she remains, in some sense, 
at one with them.
"Her face," we are told, "is calm as stone, but not 
hard. Its doggedness has a soft quality, an inwardlighted 
quality of tranquil and calm unreason and detachment" (18). 
It is her invisible life— her inwardlight— which has 
prevented Lena's visible appearance from hardening, from 
taking on the rigidity which characterizes Joe Christmas. 
She also contrasts with the brother who calls her whore:
"He was a hard man. Softness and gentleness and youth (he 
was just forty) and almost everything else except a kind of 
stubborn and despairing fortitude and the bleak heritage of 
his bloodpride had been sweated out of him" (6). Despite 
her rejection, Lena retains the hope which her brother has 
lost, even insisting that the absent father of her child, 
Lucas Burch, will eventually send for her: "unshakable, 
sheeplike, having drawn upon that reserve of patient and 
steadfast fidelity upon which the Lucas Burches depend and 
trust, even though they do not intend to be present when 
the need for it arises" (6).
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In fact, the absence of Lucas Burch seems to have no 
reality for Lena. She can only foresee his imminent 
return. Although Lucas never marries her, her hope is, 
however, validated by Byron Bunch who, upon Lena's 
appearance, falls instantly in love. The world which Lena 
inhabits is a world founded not on loss but on the hope of 
its ultimate fulfillment. It is an expectant world and 
Lena herself, of course, is its very symbol. The visible 
mark of her transgression is not finally a stigma but a 
sign of new life, a life which she brings to a world which 
desperately requires regeneration.
The moment of the novel is a moment of anticipation. 
Its central events occur in August, calendrically the 
eighth month of the year and the threshold of fall. But 
for Lena it is the ninth month of pregnancy, marking not 
the end of the growth which began in spring but the onset 
of a new spring, the birth of a child. Thus, Lena carries 
over— translates— the moistness of spring to what might 
otherwise be a dry September.
In the face of its own downward spiral, the town sees 
its only recourse to be the ritual scapegoating of Joe 
Christmas. But Joe's death merely completes another 
revolution of the cycle of violence which threatens to 
extinguish the life of the community. Joe himself is 
caught within this cycle: "But I have never got outside 
that circle. I have never broken out of the ring of what I
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have already done and cannot ever undo" (339). In the 
figure of Lena Grove, Faulkner reveals the counter-movement 
to entropy. She holds within herself the always awaited 
city, a city founded not on the sacrifice of the other but 
on the substance of things hoped for.
Conclusion
Toward the beginning of Light in August. Lena Grove is 
likened to "something moving forever and without progress 
across an urn" (7). As Louise Cowan observes, the urn 
image, which is taken from Keats's ode and which occurs in 
several of Faulkner's works, is "frequently interpreted 
. . . as representing a temptation to a platonic stasis, 
ideal and beautiful but far removed from life, implying, 
indeed, a rejection of life because of mortal imperfection" 
("For Ever" 79). Cowan, however, argues that "the image is 
for Faulkner one of intense vitality, inclusive of the 
whole of 'motion,' consequently, holy, alive" (79). It is 
this motion which Lena herself embodies. Far from standing 
for an eternal stasis, her movement from Doane's Mill, 
Alabama to Jefferson, Mississippi and beyond is an image of 
life itself.
For archaic man, as we have seen, life is conceived of 
in essentially static terms. As Eliade observes, it is 
"reduced to the repetition of archetypical acts, that is, 
to categories and not to events, to the unceasing rehearsal 
of the same primordial myths" (Cosmos 86). It "does not
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bear the burden of time, does not record time's 
irreversibility; in other words, it completely ignores what 
is especially characteristic and decisive in a 
consciousness of time" (86). For Lena, by contrast, life 
is essentially a movement, "swollen, slow, deliberate, 
unhurried and tireless as augmenting afternoon itself"
(10). Moreover, while to others she appears burdened, she 
herself is entirely unconscious of bearing the weight of 
time. For her, "the evocation of far is a peaceful 
corridor paved with unflagging and untranguil faith and 
peopled with kind and nameless faces and voices" (7).
From the point of view of archaic cultures, Lena is a 
sign of contradiction. If archaic man rejects history 
because it appears to involve a falling away from the 
purity of origins, an irreversible process of corruption 
and decay, she has entered into time and yet appears to 
retain the freshness of beginnings. As Cowan notes, Lena 
"is essentially virginal, even if she does bear with her on 
her journey the evidence of her maternity" (79). Unlike 
Aeneas, who at the end of his journey appears to succumb to 
atrophication, she maintains the open and fluid disposition 
which we see in her from the start.
For Lena, time is not a relentless succession of 
moments which leaves her dislocated within the present, 
separated from past and future. Although she lives in 
anticipation of a promised event, she remains rooted in the
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things of this life. Most obviously, she appears connected 
to the earth itself, while at the same time continually 
moving across it: "When she felt the dust of the road 
beneath her feet she removed the shoes and carried them in 
her hand" (6-7). Unlike Joe Christmas, whose shoes seem to 
insulate him from reality, Lena takes pleasure in the 
immediacy of the earth's surface.
But perhaps her most vital connection is with others, 
a connection which Lena feels despite her society's 
rejection of her. When she first meets Byron Bunch she 
tells him
more than she knows that she is telling, as she has 
been doing now to the strange faces among whom she has 
travelled for four weeks and with the untroubled haste 
of a change of season. And Byron in his turn gets the 
picture of a young woman betrayed and deserted and not 
even aware that she has been deserted. . . . (52)
Lena, as Byron suggests, seems fundamentally unaware that
she is alone in the world with her child. However, this is
not a naive misconception on her part. Rather, Lena
recognizes, at a deeply intuitive level, a fundamental
aspect of human existence: that it is always a coexistence.
Her journey is "peopled" by others upon whom she depends
for food, shelter and human kindness: "she had got along
all right this far, with folks taking good care of her"
(506). If we judge her by the ideal of self-sufficiency,
then she seems infantile, not yet attuned to the harsh
realities of adult existence. But if we recognize the
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falsity of that ideal, then she embodies the spirit of 
community.
Although Lena holds new life for Jefferson, she 
represents a reality which is inimical to that which seems 
to prevail in the city itself. The cities of our time, in 
particular, seem to be places which militate against the 
growth of communal life. They appear precisely as anti­
communities, as spaces in which men are alienated from each 
other, where isolation is the only possible mode of 
existence. It is this reality which Raskolnikov, Pierre 
and Joe Christmas embody. But it is also a reality which 
is reflected in a long tradition of myths which suggest 
that the origins of the city are murderous. The cities of 
Cain and Romulus and are founded on the bodies of slain 
brothers. Thus, from the beginning they are divided from 
themselves, worlds which have their source in the desire 
for power rather than the need for community. For 
Augustine, they are versions of the earthly city; "the 
quarrel that arose between Remus and Romulus demonstrated 
the division of the earthly city against itself; while the 
conflict between Cain and Abel displayed the hostility 
between . . . the City of God and the city of men" (15. 5).
The works of cultural theorists like Freud, Levi- 
Strauss and Girard are essentially descriptions of the 
mechanisms which operate at the heart of the earthly city.
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They depict the city as a structure of prohibitions and 
strictures designed to curb man's instinct for aggression 
and self-satisfaction. As subtle and powerful as it is, 
this body of work tends to assume that man is driven 
exclusively by self-love, that he is incapable of the kind 
of communal existence which Lena Grove holds out for 
Jefferson. If we accept this view of man, then, we accept 
that he can only inhabit a world which oppresses and 
perhaps ultimately destroys him.
The novelists which I have discussed in this study lay 
bare that world at the point of its ultimate realization, 
allowing us to see all its deadly consequences. But it is 
precisely their knowledge of the totality of man— of his 
ontology— that allows them to expose the false structures 
which oppress him. It is that knowledge, Milan Kundera 
suggests, which has led the novel since the beginning of 
modernity "to scrutinize man's concrete life and protect it 
against the 'forgetting of being'; to hold 'the world of 
life' under a permanent light" (5), Without that light, 
the writer can only imitate the closed worlds within which 
man lives divided from himself and others. By that light, 
the poet envisions man writ large and the embodied worlds 
that are always motioning toward Jerusalem to be born.
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